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ABSTRACT 
There is much dialogue in the global aviation industry about Safety 
Management Systems (SMS) and how it should be integrated across all 
domains of the industry including aircraft design, production, flight operations, 
overhaul and maintenance, suppliers, service providers, airports, and so forth 
(Johnson, 2012). 
Regulators have made significant progress in recent years to implement ICAO’s 
SMS into airlines, albeit as a required or recommended practice. More recently 
the regulators are seeking to implement SMS into the aircraft manufacturing 
and aircraft maintenance domains. 
This research reviewed regulatory publications from multiple countries to 
assess the technical makeup of SMS, and understand what regulators are 
requiring, or recommending, and when. It was found that global regulators 
accept the ICAO published definition of SMS, but different regulators have 
varying approaches regarding implementation. However, they are consistent in 
initially targeting airlines for SMS implementation. SMS comments range from 
“The best thing since sliced bread” to “Worst thing since the creation of the 
FAA; I don’t need anyone telling me what’s safe when I already know it; waste 
of time and money”. 
This investigation experimented with field tests to connect the engineering, 
production and airline domains into one ICAO SMS model. Results indicate that 
because the different domains are risk-specific, the application of one safety 
risk management model to all domains is not viable. The SMS model applies to 
airlines because airlines’ primary risk is about operational safety. Aircraft 
production and maintenance is about production risk – therefore the risk model 
must be centric to process risk. Field test 3 tailored the ICAO SMS risk 
architecture to assess and mitigate process risk as applicable to the aircraft 
manufacturing and maintenance. Although the SMS architecture was usable, 
the content and focus was significantly adjusted to be production process-risk 
centric, to the point where the term “SMS’ was deemed out of place. The 
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resulting model was therefore named Production Risk Management System 
(PRMS). 
Following the emergence of PRMS from field tests, this investigation reviewed 
industry, research and regulatory arguments for and against SMS in the airline 
industry, and correlated those arguments with the benefits and non-benefits of 
PRMS for the manufacturing and aircraft maintenance domains. 
The researcher advocates PRMS as a viable model that meets ICAO SMS-like 
architecture for aircraft production and maintenance. Methods were identified 
for developing and implementing PRMS, and for evaluating its ROI. If and when 
“SMS” is truly mandated in these domains, the researcher proposes PRMS as a 
viable model that should be considered. Furthermore, the researcher proposes 
that PRMS can be an effective production risk management system that can 
enhance the organization’s existing QMS, regardless of “SMS” regulations. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Human factors, reactive, proactive, risk, assessment, regulatory, EASA, IATA, 
FAA, CAA, ICAO, JCAB, MRO, AMO, rulemaking, aviation, nuclear, Quality 
Management Systems (QMS), ISO9000, ISO9001, production, culture, 
transportation, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Obeya, hazard, 
assurance, aviation, airframer. 
 
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This research was supported in part by the engineering, QMS and production 
departments of a large commercial aircraft manufacturer. The time, resources, 
and multiple investigations that yielded the third field test are sincerely 
appreciated. It was a pleasure to collaborate with such a group of dedicated 
professionals, who helped place the foundation for the methodology that 
became named by this paper as PRMS. 
Furthermore, my appreciation extends to Professor Graham Braithwaite and 
Cranfield University staff. Their attention to supporting this research, 
notwithstanding the challenges of long-distance / overseas communication and 
coordination is invaluable. 
Finally, I owe a very special thank you to my family and friends. They stood 
back on many occasions while my nose remained buried in this computer 
screen, and were ignored while I stayed focussed on “production risk”. With this 
research concluded, I look forward to spending time doing “normal” things and 
showing my children that I really can watch a football game, and do something 
other than research and write. 
  
 
DISCLOSURE 
This thesis and conclusions are solely the work and observation of the 
researcher. The researcher does not represent in any manner the policies, 
positions or opinions regarding or related to SMS, held by any person, 
company, agency or entity affiliated with the researcher for the purpose of this 
thesis. 
 
 i.  
 
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................... i 
KEYWORDS ....................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................... iii 
DISCLOSURE .................................................................................................... iii 
Glossary ............................................................................................................. ix 
1.0 Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 
1.1 SMS Background ...................................................................................... 1 
1.2 SMS Context and the Aviation Industry .................................................... 2 
1.3 Research Objectives ................................................................................. 5 
1.4 Research Methodology ............................................................................. 6 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis .............................................................................. 9 
2.0 Composition of Industry and Regulations .............................................. 12 
2.1 Why Investigate SMS in the Aviation Industry? ...................................... 12 
2.2 General Overview ................................................................................... 15 
2.3 Alignment with multiple US 14 CFRs ...................................................... 16 
2.4 U.S. Alignment with multiple governments’ CFRs ................................... 17 
2.5 U.S. Government  / FAA / JPDO ............................................................. 18 
2.6 Eurocontrol ............................................................................................. 19 
2.7 ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) .............................................. 19 
2.8 ICAO State Letter AN 12 / 52 / 1-08 / 70 ................................................. 23 
2.9 FAA Order VS 8001.1; SMS Doctrine ..................................................... 24 
2.10 FAA Order 8000.367; SMS Requirements ............................................ 26 
2.11 FAA Order 8000.368; Guidance for AFS Staff ...................................... 26 
2.12 FAA SMS – Request for Comments ..................................................... 27 
2.13 FAA 14 CFR Part 5 – Safety Management Systems ............................ 28 
2.14 Transport Canada SMS ........................................................................ 30 
2.15 Regulations Amending CARS ............................................................... 31 
2.16 CAR Part I – Subpart 6 ......................................................................... 32 
2.17 CAR Part I – Subpart 7 ......................................................................... 32 
2.18 EASA’s view on SMS ............................................................................ 34 
2.19 UK CAA ................................................................................................ 34 
2.20 Regulatory Observation ........................................................................ 35 
3.0 Methodology .......................................................................................... 38 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 38 
3.2 JPDO membership.................................................................................. 38 
3.3 Review of SMS regulations (U.S. and global) ......................................... 38 
3.4 Executive management charter / sponsorship ........................................ 39 
3.5 Production commodity and Integrated Product Team (IPT) .................... 39 
3.6 IPT initiation ............................................................................................ 40 
3.7 Workshops and production process walk data ........................................ 41 
 i.  
 
3.8 Data assimilation..................................................................................... 42 
3.9 Field tests and evaluation ....................................................................... 43 
3.10 Review of industry progress .................................................................. 43 
4.0 Field Tests ............................................................................................. 44 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 44 
4.2 Quantification of risk ............................................................................... 45 
4.3 Field Test 1: EPA .................................................................................... 46 
4.3.1 Engineering, Production and Airline Data ......................................... 46 
4.3.2 Risk Assessment and Tolerability Matrices ...................................... 49 
4.3.3 Field Test 1 Assessment .................................................................. 52 
4.4 Field Test 2: OPA.................................................................................... 53 
4.4.1 Production and Airline Data .............................................................. 53 
4.4.2 Risk Assessment and Tolerability Matrices ...................................... 55 
4.4.3 Field Test 2 Assessment .................................................................. 57 
4.5 Field Test 3: OD ...................................................................................... 57 
4.5.1 Production Data ............................................................................... 57 
4.5.2 Risk Assessment and Tolerability Matrices ...................................... 60 
4.5.3 Field Test 3 Assessment .................................................................. 63 
4.6 Evaluation of Field Tests ......................................................................... 63 
5.0 ICAO and Production Risk Management System (PRMS) Model .......... 67 
5.1 Component 1: Production Risk Policy ..................................................... 70 
5.1.1 Element 1 – Management commitment and responsibility ............... 70 
5.1.2 Element 2 – Production accountabilities ........................................... 71 
5.1.3 Element 3 – Appointment of key production personnel .................... 72 
5.1.4 Element 4 – Coordination of emergency PR response planning ...... 73 
5.1.5 Element 5 - PRMS documentation ................................................... 73 
5.2 Component 2: Production Risk Management ......................................... 74 
5.2.1 Element 6 – Aircraft Production hazard identification ....................... 75 
5.2.2 Element 7 – Production Risk assessment and mitigation ................. 81 
5.3 Component 3: Production Risk Assurance ............................................. 88 
5.3.1 Element 8 – Production performance monitoring and 
measurement ............................................................................................ 91 
5.3.2 Element 9 – Management of change................................................ 94 
5.3.3 Element 10 – Continuous Improvement of the PRMS ...................... 97 
5.4 Component 4: Production Culture Management ................................... 100 
5.4.1 Element 11 – Training and education ............................................. 102 
5.4.2 Element 12 – Production communication ....................................... 103 
5.5 Summary of PRMS Model .................................................................... 105 
6.0 Discussion and Evaluation of PRMS ................................................... 107 
6.1 Risk Management in High-Risk Domains .............................................. 107 
6.1.1 Aircraft Production Risk Mgmt is not Airline Safety Risk Mgmt ...... 107 
 i.  
 
6.1.2 Type of Risk - Process versus Safety............................................. 108 
6.1.3 Approach to Managing Type of Risk .............................................. 109 
6.1.4 Regulatory Considerations ............................................................. 110 
6.1.5 Risk Management Design .............................................................. 110 
6.1.6 Standards and Procedures ............................................................. 111 
6.1.7 Safety and Process Training .......................................................... 111 
6.1.8 Incident Reporting and Investigation .............................................. 112 
6.2 PRMS and the Manufacturing Domain .................................................. 112 
6.3 PRMS and the Maintenance Domain .................................................... 115 
6.3.1 Reducing Risk in MROs ................................................................. 115 
6.3.2 Integration of the MRO Domain ...................................................... 117 
6.3.3 PRMS and MRO Regulations ......................................................... 119 
6.4 PRMS Implementation, Assessment and Value ................................... 121 
6.4.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 121 
6.4.2 Implementation ............................................................................... 123 
6.4.3 Assessment .................................................................................... 125 
6.4.4 Value .............................................................................................. 127 
6.5 PRMS Maturity ...................................................................................... 128 
6.6 Further Considerations ......................................................................... 130 
6.6.1 Systemic SMS ................................................................................ 130 
6.6.2 SMS Standstill ................................................................................ 131 
6.6.3 SMS... Boom or Bust? .................................................................... 132 
6.7 PRMS Liability ...................................................................................... 134 
7.0 Current Status of FAA SMS Regulations ............................................. 137 
7.1 SMS Voluntary Pilot Project .................................................................. 137 
7.2 Final FAA Rule ...................................................................................... 140 
7.3 SMS Manufacturing and MRO Pilot Project .......................................... 142 
8.0 Conclusions ......................................................................................... 143 
9.0 References and Bibliography ............................................................... 148 
Appendix A - Joint Planning Development Office ....................................... 157 
Appendix B – Air Transport Association Chapters (ATA) ............................ 158 
Appendix C – Production Culture Assessment ........................................... 160 
Appendix D - Alaskan Region (AAL) ........................................................... 161 
Appendix E - Central Region (ACE) ............................................................ 162 
Appendix F - Eastern Region (AEA) ........................................................... 163 
Appendix G - Great Lakes Region (AGL).................................................... 164 
Appendix H - Northwest Mountain Region (ANM) ....................................... 165 
Appendix I - Southern Region (ASO) .......................................................... 166 
Appendix J - Southwest Region (ASW) ...................................................... 167 
Appendix K - Western Pacific Region (AWP) .............................................. 168 
 
 i.  
 
Table of Figures  
Figure 1-1. Airplane Lifecycle Domains .............................................................. 6 
Figure 2-1. Industry Domain Certificates that Influence the Manufacturer ........ 13 
Figure 2-2. The Four ICAO SMS Components ................................................. 20 
Figure 4-1. Airplane Lifecycle SMS Data Management .................................... 45 
Figure 4-2. Portion of EPA FMEA ..................................................................... 47 
Figure 4-3. E Input for EPA FMEA ................................................................... 48 
Figure 4-4. P Input for EPA FMEA ................................................................... 48 
Figure 4-5. A Input for EPA FMEA ................................................................... 49 
Figure 4-6. Field Test 1: Risk Assessment Matrix ............................................ 50 
Figure 4-7. ICAO Risk Tolerability Matrix ......................................................... 50 
Figure 4-8. Field Test 1: EPA FMEA ................................................................ 51 
Figure 4-9. Portion of OPA FMEA .................................................................... 54 
Figure 4-10. O Input for OPA FMEA ................................................................. 54 
Figure 4-11. P Input for OPA FMEA ................................................................. 54 
Figure 4-12. A Input for OPA FMEA ................................................................. 55 
Figure 4-13. Field Test 2: Risk Assessment Matrix .......................................... 55 
Figure 4-14. Field Test 2: OPA FMEA .............................................................. 56 
Figure 4-15. Portion of OD FMEA .................................................................... 59 
Figure 4-16. O Input for OD FMEA ................................................................... 59 
Figure 4-17. D Input for OD FMEA ................................................................... 60 
Figure 4-18. Field Test 3: Risk Assessment Matrix .......................................... 61 
Figure 4-19. Field Test 3: OD FMEA ................................................................ 62 
Figure 4-20. Comparison of Field Test Results ................................................ 66 
Figure 5-1. PRMS Architecture ......................................................................... 69 
Figure 5-2. ICAO Risk Assessment Matrix ....................................................... 83 
Figure 5-3. PRMS Risk Assessment Matrix...................................................... 83 
Figure 5-4. ICAO Definitions of Probability (applied unaltered to PRMS) ......... 83 
Figure 5-5. PRMS Definitions of Severity ......................................................... 84 
 i.  
 
Figure 5-6. ICAO Risk Tolerability Matrix (applied unaltered to PRMS) ........... 85 
Figure 5-7. ICAO SMS Definitions of Severity .................................................. 86 
Figure 5-8. PRM-PRA Functional Relationship ................................................ 90 
Figure 5-9. PRMS Plan-Do-Check-Act ............................................................. 98 
Figure 5-10. Organizational Culture ............................................................... 104 
Figure 6-1. Scale Development of PRMS Evaluation ..................................... 126 
Figure 6-2. PRMS Cost Risk Assessment Matrix ........................................... 128 
Figure 6-3. Production Risk using James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model ..... 128 
Figure 7-1. SMS Implementation Levels ........................................................ 138 
Figure 7-2. SMS Development Chart ............................................................. 139 
Figure 7-3. U.S. Participation of Voluntary SMS Pilot ..................................... 140 
Figure 8-1. Airplane Lifecycle Risk Management ........................................... 145 
 
 
 
 
 i.  
 
Glossary  
AMO 
ANPR 
AP 
A&P 
ARC 
ASAP 
ASIAS 
ATC 
ATOS 
ATO 
AFS 
AVS 
Approved Maintenance Organization 
Advanced Notice of Public Rulemaking 
Airline Risk 
Airframe and Powerplant 
Aviation Rulemaking Committee 
Aviation Safety Action Program 
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing 
Air Traffic Control 
Air Transportation Oversight System 
Air Transport Association 
Flight Standards Service 
Administration (FAA) Aviation Safety 
CAA 
CASA 
CFR 
CASO 
C of A 
CI 
Civil Aviation Authority 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
Code of Federal Regulations 
Commercial Air Service Operations 
Certificate of Airworthiness 
Continuous Improvement 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
ERMS 
FAA 
HF 
Engineering Risk Management System 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Human Factors 
IATA International Air Transport Association 
IP Installation Plan 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
ICAO 
IFPPF 
INSAG 
IPT 
IT 
International Civil Aviation Organization 
Instrument Flight Procedure 
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group 
Integrated Product Team 
Integrated Technology 
ISO 
JCAB 
International Organization for Standardization 
Japanese Civil Aviation Bureau 
JPDO 
MEDA 
MR&O 
MTBF 
Joint Planning and Development Office 
Maintenance Error Decision Aid 
Maintenance Repair & Overhaul 
Mean Time Between Failures 
NGATS 
NCR 
Next Generation Air Transport System 
Non-Conformance Report 
 i.  
 
NPRM 
NRC 
NRR 
ORM 
Notice of Proposed Rulemkaing 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
Operational Risk Management 
PA Production Assurance 
PC Production Certificate 
PCM Production Culture Management 
PDCA Plan-Do-Check-Act 
PMA 
PR 
PCM 
Parts Manufacturer Approval 
Production Risk 
Production Culture Management 
PRMP Production Risk Management Panel 
PRMD Production Risk Management Document 
PRMDM Production Risk Decision Memo 
PR Production Risk 
PRM Production Risk Management 
PRMS Production Risk Management System 
QA Quality Assurance 
QC Quality Control 
QMS Quality Management System 
RM 
RPN 
ROI 
Risk Management 
Risk Priority Number 
Return On Investment 
SA Safety Assurance 
SARPS 
SME 
Standards and Recommended Practices 
Subject Matter Expert 
SMM 
SMS 
Safety Management Manual 
Safety Management Systems 
SMS PP 
SPC 
SR 
SMS Pilot Project 
Senior Policy Committee 
Safety Risk 
SRM Safety Risk Management 
TC Type Certificate 
TEM Threat and Error Management 
  
 
  
 1 
1.0 Introduction 
1.1 SMS Background 
SMS is a term that has various definitions subject to the person or organization 
using it. Generally it is interpreted as applying a quality management approach 
to control safety risks. Similar to other management functions, safety 
management requires planning, organising, communicating and providing 
direction. Some definitions are concise such as the FAA’s and ICAO’s, while 
others are lengthier and include reference to organizational culture. However, 
SMS categorization and intent across industries is consistent. Whether applied 
to nuclear, chemical, marine, aviation, or others – SMS has become a 
methodology that is recognized by practitioners as an industry practice that 
some would argue is an industry standard closely allied with organizational 
QMSs. While high-level SMS definitions are universally consistent, the technical 
details and implementation strategies that constitute a functioning SMS vary 
subject to the industry. It is these details that cause philosophies of what SMS is 
to vary. Some high-level descriptions are as follows: 
“A businesslike approach to safety. It is a systematic, explicit and 
comprehensive process for managing safety risks. As with all management 
systems, a safety management system provides for goal setting, planning, and 
measuring performance. A safety management system is woven into the fabric 
of an organization. It becomes part of the culture, the way people do their jobs” 
(LaFlamme, 2001). 
“SMS is an organized approach to managing safety, including the necessary 
organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures” (ICAO, 
2006). 
 “An SMS provides a systematic way to identify hazards and control risks while 
maintaining assurance that these risk controls are effective” (FAA, 2009). 
“For the purposes of defining safety management, safety can be defined as the 
reduction of risk to a level that is as low as is reasonably practicable. There are 
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three imperatives for adopting a safety management system for a business – 
these are ethical, legal and financial” (Karuppasamy & Venkadesh, 2011). 
 “A Safety Management System is the most effective way to improve safety in 
any aviation organization (operators, manufacturers, maintenance providers, air 
traffic control, training providers, etc). It is a systemic approach to managing 
safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, 
policies and procedures. In other words an SMS assures that an aviation 
organization is organized, structured and clearly documents and implements all 
the aspects necessary to be effective in the operational environment” (Fuentes, 
2012). 
1.2 SMS Context and the Aviation Industry 
The Three Mile Island accident was a partial nuclear meltdown which occurred 
in one of the two Three Mile Island nuclear reactors in Dauphin County, 
Pennsylvania, United States, on March 28, 1979 (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2013). It was the worst accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power 
plant history, and resulted in the release of radioactive gases and radioactive 
iodine into the environment (Walker, 2004). Questions were subsequently 
asked such as “Why did we not foresee the problem before it became an 
accident?” “Can a methodology be developed that could predict the likelihood of 
an issue within the organization and proactively make adjustments to avoid 
prospective incidents and accidents?” Human factors became a key aspect of 
understanding and quantifying risk, in conjunction with the culture of the 
organization. 
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) investigation stated 
that “The one theme that runs through the conclusions we have reached is that 
the principal deficiencies in commercial reactor safety today are not hardware 
problems, they are management problems” (Rogovin, 1980). Later, the NRC 
established the Division of Human Factors Safety in the Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the Human Factors Branch within the Division of 
Risk-Analysis in the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. These branches 
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became responsible for addressing human factors issues in operator licensing, 
procedures, human-systems interface, training, staffing, and management. 
The term “safety culture” came about after the Chernobyl nuclear power-plant 
accident in 1986. The ensuing investigation concluded that the management 
attitude was a significant contributor to the chain of events leading to the 
accident (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992). INSAG stated in 
its post-accident report that “The vital conclusion drawn is the importance of 
placing complete authority and responsibility for the safety of the plant on a 
senior member of the operational staff of the plant.” INSAG went on to name 
safety culture among the fundamental management principals along with the 
responsibilities of the operating organization and the provision of regulatory 
control and verification of safety-related activities. 
The Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents brought attention to the need 
for a form of systemic risk management that is predictive, proactive, non-
punitive, repeatable, has executive management accountability, and is centric to 
safety culture - all aspects that over subsequent years became cornerstones of 
SMS philosophy and architecture. As SMS became defined and formalized, 
other areas adapted the philosophy including the maritime industry   
(International Maritime Organization, 1993), and railway companies in 2001 
under Transport Canada (Bourdon, 2011). 
In the mid 1990s the FAA along with other aviation regulatory bodies worldwide 
took note of SMS philosophy. They recognized the value of SMS as a 
methodology that could reportedly predict the likelihood of a risk event and 
proactively made adjustments, rather than taking the decades-old reactive 
approach of primarily mitigating after an incident or accident investigation. In the 
late 1990s ICAO and the FAA began considering SMS for CFR Part 121 airlines 
(Larson, 2010). Although the reactive method for improving safety was shown to 
be effective, there was still a need for a method or system that would help 
identify latent conditions to accidents before they actually occurred. In order to 
support the implementation of this new approach to the management of safety, 
the ICAO Safety Management Systems (SMS) program was launched in 2004 
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(ICAO, 2009). Since then SMS has been consumed with varying degrees of 
success and has become a recognized term across the aviation industry. Now, 
as aviation SMS moves closer to regulatory mandate, debates continue that 
while recognizing the intent of SMS, deliberate over all aspects including how to 
implement the architecture, how to manage the data, and what SMS ROI 
benefits are, or are not (Collogan, 2011). 
A central argument is that many or all features of SMS are already embedded 
within an airline’s traditional QMS, and organizing into an SMS structure may be 
redundant (Burchell, 1 May 2011). Aside from discussions about the operational 
practicality and implementation costs, SMS is generally recognized as beneficial 
to airline operational safety management and to their business/economic model. 
For example, Civil Aviation Authority, United Kingdom in 2004 recognized the 
value of a safety management system as “the systemic management of risks 
associated with flight operations, related ground operations and aircraft 
engineering or maintenance activities to achieve high levels of safety 
performance” (Gill & Shergill, 2004). Notwithstanding the pro and con debates, 
SMS has become an aviation industry standard that is part of administrative 
oversight – albeit required or voluntary depending on the state regulator. 
Although airlines have varying views of SMS, in recent years its prospective 
integration with aircraft manufacturers’ and MROs’ has received increasing 
regulatory attention. If a path is taken that is similar to airline SMS 
implementation, ICAO will issue a Standards Recommended Practices 
(SARPS) stating that manufacturers “shall establish and maintain an SMS that 
is appropriate to the size and complexity of the operation” (National Business 
Aviation Association (NBAA), 2014). As with airline SMSs, some state 
regulators may implement SMS for manufacturers and MROs ahead of others, 
which would become a source of concern for countries and business 
enterprises that are not yet ready for such change.  
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1.3 Research Objectives 
Now that SMS is taking hold with airline regulators, the aviation industry at large 
is considering how SMS can be implemented across the entire airplane lifecycle 
- from cradle to grave. In addition to airline operations, this encompasses 
aircraft manufacturing, and aircraft maintenance and repair (Prentice, 2013). 
This research investigates the ongoing conversations and challenges of 
applying SMS philosophy to said manufacturing and MRO domains of the 
airplane lifecycle [Figure 1-1]. 
Discussions of SMS in the aviation industry have been ongoing for several 
years, but dialogue of its application to the production and MRO domains is 
more recent. The airline domain generally embraces SMS as another tool for 
improving safety, and one may anticipate manufacturers as seeing it as one for 
improving production risk. Doug Carr, FAA  says there appear to be three 
camps that emerge regarding SMS: (1) “Love it; best thing since sliced bread; 
can’t get enough,” (2) “Not sure if I need it, but we’ll do it because we can’t face 
the question from the boss about why [some country] won’t let us in and (3) 
“Worst thing since the creation of the FAA; I don’t need anyone telling me 
what’s safe when I already know it; waste of time and money” (Collogan, 2011). 
It is likely that similar camps will emerge with manufacturers and MROs as SMS 
becomes targeted for these domains. 
Doug Car stated that ICAO adopted SMS language in 2008 “as a leading edge 
concept that a lot of people just weren’t ready for yet …. And as a result it will 
most likely be many years before countries and aircraft manufacturers adopt 
some form of SMS with its inherent complexities. But as a community practice, 
airlines’ QMSs are 80-90% toward an SMS. The difference between where 
airlines’ SMSs and QMSs are, and where they need, to be is probably pretty 
small” (Collogan, 2011). The aviation industry anticipates significant growth in 
the amount of flying in upcoming years, and SMS is seen as a proactive 
methodology to lower the accident rate. Conversely, manufacturers will need to 
increase production rate to support the growth – and a form of SMS is arguably 
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a proactive tool to support production rate increases while further managing 
production risk. 
This research explores key questions of SMS application with manufacturers 
and maintainers: Safety of flight can directly impact people. Manufacturers 
produce airplanes but manufacturers do not fly airplanes – so should SMS 
reside exclusively with the airlines? Is there a direct correlation between a 
production risk event and an in-service airline risk that one holistic airplane life-
cycle SMS architecture can capture? Can SMS airline domain architecture and 
philosophy apply to, or be tailored, to the aircraft production domain? Just as 
airline QMSs are 80-90% toward an SMS – is a manufacturer’s QMS already 
very close to an SMS? If so, is “SMS” redundant in the production environment? 
If SMS does not fit the production domain, can some form of SMS be tailored to 
fit – and if so – would SMS purists contend that it is not really SMS and it should 
take on a different and more applicable production-centric title? 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Airplane Lifecycle Domains 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
This thesis is supported by an examination of aviation regulatory and industry 
developments and philosophies, field tests within an aircraft manufacturing 
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company, and the researcher’s career of over twenty-five years of employment 
with airlines and aircraft design and manufacturing companies. 
In 2007 a commercial aircraft caught fire and exploded after landing and taxiing 
to the gate area. All 157 passengers escaped, and 4 people (three from the 
aircraft and one ground crew) sustained injuries. Fortunately there were no 
fatalities. Subsequently an FAA inspector asked if airline SMS methodology, if 
applied to the aircraft production domain, could have prevented the accident. 
The inspector’s question is central to the research methodology. 
To address this question the researcher investigated data flow from the 
manufacturer’s QMS and the airline’s QMS to identify potential data 
correlations. The existing regulated QMSs both in the manufacturing and airline 
domains are robust, having been in place for decades. There are multiple safety 
and process filters within airline operations, and multiple production control 
procedures and filters within aircraft manufacturing systems. 
To evaluate if and how existing data may be organized into an “SMS” format, 
the researcher gained a charter from executive management at an aircraft 
production company. The charter provided for an IPT to support research of 
how SMS may or may not enhance the existing production QMS. 
Before field tests took place, the researcher initiated the IPT with overviews of 
SMS concepts and talked about how SMS methodology correlates data 
intelligence with human factors input. An overview of all production datastreams 
was reviewed, and the researcher hypothesized that this existing quantitative 
data coupled with qualitative human factors information from production line 
mechanics may support an SMS-like model. 
Quantified production datastreams are currently incorporated with the QMS, 
while qualitative human factors information about aircraft build practices is less 
formulated. To enhance human factors information, the researcher selected the 
fuel systems installation commodity and organized “process walks” with the 
commodity mechanics. This required a close relationship with production 
personnel and supervisors. Questions were asked of mechanics in a 
 8 
constructive non-threatening manner, and expeditiously so as not require 
unreasonable time. Relationship building with production personnel was 
essential in order to gain trust and continued support, and mechanics were 
added to the IPT. 
SMS requires a repeatable process, and initially production process walks were 
based on the Obeya model. However, this model did not provide adequate 
focus for a specific commodity type, so standard process walk questions were 
established by the IPT. Human factors inputs were based on process walk 
observations and correlated with existing production data, as a function of the 
specific production commodity. 
A FMEA matrix was selected to associate information from the domain types – 
i.e. engineering, production and airline. SMS defines risk as a function of the 
likelihood of a negative event and the severity of that negative event 
manifesting. With inputs from Engineering (E), Production (P) and Airline (A) 
data in a FMEA matrix, the researcher experimented with a resulting Risk 
Priority Number to represent lifecycle EPA risk. 
Iterative field tests were conducted to evaluate the value and practicality of 
linking the aircraft lifecycle domains into one FMEA matrix. The third field test 
provided data specific to the manufacturing domain that was then transcribed to 
SMS architecture. Given that the data was exclusively production-centric, the 
model was named PRMS, and the details of PRMS were developed. 
PRMS as an SMS-like system was benchmarked against regulatory and 
industry SMS implementation challenges, and a conclusion was drawn as to 
whether or not SMS is applicable to aircraft manufacturing. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter lays out the setting for the research. It introduces SMS as defined 
by various industries, and provides an oversight of its origins and makeup, and 
how it adapted into the aviation business. It introduces arguments for and 
against SMS as applicable to different domains of the aviation industry. 
Chapter 2: Composition of Industry Regulations 
The key objective of Chapter 2 is to assess global SMS regulations that have 
been and are taking place, and understand how state regulators are responding 
to them. Beyond reviewing the regulatory push, this chapter identifies the SMS 
definition that is globally recognized by the aviation industry, and thereby 
establishes a baseline SMS description for this research. The ICAO definition is 
accepted by regulators globally. ICAO requires member states to implement 
SMS with airlines, and is moving towards requiring it of all domains of the 
airplane lifecycle at some future time. The objective of Chapter 2 includes the 
review ICAO’s Safety Management Manual (SMM) and SMS architecture, and 
State regulator’s responses to ICAO’s SMS goals. The chapter reviews the 
complexity of implementing SMS from a regulatory perspective, including the 
Notice of Public Rulemakeing (NPRM) process that the FAA uses to gain 
industry comments ahead of implementing a significant requirement. The review 
includes regulators such as the FAA, UK CAA, Transport Canada, and CAR. By 
seeking to understand the composition of the industry, the foundation for this 
research is laid. 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter describes the approach that is taken for field tests. It includes an 
overview of the researcher’s membership with the U.S. JPDO organization that 
aligns U.S. aviation SMS policy with ICAO SMS definition, and by gaining first-
hand knowledge of the JPDO forum the researcher seeks to ensure that field 
tests are copasetic and consistent with the technical aspects and risk definitions 
that are embedded in SMS architecture [Appendix A]. The chapter describes 
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the charter, from executive management of an aircraft production company, to 
engage an IPT. The IPT was used to experiment with methods for assessing an 
SMS model that prospectively connects the three domains of the aircraft 
lifecycle, then for just the production and airline domains, and finally to assess 
production risk exclusively within the production system using SMS-like 
architecture. 
Chapter 4: Field Tests 
This chapter begins with a review of what a single point of failure is within a 
production system, and within an airline. It provides definition of what a holistic 
airplane lifecycle SMS is, and introduces ICAO’s method for quantifying risk as 
a function of the Likelihood of the risk taking place, and the Severity of that risk 
if left unchecked – or manifesting. The chapter lists by job title the members of 
the IPT, and describes the 3 field tests and results. 
Field Test 1 experiments with identifying a single point of failure (or risk) with 
engineering-to-production-to airline data using SMS-like architecture.  
Field Test 2 experiments with identifying a single point of failure with production-
to-airline data using SMS-like architecture. 
Field Test 3 experiments with identifying a single point of failure exclusively with 
production system data using SMS-like architecture. 
The Field tests are evaluated to determine if an SMS architecture can be used 
for the production system, and if the architecture should be revised (relative to 
pure SMS) to focus on the type of risk that is exclusively a function of the 
production system. The term PRMS is created to describe a system that 
identifies production risk (PR) within a manufacturing domain, and that is in the 
context of SMS-like architecture. 
Chapter 5: ICAO and Production Risk Management System (PRMS) Model 
Chapter 5 evaluates each detail of the SMS’s architectural components and 
elements, and translates them into PRMS context. By establishing a PRMS 
definition for each of the elements, the research seeks to create a repeatable 
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model that can be used for PR with aircraft manufacturers and maintainers, and 
that uses ICAO-style risk assessment and risk tolerability matrixes. 
Chapter 6: Discussion and Evaluation of PRMS 
This chapter evaluates why an unaltered SMS does not fit into a production 
domain. It looks at definitions of process risk versus safety risk, and how types 
of risk should be assessed. The chapter reviews industry literature that supports 
the concept of an overall airplane lifecycle SMS, and reviews literature that 
opposes it given that the risk types are different. A PRMS implementation 
strategy is developed and assessed by benchmarking against SMS 
implementation strategies, as is a conceptual assessment of PRMS 
implementation costs and benefits, and potential liabilities. 
Chapter 7: Current Status of FAA SMS Regulations 
Chapter 7 revisits the FAA’s position with SMS to compare where its regulations 
are now, relative to were the FAA was when this research began. The chapter 
shows reviews the mandate for airlines to have Part 5 SMS in place by 
05/12/14. Over recent years, 94% of Part 135 and 121 air carriers participated 
in a voluntary SMS implementation. Knowing that the FAA would at some point 
mandate SMS, the carriers did not want to be caught flat-footed when the 
mandate finally came through. Conversely data shows that only 0.3% of MRO 
facilities have participated in voluntary SMS. And given that it took many years 
for SMS to be mandated with airlines, maintenance organizations and MROs 
may expect a similar time span before a similar mandate is applied to them. 
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
This chapter provides a summary of the thesis. It addresses the effectiveness of 
the research methodology and suggests further areas for study. It considers 
areas of research that were most challenging, and how my initial thoughts 
aligned with research. 
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2.0 Composition of Industry and Regulations 
2.1 Why Investigate SMS in the Aviation Industry? 
SMS refers to a managed system that proposes to overarch and integrate all 
safety activities in the industry. It is arguably applicable across all domains that 
include predominant aircraft manufacturers such as Boeing and Airbus, large 
airlines, regional carriers and small private operators, small and large aircraft 
maintenance providers, and suppliers of all types, size and complexity. “The 
requirement for SMS is aimed at every enterprise touching aviation, from 
manufacturers to aircraft operators, FBOs and maintenance shops” (Larson, 
2010). Beyond general acceptance of what SMS is, can be or should be, there 
is variance in the philosophy and details of SMS composition, and if it can in 
practicality be applied across all domains in its purest form. 
Aircraft manufacturers, commercial airline operators, MROs and aviation 
regulators are not uniform in their interpretation, implementation and rulemaking 
of SMS. For example, Transport Canada currently requires airframers to 
implement SMS under (Transport Canada, 2003). Other regulators such as the 
FAA have yet to require 14 CFR Part 25 airframers to implement an SMS, but 
the FAA does require SMS of airlines under its jurisdiction. The FAA applies 
ATOS as its tool to gather maintenance and flight operational data for oversight, 
which is also used to verify the effectiveness of airlines’ SMSs. If SMS is 
applied to manufacturers one may then question if ATOS (an airline-derived 
assessment tool) should be modified to encompass aircraft production. 
Major airline operators hold a “Part 121” certificate. Implementing SMS into this 
one domain has a clear boundary – flight operations. However, some operators 
also hold a “Part 145” certificate which allows them to maintain their own (and 
or other operators’) aircraft. In such cases the airline enterprise has two 
different domain-types to manage – flight operations and maintenance 
operations. SMS implementation becomes convoluted since the two domain 
types have different, but overlapping, primary functions. Regulators struggle 
with the application of SMS with airlines that include the Part 145 certificate in 
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terms of how to apply SMS that is architected around flight safety into an 
organization that also includes maintenance, and how to integrate and interface 
the two different primary functions within that one business enterprise. 
The question becomes more convoluted for manufacturers of large commercial 
airplanes who hold multiple certificate types. Manufacturers such as Boeing and 
Airbus hold Part 21 certificates that regulate their primary function – aircraft 
production. But due to a business environment that has become increasingly 
integrated, such manufacturers are directly and indirectly influenced and 
regulated by other certificates such as Part 91 (Aircraft Operations / Flight Test), 
Part 141 (Training), Part 145 (MR&O), and Part 121 (Scheduled Passenger 
Service Operations). These certificate types overlap and interface with the 
manufacturers’ primary business, and complicate the process of defining and 
implementing one SMS into aircraft manufacturing enterprises [Figure 2-1]. 
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Figure 2-1. Industry Domain Certificates that Influence the Manufacturer 
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Airline operators, manufacturers, maintainers and service providers are referred 
to as high-risk industries, or high-risk domains (Grote, 2012). The safety 
literature for high-risk industries is dominated by studies involving large 
machine-bureaucratic organizations, such as nuclear and chemical industries, 
often with very considerable investment. Civil aviation, on the other hand, has 
generally received less focus, yet few industries can rival the growth, 
introduction of new technologies, and increase in complexity that the civil 
aviation industry has experienced over the past years, and will experience in the 
future (Shin, 2005). The civil aviation industry can be described as a complex 
system of overlapping socio-technical systems embedded within a highly 
competitive business environment, where safety is a primary, but not the only, 
goal. It is an arrangement of interfacing systems where external actors can 
obscure or mask system deficiencies that can lead to the development of latent 
conditions (Lofquist, 2010). 
This research explores the feasibility of an aircraft production-centric SMS 
model to meet the generally accepted ICAO SMS definition. It addresses the 
SMS alignment of multiple certificates that overlap with the production 
enterprise, including the arrangement of policies and practices with an integral 
set of analytical tools and documented processes. To meet ICAO intent, the 
production “SMS” model should be capable of incorporating regulatory 
certificates and processes that they are already subject to, and it should be 
compatible with global SMS standards. In the spirit of SMS, the model should 
dually serve as a tool to help optimize the production enterprise, and be capable 
of integrating with a globally connected data network that is proposed for the 
future SMS world (Darr, et al., 2010). 
The prospective model should include a formal, top-down business-like 
approach. To meet SMS context it should include systematic procedures, 
practices, and policies that align with risk management, safety policy, safety 
assurance, and safety promotion – the four generally accepted components of 
SMS architecture. It should align with established SMS protocols to ensure that 
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risks in each department collectively correlate with the manufacturing 
enterprises’ outputs, and that the enterprise can simultaneously align with 
globally emerging SMS developments and existing regulations. 
Large commercial transport airlines have a highly commendable safety record, 
but the probability of risk occurrences that involve hull loss increase with the 
number of aircraft delivered into service each year (Cokorilo, et al., 2010). In 
2011 the United States broke all safety records having gone for nearly three 
years without an airliner accident fatality. The accident rate worldwide was also 
down considerably (Dr. Johnson, 2012). And as of 2013, even with nearly 
80,000 flights each day within the U.S. national airspace system, there had not 
been a fatal commercial aviation accident in more than four years. The U.S. 
airspace system is arguably one of the safest in the world, with key aviation 
stakeholders – the FAA, airlines, airports, aircraft manufacturers, and the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) – working together to ensure 
these results (Dillingham, 2013). It is argued that a holistic airplane life-cycle 
SMS will support continuance and enhancement  of aviation safety, and will 
benefit all domains by structuring homogenized cross-company/enterprise 
efficiencies and processes, endorse timely dissemination of emerging 
information, and promote stronger cultures with aviation regulatory 
administrations. The FAA is currently pursuing SMS on two tracks – one for 
industry and one for FAA itself. As officials develop the internal SMS regime, it 
will document the steps along the way, which will serve as guidance (Infanger, 
2010). The production-centric SMS model should be able to integrate with all 
aspects of the aircraft lifecycle from design, through production, to flight 
operations and aircraft maintenance.  
 
2.2 General Overview 
Regulatory literature searches review predominant SMS policies being 
developed and published. It indicates that while many regulators have, and are, 
issuing SMS programs and directions of varying capacity, ICAO has issued the 
most comprehensive guidance of all SMS publications. It is thus the most 
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accepted SMS definition as recognized by U.S. and non-U.S. aviation 
administrations. This review observes that all SMS regulators require the same 
four components as defined by ICAO: Safety Risk: Safety Assurance: Safety 
Promotion: and Safety Policy. Beyond that, publications address how SMS 
encompasses areas such as hazards, safety risks, human factors, and 
organizational accidents. State Programs include implementation specificity 
where the Target Audience is “Representatives from civil aviation authorities 
with responsibilities regarding the implementation of safety programmes, and 
the implementation and/or oversight of safety management systems, in the 
areas of airline operations, air traffic services, maintenance of aircraft and 
aerodrome operations” (ICAO, 2008). 
Aviation administrators reviewed in this paper are defining SMS as part of a 
comprehensive long-term aviation strategy. It is recognized that while many are 
reviewed in this paper, other governments that are not specifically mentioned 
are pursuing similar paths that address either limited-scope SMS programs, and 
or programs that incorporate SMS in conjunction with more wide-ranging 
NGATS components. 
2.3 Alignment with multiple US 14 CFRs 
Regulators such as the FAA issue SMS communiqués that are specific to FAR 
14 CFR “Parts” – also referred to as “Certificates”. A Maintenance Repair & 
Overhaul (MR&O) station/depot operates under a Part 145 Certificate. Major 
airlines operate under Part 121 (scheduled passenger service operations), and 
an Airframer’s primary business of design and production are under Parts 25 
and 21. An airframer also holds certificates for areas including Training (Part 
141), Flight Test (Part 91), and Part 145 if the airframer also operates repair 
stations. 
Since FAA SMS communiqués are specific to certificates, and the certificates 
vary according to the aviation domain, regulatory communiqués are released 
independently, that is, they are domain specific. In addition to being 
independent, the domains are not receiving prospective rules at the same time. 
In fact years are passing between the application of SMS into the airline domain 
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versus the MRO and the manufacturing domains. MROs have received 
prospective SMS rules years after the airlines – and the rules are to date not 
enforced. And Part 21 airframers have yet to receive SMS rules, although there 
is discussion with regulators as to how SMS can be applied to this domain. This 
presents a dilemma for the airframers who typically hold multiple certificates. 
The policy is designed to be systemic. It requires an accountable executive to 
be identified for the entire enterprise, and it requires each of the enterprises’ 
departments to fulfil a clearly defined role in the SMS system (U.S. Department 
of Transportation, 2004). The issue an airframer faces is that while some SMS 
certificate requirements are identified by the regulator, SMS definitions for other 
certificates (i.e. Part 21) remain undefined or nebulous. So an airframer who 
holds both a Part 145 certificate prospectively has to define and implement an 
SMS methodology for its repair stations, but is not simultaneously required to 
implement SMS in its design and manufacturing functions. This creates the 
challenge of defining an SMS system for the entire airframer enterprise – with 
one “SMS accountable executive” – a stipulation of SMS implementation. 
In addition to being direct holders of multiple certificates, airframers are also 
influenced indirectly by certificates that customers hold, i.e. Part 121 airlines. 
The airlines are ahead of the airframers in terms of receiving SMS 
communiqués from the FAA, but this still influences airframer’s departments 
such as in-service engineering and aircraft maintenance and repair services. 
Thus the scenario of certificate-centric SMS communiqués rather than 
organizationally-centric SMS communiqués is not an issue for single certificate 
holders such as airlines and independent repair stations. But it is an issue for 
airframers who are inherently influenced by certificates both directly and 
indirectly. 
2.4 U.S. Alignment with multiple governments’ CFRs 
U.S. based airframers with foreign customers must also align with overseas 
aviation regulators who have, or will have SMS requirements. Such regulators 
are developing SMS schedules that are independent of FAA schedules. As an 
example, JCAB requires a U.S. airframer that services its U.S.-built, but 
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Japanese registered aircraft, to implement SMS in its U.S.-based repair station. 
Without an SMS implementation as accepted by the JCAB, JCAB reserves the 
prerogative not to renew the repair station certificate. So the impact to a U.S. 
airframer is that it must not only somehow comply with evolving and prospective 
domestic FAA SMS requirements that are certificate-centric, but it must also 
comply with multiple foreign SMS rules in order to maintain certification from 
foreign regulators for services such as aircraft maintenance. And as with FAA 
SMS definition, foreign SMS definitions can be subjective which further 
compounds the challenge of creating a universally accepted SMS architecture. 
2.5 U.S. Government  / FAA / JPDO 
In the late 1990s the U.S. Federal Government was advised that the air 
transportation system within U.S. airspace, would not efficiently support future 
capacity based upon projected expansion of the Department of Transportation’s 
(civilian) and Department of Defense’s (military) airspace usage. 
In response, the USA created JPDO (Joint Planning Development Office) to 
manage the work related to the development of the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NGATS), a vision of air transportation in 2025 (USA 
Government, 2001).  
JPDO began with eight focus working groups that included participants from 
industry and government. One of the groups was the Safety Group, which spun 
off a Safety sub-group that subsequently developed and defined the 
NGATS/JPDO SMS policy. 
While the amalgamated NGATS (with all component programs and sub-
programs) is expected to be implemented by 2025, the focus groups are 
defining their programs incrementally. And in turn the departments (within DoD 
and DoT) are, and will be, interpreting the resulting policies, and determining 
implementation timelines for their respective jurisdictions.  An example is the 
SMS policy that was accepted by the JPDO Senior Policy Committee (SPC) 
and published in a 2008 FAA Advisory Circular (Fedaral Aviation Administration 
(FAA), 2008). SMS policy was published even though the implementation 
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methodology and timeline requirements were not established by the FAA, due 
to various interpretations of the details by both the FAA and by the aviation 
industry at large. Note that although this research focuses on civilian air 
transport SMS (i.e. DoT/FAA), the discussion also pertains to parallel domains 
in the aviation defence industry. 
2.6 Eurocontrol 
SMS and long-term air transportation system strategies are not exclusive to the 
U.S. The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation 
(EUROCONTROL) identified y2030 as its target to have implemented its New 
Generation Air Traffic System (NGATS). This is equivalent to the U.S. 
NGATS/JPDO program and has similar focus groups including a Safety group 
with an SMS policy definition as published in 2008. JPDO and EUROCONTROL 
are coordinating efforts with the intent of the two systems becoming 
interoperable. (The MITRE Corporation, 2005). 
2.7 ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) 
Ref. ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM), Second Edition - 2009 
The manual is an extensive guide that describes how aviation safety, reliability 
and quality systems have evolved from the early 1900s “technical era”, to the 
“organizational era” that spans from the mid 1990s to current times. This highly 
successful organizational era resulted in incidents and accidents becoming rare, 
which manifested in a movement towards a business-like approach to the 
management of safety. SMM Ref 3-5 …. “This business-like approach to safety 
underlines the rationale of safety management systems (SMS) as discussed in 
Chapter 7” (ICAO, 2009). 
The SMM describes classic concepts of safety theory including accident 
causation, organizational accidents, errors and violations, and safety 
investigation. Most importantly it defines SMS architecture that has become the 
universally accepted standard by regulators. 
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The architecture is defined by four components: Safety Promotion, Safety 
Policy, Safety Risk Management and Safety Assurance. Each component 
contains sub-parts called Elements [Figure 2-2]. 
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Figure 2-2. The Four ICAO SMS Components 
 
Component 1 – Safety Policy and Objectives 
Element 1: Management commitment and responsibility: commitment of senior 
management to safety is reflected in a policy statement signed by the 
accountable executive. 
Element 2: Safety accountabilities: a statement of accountabilities clearly 
defines safety responsibilities of managers and employees at different levels in 
the organization with effective delegation of responsibilities established for 
operationally critical areas when principal office holders are absent. 
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Element 3: Appointment of key safety personnel: there needs to be a safety 
manager, tasked by the accountable executive with the daily oversight functions 
of the SMS.  
Element 4: Coordination of emergency response planning: there needs to be an 
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) that includes contingency plans to ensure 
proper response throughout the organization when an emergency situation 
arises. 
Element 5: SMS documentation: all safety management activities must be 
documented and be available to all employees. 
Component 2 – Safety Risk Management 
Element 6: Hazard identification: the organization must maintain processes that 
insure that hazards are identified for all operational activities. Hazard 
identification is based on a combination of reactive, proactive and predictive 
safety management methods.  
Element 7: Risk assessment and mitigation: individual hazards are analyzed, 
their consequences are assessed and communicated throughout the 
organization. Mitigation actions must be developed for those hazards presenting 
unacceptable operational risk. 
Component 3 – Safety Assurance 
Element 8: Safety performance monitoring and measurement: safety assurance 
activities focus on assessing the health of the organization with an emphasis on 
safety. Specific goals for improvements in all areas should be set for all senior 
operational managers. Safety assurance should include monitoring of external 
sources of safety information and include participation in regional safety groups 
or safety data sharing organizations. 
Element 9: Management of change: external or internal changes may introduce 
new hazards to operational activities. Processes must exist to manage 
organizational responses to regulatory changes, major changes in operational 
procedures or new activities. Safety reporting systems should have processes 
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established to identify new risks and actively monitor performance in new areas 
of the operation. 
Element 10: Continuous improvement of the SMS: safety assurance utilizes 
quality tools such as internal evaluations or independent audits to assess 
organizational health from a safety perspective. Onsite assessments of 
operational management systems on a recurring basis provide opportunities for 
continuous improvement of processes and procedures for each functional area 
of the organization. 
Component 4 – Safety Promotion 
Element 11: Training and education: the organization must identify safety 
training requirements for each level of management and for each employee 
group. Safety training for operational personnel should address safety 
responsibilities, including complying with all operating and safety procedures, 
recognizing and reporting hazards and ultimately ensuring that employees have 
the knowledge and skills to safely complete work activities. 
Element 12: Safety communication: communication of safety information is a 
key responsibility for the safety manager but more so for the organization as a 
whole. Continuous improvement and learning is accomplished through the 
sharing of lessons learned from investigations, hazard report analysis and 
operational safety assessments. Feedback to operational personnel such as 
examples of procedural improvements as a result of safety reports is an 
essential feature of safety communications. 
SMM Chapter 7 – Introduction to Safety Management Systems (SMS), section 
7.2.7 notes that all aviation stakeholders may contribute to SMS to assist in the 
decision-making process on safety risks: 
a) aviation professionals 
b) aircraft owners and operators 
c) manufacturers 
d) aviation regulatory authorities 
e) industry trade associations 
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f) regional air traffic service providers 
g) professional associations and federations 
h) international aviation organizations 
i) investigative agencies 
j) the flying public 
7.2.7 invites input from all sectors and stakeholders of the aviation community, 
including c) manufacturers. This concurs that SMS is intended to become all-
inclusive, and that while to-date there is limited specificity for manufacturers’ 
implementation, an airframer SMS model will likely, at some point, be defined 
that is acceptable to U.S. FAA that also aligns with ICAO. 
The SMM includes a gap analysis checklist (7-APP 2-2) that can be used as a 
template to help determine how similar existing organizational systems are to 
the ICAO SMS framework. It includes the four components (Safety Policy and 
Objectives; Safety Risk Management; Safety Assurance; and Safety 
Promotion). These are sub-divided into questions with yes/no responses that 
indicate where gaps exist between where the organization is versus SMS 
definition, and therefore suggests a foundation to begin an SMS implementation 
plan. Although the questions are generic and may be applicable to any domain 
within the aviation industry, some questions can be tailored, and other 
questions may be added to generate a domain-centric SMS gap analysis. 
2.8 ICAO State Letter AN 12 / 52 / 1-08 / 70 
ICAO State letter AN 12/52/1-08/70 addresses Implementation of the State 
Safety Programme in States (ICAO, 13th November 2008). 
The letter introduces requirements for implementation of the State Safety 
Program (SSP). It states that SSP is a consequence of “growing awareness that 
safety management principals affect most activities of a civil aviation authority, 
including safety rulemaking, policy development and oversight”. The letter 
introduces objectives of the SSP training course that is targeted at State 
Officials with responsibilities that include implementation and/or oversight of 
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safety management systems. The course was first offered in March 2009 and 
includes training of SSP safety data management. 
The letter is applicable to Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part I – International 
Commercial Air Transport – Aeroplanes, and Part III – International Operations 
– Helicopters, Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services, and Annex 14 – Aerodromes, 
Volume I – Aerodrome Design and Operations. However, the letter does not 
encompass Aircraft Design and Production. 
 
2.9 FAA Order VS 8001.1; SMS Doctrine 
Ref. U.S. Department of Transportation FAA Order VS 8000.1; SUBJ: Safety 
Management System Doctrine: Effective Date 08/11/2006 (Fedaral Aviation 
Administration (FAA), 2008) 
The purpose of the order is to “provide a doctrine for Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) Aviation Safety (AVS) services/offices to implement a 
common AVS Safety Management System (AVSSMS)”. It cites SMS concepts 
such as the need for a more process-oriented system safety approach with an 
emphasis on management systems that ensure risk management, safety 
assurance and safety culture. The order requires each AVS service/office to 
develop and implement a plan for its functions under the AVSSMS, including 
the structure of its safety oversight relationship with the segment of industry for 
which it holds safety oversight responsibility (FAA Dept Transportation Order vs 
8000.1, Sep 2006). 
The order is applicable to individuals and entities over which AVS has safety 
oversight jurisdiction such as aviation product/service providers, which include 
“manufacturers, operators, maintainers, educators, providers of air traffic 
services, and others”. 
Par 2-4 refers to concepts related to aviation safety management and safety 
management systems evolving at the international level, and at the U.S. 
national level within the FAA. It notes that standards and principals that evolve 
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from within the AVS organization will be aligned with national and international 
standards and concepts, and it invokes the requirement to align with Public Law 
108-176, JDPO and the NGATS integrated plan. 
Par 2-4.b. notes that ICAO has proposed a standard for member States that 
includes the requirement for each State to have a safety program to achieve an 
acceptable level of safety in the operation of aircraft, where the “acceptable 
level of safety” is to be defined by each State. And it notes that an element of 
the ICAO program as it relates to Annex 11, is for each State to require 
product/service providers to implement a State-approved SMS. 
Section 3-1 requires that AVSSMS implement SMS in a fully integrated manner 
consistent with safety principals and concepts that serve as a model for 
international, national and agency policy. Integration must be accomplished 
across the organizational elements of AVS to ensure safety management 
throughout a product or service life cycle and in all areas of the aviation system, 
including: 
a) Design of aircraft and components 
b) Manufacturer of aircraft and components 
c) Operation of aircraft 
d) Maintenance of aircraft and components 
e) Management of air traffic 
f) Training and qualification of personnel 
g) Maintenance of the aviation system infrastructure 
h) Promulgation of standards through regulation and guidance materials 
The above list is similar to ICAO’s SMS domain, and likewise includes aircraft 
manufacturers. As with ICAO, the FAA has defined SMS concepts, 
methodology, and implementation goals, but the details of an airframer SMS 
compliance model remain undefined. 
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2.10 FAA Order 8000.367; SMS Requirements 
Ref. U.S. Department of Transportation FAA Order 8000.367; SUBJ: Aviation 
Safety (AVS) Safety Management System Requirements: Effective Date 05-14-
2008 (FAA Department of Transportion, 05-14-2008). 
This order full fills requirements described in FAA Order VS888.1, Safety 
Management System (SMS) Doctrine, Section 1-1.c (2). It provides 
requirements to be met by AVS services/offices to support AVSSMS. It is 
specific to aviation safety, does not address occupational safety and health or 
personnel safety issues, and does not address implementation schedules. It 
requires AVS services/offices to have processes and procedures in place to 
align with: 
 SMS processes in other AVS services/offices 
 AVSSMS 
 SMS processes in product/service provider organizations for which the 
AVS service has oversight responsibility, if applicable. 
The bulk of the order defines details of Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management, 
Safety Assurance and Safety Promotion such that the descriptions of these four 
components align directly with ICAO’s SMM definitions. 
As with other regulatory SMS publications, this order restates the philosophy 
and details of the globally accepted SMS model. But no specificity is given that 
defines details and data collection methods of how to implement an airframer or 
MRO SMS. 
2.11 FAA Order 8000.368; Guidance for AFS Staff 
Ref. U.S. Department of Transportation FAA Order 8000.368; SUBJ: Flight 
Standards Service Oversight: Effective Date 7/11/08 (“guidance for Flight 
Standards Service (AFS) staff and offices in meeting the requirements specified 
in FAA Order VS 8000.1, Safety Management System Doctrine”) (FAA 
Department of Transportation, 7/11/08). 
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This order describes how the Flight Standards Service (AFS) complies with the 
Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (AVS-1) Order VS 8000.1, Safety 
Management System Doctrine. The audience is principally AFS personnel who 
are responsible for safety and regulatory oversight of aviation certificate holders 
and service providers in the U.S as follows: 
 Certification standards for air carriers, commercial operators, air 
agencies, and airmen (except air traffic control (ATC) tower operations) 
 Flight procedures, operating methods, airmen qualification and 
proficiency, aircraft maintenance, and the maintenance aspects of 
continued airworthiness programs 
 Service providers performing Instrument Flight Procedure (IFP) 
development, including flight inspection/flight validation services 
 Registry of civil aircraft and all official airmen records, and supporting law 
enforcement agencies responsible for drug interdiction 
Par 2.c.(2) invokes ICAO’s standards and recommended practices “across the 
spectrum of international aviation activity and provides direction and guidance 
for member states”. The Order also refers to ICAO’s critical elements of a safety 
oversight system for oversight guidance – ICAO doc 9858 AN/474 (ICAO, 
Second Edition - 2011). 
Although this order is specific to non-manufacturer oversight, the content 
becomes significant to an airframer’s SMS development at the point where the 
airframer and aircraft operator SMSs intersect, i.e. with the aviation service 
interests of the manufacturer’s business. 
2.12 FAA SMS – Request for Comments 
Ref. U.S. Federal Register / Vol.74, No 140 / Thursday, July 23, 2009 / 
Proposed Rules: Department of Transportation FAA [Docket No. FAA-2009-
0671; Notice No 09-06]: SMS – Advanced Notice of proposed rulemaking 
(ANRPM), request for comments (USA Department of Transportation, 
Thursday, July 23, 2009). 
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The ANPRM solicits public comments on a potential rulemaking requiring 
“certain 14 CFR part 21, 119. 121, 125, 135, 141, 142, and 145 certificate 
holders, product manufacturers, applicants, and employers (hereafter 
‘‘product/service providers’’) to develop a Safety Management System (SMS). 
SMS is a comprehensive, process-oriented approach to managing safety 
throughout an organization. An SMS includes an organization-wide safety 
policy, formal methods of identifying hazards, mitigating and continually 
assessing risk, and promotion of a safety culture. SMS stresses not only 
compliance with technical standards but increased emphasis on the 
organizational aspects and processes that ensure risk management and safety 
assurance. 
The purpose for the ANPR is to give the aviation industry at large an opportunity 
to comment on issues and concerns they may have relative to the 
implementation of SMS. Responses were returned to the FAA by October 21, 
2009. 
At the time of this research, SMS remains at the stage of being understood from 
a legalistic/implementation standpoint, and no regulatory compliance model is 
defined for U.S. manufacturers or MROs – which leaves the field subjective for 
the definition of an airframer/manufacturing and MRO SMS implementation 
models. 
 
2.13 FAA 14 CFR Part 5 – Safety Management Systems 
Ref. Docket No. FAA–2009–0671; Notice No. 10–15; RIN 2120-AJ86. (FAA, 
2009). In this NPRM the FAA defines the components of SMS as Safety Policy 
(subpart B), Safety Risk Management (subpart C), Safety Assurance (subpart 
D) and SMS Documentation and Recordkeeping (subpart F). The docket also 
provides descriptions of the elements that make up the components. These 
components and elements align directly with ICAO’s SMS architecture. 
Applicability is as follows: 
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 (a) A certificate holder under part 119 of this chapter authorized to conduct 
operations in accordance with the requirements of part 121 of this chapter must 
have a Safety Management System that meets the requirements of this part 
and is acceptable to the Administrator by [date 3 years after the effective date of 
final rule].  
(b) A certificate holder must submit an implementation plan to the FAA 
Administrator for approval no later than [date 6 months after the effective date 
of the final rule].  
(c)The implementation plan may include any of the certificate holder's existing 
programs, policies, or procedures that it intends to use to meet the 
requirements of this part, including components of an existing SMS. 
The docket proposed to require each certificate holder operating under 14 CFR 
Part 121 to develop and implement a safety management system (SMS) to 
improve the safety of its aviation-related activities.  The proposal required the 
certificate holder to go beyond the basic regulations to minimize risk. The Airline 
Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 required the 
FAA to conduct rulemaking to “require all Part 121 air carriers to implement a 
safety management system.”  
The FAA also cited the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), in its 
March 2006, amendments to Annex 6 part I, which addressed operation of 
airplanes in international commercial air transport, and established a standard 
for member states to mandate that each of these operators establish an SMS.  
The FAA argued that the need for SMS is in fulfillment of the international 
agreements.  If adopted, the provisions in this rule would conform to these 
ICAO agreements. 
The proposal stated that it is not the FAA's intent that this rule would result in 
contractors or subcontractors, or entities not directly regulated by the FAA, 
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being required to develop an SMS. Existing processes required air carriers to 
ensure that the employees or businesses with whom they contract to conduct 
training or maintenance activities on their behalf are qualified, capable, and 
have the necessary equipment and facilities to perform the work. This proposal 
would not expand these existing requirements (Aircraft Electronics Association, 
2010). 
2.14 Transport Canada SMS 
Ref. TP 13739 (04/2001), Introduction to Safety Management Systems 
(Transport Canada, 2001) 
TP 13739 is an early SMS publication (2001) that introduces a Systems 
Approach to aviation safety management. The Forward states “…projected 
growth in aviation means that maintaining the current low accident rate will 
result in an unacceptable number of accidents. The challenge for Transport 
Canada and the industry is to find ways to lower the accident rate even further 
as the industry grows”. TP13799 addresses a data-driven approach to 
enhancing aviation safety; using a risk-based approach to resource allocation to 
support those activities which will receive the greatest safety benefit; 
strengthening partnerships to put into effect the concept that responsibility for 
safety is shared by the regulator and the aviation community, implementing 
safety management systems in aviation organizations; taking account of human 
and organizational factors in safety management; and communicating 
effectively with the aviation community on safety. The material in the publication 
“is condensed from a number of sources to introduce safety management 
system principles and concepts”, with special thanks to Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority of Australia (CASA). 
TP 13739 does not refer to the four SMS components since those became 
established in subsequent years. However, while it contains no specific SMS 
airframer content, the material is valuable in understanding early roots and logic 
of SMS. 
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2.15 Regulations Amending CARS 
Ref: Canada Gazette, Vol. 139, No 10 – March 5, 2005: Regulations Amending 
the Canadian Aviation Regulations (Parts I, IV, V and VII). (Canada Gazette, 
March 5th, 2005) 
This publication is similar to the U.S. FAA’s Request for Comments (July 23, 
2009). It introduces, into the public domain, its proposed regulatory 
amendments of requirements for holders of certain CAR certificates to appoint 
“accountable executives” to institute safety management systems. It states that 
“the current proposals will be followed by requirements”, and states that two 
new subparts within Part I will be created, i.e. Subpart 106 Accountable 
Executive and the conditions applicable to all accountable executive 
appointees; and Subpart 107 Safety Management System Requirements. 
The Alternatives section of the publication states that these proposed 
Regulations Amending the CARS build upon the work of leading safety experts 
and international bodies, such as ICAO. It states that the consequences of not 
acknowledging the need to overhaul and modernize the framework would “leave 
Canadian civil aviation facing an increased risk of incidents and accidents”, and 
that there is “no alternative to regulatory action that will accomplish the 
necessary changes”. 
The Consultation section provides a timeline history of developments that led to 
the proposed regulatory amendment including: “Starting with the meeting of the 
Maintenance and Manufacturing Technical Committee (Part V) in February 
2000 at which the concept of "accountable executive" was introduced to the 
committee members, meetings of the Personnel Licensing and Training 
Technical Committee (Part IV), the Maintenance and Manufacturing Technical 
Committee and the Commercial Air Service Operations (CASO) Technical 
Committee (Part VII) were held over the period from 2000 to 2003. In addition, 
members of the General Technical Committee (Part I) were briefed on the 
status of the safety management system proposals at their meeting of October 
22, 2002, and discussed the proposals for the introduction of requirements for 
 32 
accountable executives and for safety management systems at their meeting of 
April 3, 2003”. 
The General Provisions section contains definitions that affect accountable 
executives and specifies certificates that are impacted as defined in subsequent 
subparts 6 and 7: 
2.16 CAR Part I – Subpart 6 
Ref: Canadian Aviation Regulations (CAR) Part I - Subpart 6 – Accountable 
Executive. Content last revised: 2007/12/30 (Canadian Department of 
Transportation, 2007/12/30)  
106.01 – Application 
This subpart is applicable to the following certificates: An airport certificate 
issued under section 302.03: A flight training unit operator certificate issued 
under section 406.11: A manufacturer certificate issued under section 561.03:, 
and an approved maintenance organization (AMO) certificate issued under 
section 573.02 
2.17 CAR Part I – Subpart 7 
Ref: Canadian Aviation Regulations (CAR) Part I - Subpart 7 - Safety 
Management System Requirements. Content last revised 2007/12/30 
(Transport Canada, 2001) 
107.01 - Application 
This subpart is applicable to an applicant for, or holder of an approved 
maintenance organization (AMO) certificate under CAR section 573.02: An air 
operator certificate under CAR section 705.07; An airport certificate under CAR 
section 302.03; and Air Traffic Services (ATS) operations certificates under 
CAR section 801.05 (air traffic control or flight service station). 
107.02 - Establishing a Safety Management System 
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This subpart requires that the applicant or holder of a certificate referred to in 
section  
107.01 shall “establish, maintain and adhere to a safety management system”. 
107.03 – Safety Management System 
This subpart defines the contents of an SMS as follows: 
a) a safety policy on which the system is based; 
b) a process for setting goals for the improvement of aviation safety and for 
measuring the attainment of those goals; 
c) a process for identifying hazards to aviation safety and for evaluating and 
managing the associated risks; 
d) a process for ensuring that personnel are trained and competent to 
perform their duties; 
e) a process for the internal reporting and analyzing of hazards, incidents 
and accidents and for taking corrective actions to prevent their 
recurrence; 
f) a document containing all safety management system processes and a 
process for making personnel aware of their responsibilities with respect 
to them; 
g) a quality assurance program; (amended 2008/01/01; 
h) a process for conducting periodic reviews or audits of the safety 
management system and reviews or audits, for cause, of the safety 
management system; and 
i) any additional requirements for the safety management system that are 
prescribed under these Regulations. 
107.04 – Size 
This subpart states that the SMS “shall correspond to the size, nature and 
complexity of the operations, activities, hazards and risks associated with the 
operations of the holder of a certificate referred to in section 107.01”. 
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2.18 EASA’s view on SMS 
Ref: EASA’s view on SMS: Approach to an integrated management system. 
The European Business Aviation Convention & Exhibition (EBACE), EBACE, 
Geneva 13th May 2009: Daniela Defossar / Rulemaking Directorate. (European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), May 2009) 
This presentation noted NPA 2008-22C in reference to proposed implementing 
rules on organization requirements for SMS. It is currently applicable to: 
Approved training organizations; Commercial operators: and non-commercial 
operators of complex motor-powered aircraft. In the future it will apply to 
Maintenance organizations, and design and production organizations.  
It states that proposed acceptable means for SMS compliance are 
a) Adapted to the size of organizations 
b) Based on ICAO documentation 
c) Safety policy 
d) Safety risk management 
e) Safety assurance 
f) Organization and accountabilities 
g) Training and communication on safety  
h) Occurrence reporting scheme 
i) Organization manual 
j) Compliance monitoring system 
 
2.19 UK CAA 
As of 1st January 2009, the UK CAA encouraged Air Operators Certificate 
holders, Part-M subpart G organizations, and maintenance organizations to 
have an “SMS implementation plan that will provide a fully functional SMS in 
two to three years” (UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), 2008). The UK CAA 
refers to EASA for implementing rules, which in turn (as with other aviation 
bodies) contains the requirement for an ICAO-compliant SMS. Other 
documentation that UK CAA points to for SMS implementation includes: CAA 
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Safety Management Systems Guidance Material that is based on ICAO 
Document 9859; CAA Gap Analysis/Checklist that is available for an 
organisation to assist in constructing an implementation plan, or assess an 
existing SMS for compliance with elements and components of an SMS as 
shown in the CAA SMS Guidance Material; ICAO Document 9859 Safety 
Management Manual; ICAO SMS Training Material; and EASA Regulation 
216/2008 - the basic regulation that requires a safety management system. 
UK CAA does not currently encourage aircraft manufacturers to implement an 
SMS. However, ICAO does, so one would expect UK CAA to encourage 
airframers SMSs sometime in the future – just as other aviation administrators 
will most likely require airframers to have SMS in the longer term rather than the 
shorter term. 
2.20 Regulatory Observation 
The objective of the regulatory overview was to assess SMS advisories and 
regulations being developed and published, and determine their applicability to 
U.S. aircraft production and MROs. With so many state regulatory bodies, and 
so many domains and opinions it can be confusing to assimilate where SMS is, 
and who should do what. SMS has generally been a collective and shared effort 
with U.S. and non-U.S. aviation administrators and industry. It is recognized that 
ICAO defines the universally accepted SMS model with four key components: 
Safety Promotion, Safety Policy, Safety Risk Assessment, and Safety 
Assurance. These components contain constituent elements 
But ICAO is not the founder of aviation SMS."It's incorrect to assume that SMS 
is an ICAO-driven initiative. While ICAO is coordinating worldwide SMS activity 
as the custodian of SMS standards and a focal point for SMS information, the 
FAA and a number of other aviation authorities started developing SMS well 
before ICAO issued its standards. As well as the U.S., several other countries 
were also exploring system safety oversight and SMS. So when the ICAO 
proposal for SMS standards came along, the United States and almost all other 
major states endorsed it. Some nations such as Canada and Singapore were 
ahead of the curve" [Don Arendt, FAA]. 
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In 2008, even though the FAA agreed with ICAOs proposed SMS standards it 
was unable to complete the rulemaking in time for ICAO’s implementation date 
of 2009 for commercial airlines, so it filed a “difference”, and continued to work 
toward SMS–based oversight. The FAA chartered an Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee (ARC) – and the ARC filed the responses and comments in its April 
2010 report. At that time congressional action (HR 5900) required the FAA to 
mandate that all Part 121 operators implement an SMS. The FAA was given 90 
days from when it was signed into law [Aug. 2, 2010] to produce an NPRM and 
two years to produce a final rule. Without congressional endorsement, the FAA 
cannot approve or accept anything that's not a regulation. Meanwhile EASA set 
an April 2012 target date for the rulemaking process. FAA AC120-92A (date) 
was published. It was the hoped-for document telling operators what they "have 
to do”, and AC120-9A (date) clarified the definition of an aviation service 
provider as "any organization providing aviation services." 
So what does this all mean to the industry? It is accepted that the FAA plans to 
eventually to condense all safety practices into a single regulatory structure.  
Companies that have adopted a course of action to comply with international 
standards in order to operate outside the United States are taking a 
conservative approach, starting early, and in the absence of hard guidance 
Regardless of where the aviation SMS drive started, it is clear that the era of 
SMS is upon us. It is aimed at every enterprise touching aviation, from 
manufacturers to aircraft operators, FBOs and maintenance shops. The most 
common complaint is that the approval process is unclear because the SMS 
concept as of 2010 was not embodied in regulation (Larson, 2010). 
Aviation administrators first required some form of SMS with airline operators. 
MROs are next in line. Although U.S. aircraft manufacturers have received 
guidance, they have yet to receive specifically mandated regulations. However, 
given the global market that U.S airframers of large commercial jets serve, 
observations point to the fact that in the future, the FAA will become definitive 
with SMS aircraft production. With this, it may be prudent for U.S.-based 
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manufacturers to adopt some form of SMS to align with overseas markets, or to 
show that their current QMS contains the equivalent elements of the ICAO SMS 
model. 
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3.0 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The approach to accomplish this research is to align SMS industry and 
regulatory developments with field tests for the purpose of evaluating and or 
validating the practicality of SMS in the manufacturing and maintenance 
domains of the aviation industry. The researcher became involved in the 
development of SMS at the U.S. state level, and simultaneously worked in the 
aircraft production domain to observe how SMS may apply. The methodology 
used for field tests was based on development and experimental iterations of a 
process, revision of the process, and testing of revised processes until a 
quantifiable and repeatable practice was recognized.  
3.2 JPDO membership 
The U.S. Joint Planning and Development Office is a collaboration of networks 
that include members of the aviation community to participate in NextGen 
projects, activities, and initiatives. It provides an environment for the 
government and industry to share information and collaboratively engage in 
discussions and activities. As an active JPDO member from 2008 through 2010, 
the researcher supported the SMS development group that generated policy 
definition. By participating in this forum that met for four consecutive days each 
month in WADC, the researcher gathered first-hand data from members who 
represented commercial and military interests as SMS definition was 
developed, addressed implementation issues for the aviation industry at large, 
and coordinated with ICAO regarding ICAO’s SMS goals. Participation as a 
JPDO working-group member allowed the researcher to align SMS 
implementation research with the development of national and international 
SMS initiatives. 
3.3 Review of SMS regulations (U.S. and global) 
Upon beginning SMS research, a thorough review was undertaken of proposed 
national and international regulations, and industry responses. This review 
highlighted ICAO’s and the FAA’s drive to implement SMS into all domains of 
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the aviation industry, and member state’s recognition of SMS as defined by 
ICAO, i.e. the SMS “components” and “elements”. The review also highlighted 
regulators’ multi-year approach at mandating SMS into airlines, as opposed to 
just recommending SMS as an industry practice, and emphasized the question 
of how SMS may be applied to all aviation domains, i.e. the aircraft lifecycle – 
not just the airline domain. 
3.4 Executive management charter / sponsorship 
With the FAA moving SMS discussion into the aircraft production domain, 
executive managers at a large aircraft manufacturing company questioned how 
SMS may, or may not apply. The researcher gained sponsorship from said 
company to charter a team to explore the practicality of SMS implementation 
into the production environment. Throughout field tests of this study, the 
researcher reported back to the sponsors to provide results and maintain 
support. Reviews were not only essential to gain continued support, but from an 
ethical perspective, they also provided a forum to report out prospective 
production information discovered during research that may need attention.  As 
shown by literature reviewed during this thesis, top management sponsorship is 
essential for SMS research and or implementation – it must be top down – it 
cannot be driven from the bottom up.  
3.5 Production commodity and Integrated Product Team (IPT) 
Regulators organize the airplane by Air Transport Association (ATA) “chapters”. 
The chapters fall under three categories: Airframe Systems; Structure; and 
Power Plant. Airframe Systems consists of 30 ATA chapters, there are 7 
chapters for Structure, and 16 chapters for Power Plant. These chapters are 
often referred to as “commodities” or “ATAs” by production operations. For 
example ATA 27 is the flight controls commodity (Airframe Systems), ATA 32 is 
the landing gear commodity (Airframe Systems), ATA 53 is the doors 
commodity (Structure), ATA 74 is the ignition commodity (Power Plant), and so 
forth [APPENDIX B]. Production companies typically have an IPT (or equivalent 
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body) consisting of Subject Matter Experts (SME) organized around each 
commodity. 
Due to the number of commodities and time availability, it was necessary for 
this research to select one representative commodity to investigate and thereby 
keep research scope to a manageable level. During discussions with executive 
sponsorship it was determined that the Fuel IPT (chapter 28) would support 
research. The FAA Part 25 production certificate requires that all production 
commodities are monitored with quantitative metrics (also referred to as 
datastreams) that are used to control the health of the production system. 
Based upon this production data, production operations managers continuously 
prioritize commodities for process review, organizational change, output 
reliability, and so forth. The Fuel commodity was selected since it was already 
prioritized. 
3.6 IPT initiation 
In the “kick-off” meeting the researcher initiated the Fuel commodity IPT with an 
overview of the executive charter and SMS. It was emphasized that the IPT was 
authorized to support research, but support was secondary to maintaining 
existing job roles and responsibilities. The researcher was cognizant that any 
actual or perceived perception that the research was negatively impacting 
existing personnel’s attention to current responsibilities, or production 
operations, may jeopardize the charter. Primary IPT members supporting 
research included the IPT leader, manufacturing engineer, quality engineer, 
industrial engineer, and a quality investigator. Additional on-call IPT 
staff/disciplines included: 
 Design and operations support engineer 
 Liaison engineer 
 Design engineer 
 Structures Engineer 
 Risk analysis engineer 
 Production supervisors 
 Mechanics (preflight and flight test) 
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 Wings mechanic 
 Project manager/administrator 
 Supplier management 
 Materials management 
 Equipment Quality Analyst 
 Human factors 
 Airworthiness Representative (AR) 
The initial meeting included an overview of the ICAO SMS components and 
elements. SMS was proposed as a prospective methodology to manage risk in 
the production environment, and ICAO’s Risk Assessment Matrix and Risk 
Tolerability Matrix were presented as the target format for quantifying risk. 
3.7 Workshops and production process walk data 
The researcher proposed to the IPT that the study take place through a series 
of workshops. Workshop meetings brought the IPT together to collectively 
discuss approaches to experiment with SMS in the production environment, 
assess possible data-gathering tools already available and or customize them, 
create new data gathering formats if and as necessary, conduct iterative and 
revised field tests, and appraise results. Over the course of more than a year, 
the meetings typically took place on a bi-weekly basis. 
In this paper the term “process walk” is used to describe the event of staff - 
usually engineers and associated professionals associated with a specific 
commodity – of “walking” the production line and talking with production 
mechanics to understand how well (or not) aspects of the build process, or IP 
are, and if and how improvements can be made. The researcher concurred with 
the IPT that process walks would be key to gathering human factors information 
to support production input into a broader SMS-like risk model. 
The researcher considered the use of the Gemba methodology to support 
production process walks. “The Gemba Walk is all about getting out into the 
workplace. It affords company leaders, managers and supervisors a reliable, 
simple and easy means of supporting an improvement structure and 
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encouraging process standardization. The Gemba Walk is a key component in 
the sustainment of improvement” (The LEANing Post, 2010). However, the 
researcher and IPT determined that while applicable for general process 
information, questions formulated and quantified by the commodity-specific IPT 
would be time-efficient and appropriately focussed – as was evidenced in Field 
Test 3 - when talking with mechanics during process walks. Therefore Gemba 
Walks were not used. 
The researcher also considered the Maintenance Error and Decision Aid 
(MEDA) tool as a format for collecting process walk data. MEDA is a structured 
process for investigating the causes of errors made by aircraft maintenance 
technicians and inspectors. It is an organization's means to learn from its 
mistakes. Errors are a result of contributing factors in the workplace, most of 
which are under management control. (William Rankin, 2007). However, MEDA 
is a reactive investigation process that although aircraft-specific, is not 
commodity-specific. And similar to Gemba Walks it was determined that 
proactive questions generated by the IPT would best support research. Thus 
the MEDA tool was also deselected. 
3.8 Data assimilation 
The researcher considered various formats for collecting and correlating 
process walk data into risk information that would support ICAO’s risk 
assessment and tolerability matrixes. The Failure Mode Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) model was selected. It is also referred to as potential failure modes and 
effects analysis; failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) ..... is a 
step-by-step approach for identifying all possible failures in a design, a 
manufacturing or assembly process, or a product or service ..... is prioritized 
according to how serious their consequences are, how frequently they occur 
and how easily they can be detected. The purpose of the FMEA is to take 
actions to eliminate or reduce failures, starting with the highest-priority ones” 
(Tague, 2004). Furthermore, the first step in the FMEA process is to “assemble 
a cross-functional team of people with diverse knowledge about the process, 
product or service and customer needs. Functions often included are: design, 
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manufacturing, quality, testing, reliability, maintenance, purchasing (and 
suppliers)”. All these characteristics fit with the IPT already in place, so FMEA 
was selected as the format with which to gather data, including process walk 
observations, and prospectively feed results into an ICAO risk assessment and 
tolerability model. 
3.9 Field tests and evaluation 
Using FMEA as the general data collector, the researcher first attempted to link 
the three aviation domains of engineering, production, and flight operations into 
a single SMS risk assessment architecture. Multiple field tests were undertaken 
with various fuel systems production installation plans, and as data was 
evaluated, the architecture transitioned to a production-centric only model that 
became defined as “PRMS”, rather than “SMS”. This paper describes three of 
the field tests, to highlight how and why the details of the architecture 
transitioned. Several process walks and FMEA evaluations were undertaken. 
Field tests 1, 2 and 3 represent key milestones as experimentation of a 
production-like SMS transitioned into what became known as “PRMS”. 
3.10 Review of industry progress 
With a PRMS model developed, further academic and industry literature review 
was conducted to benchmark research findings with current industry 
developments. Some arguments were found in support of research conclusions, 
and overall the industry continues to move at varying stages towards SMS, or 
SMS-like agendas. 
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4.0 Field Tests 
4.1 Introduction 
SMS requires a standard repeatable process to proactively gather and assess 
data, and subsequently disposition the results using risk probability values to 
determine prospective mitigative actions. This research explores the feasibility 
of a single SMS data model for the entire airplane lifecycle. Can a “Mitigate 
Production Risk” step be incorporated to support a holistic SMS that fully 
integrates aircraft engineering/manufacturing, airline, and maintenance 
operations?  Should SMS remain specific to airline operations, and a similar but 
separate “SMS” data architecture be deployed the other domains? If separate, 
how or should domain-specific SMSs be connected? [Figure 4-1]. 
Airline SMS’s are designed to gather, assess and disposition data to identify 
single points of failure that can propagate into systemic risks in the airline 
operating domain. An example would be low hydraulic fluid pressure due to a 
mechanic’s error (single point of failure) causing an operational-economic risk in 
terms of the landing gear not retracting after takeoff, and an air turnback that 
incurs passenger travel delays (systemic risks). Or, the A&P’s error may cause 
the gear not to deploy upon landing thus resulting in an operational-safety risk. 
At the discretion of the airline, various methodologies that align with regulatory 
oversight are used to proactively gather data that can indicate a prospective 
failure point. The ICAO SMS model requires the data to be quantified with a risk 
probability value (L). The possible (or known) impact of the failure point at the 
systemic level is evaluated with a risk severity value (S), and the allowance of 
the risk to remain in the system (or be mitigated out) is reviewed through the 
lens of a tolerability matrix. This research conducted field tests to explore the 
feasibility of creating a Risk Tolerability Matrix that is not constrained to one 
domain, but is architected to connect some or all of the airplane lifecycle 
domains. 
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Figure 4-1. Airplane Lifecycle SMS Data Management 
 
4.2 Quantification of risk 
SMS is defined as “A dynamic risk management system based on quality 
management system (QMS) principles in a structure scaled appropriately to the 
operational risk, applied in a safety culture environment”. (Stolzer, et al., 2008). 
FAA and ICAO guidance define SMS risk as a measure of the expected losses 
that can be caused by an undesired event, factored with the probability of that 
event occurring, or, risk equals Likelihood x Severity (Stolzer, et al., 2008): 
R = L x S 
For example, in the context of the low hydraulic fluid pressure causing aircraft 
landing gear retraction failure, L accounts for the airline mechanic’s erroneous 
accomplishment of the Task Card. Task cards include specific maintenance 
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steps as defined and controlled by the quality system, that are performed in 
order for the Certificate of Airworthiness to remain current with the aircraft. L 
represents the single point of failure of a task card (undesired event). And “S” 
represents the negative systemic impact, that is, airline operational safety risk. 
Comparable to airline maintenance task cards, the aircraft factory uses 
Installation Plans (IP). Manufacturing planners and quality engineers write IPs 
with process steps that mechanics accomplish to build aircraft. An IP error can 
be a single point of failure on the production line that can negatively manifest 
downstream in the production system, or once the airplane has left the factory 
and is in-service with the airline. 
This research is central to identifying the “L” and “S” values within the 
production system, and explores the possibility of connecting the resulting Risk 
(R) value to a holistic aircraft lifecycle SMS. Field Tests use data from the 
Engineering, Production and Airline domains. 
 
4.3 Field Test 1: EPA 
4.3.1 Engineering, Production and Airline Data 
Field Test 1 gathered data from Engineering (E), Production (P) and Airline (A) 
domains. The objective was to test whether a link existed across the domains, 
and establish if it was possible to directly correlate an airline risk event to an 
upstream IP production occurrence, and from production further upstream to 
design/engineering. 
SMS requires a risk probability value (L), but it is the enterprise’s discretion to 
determine a process for assimilating data to generate it. To support the 
processes of identifying, assessing and dispositioning, a Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) matrix was selected to integrate data from the E, P and 
A domains. FMEA was one of the first systematic techniques for failure 
analysis. It was developed by reliability engineers in the 1950s to study 
problems that might arise from malfunctions of military systems. In later 
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decades versions became used in many industries (Dhillon, 1990). FMEA 
involves reviewing as many components, assemblies, and subsystems as 
possible to identify failure modes, causes and effects. FMEAs provide single 
point inductive reasoning root cause analysis, based on knowledge and 
experience with products and processes – key to SMS’ proactive and predictive 
philosophy. FMEAs are widely used in development and manufacturing 
industries at various phases of the product life cycle (Xiao, et al., 2011).  And 
FMEAs are formatted to structure mitigation based on risk intelligence gathering 
– also compatible with SMS. 
IP “XYZ” from the fuel systems aircraft production line was selected as a test 
case. The objective was to gather information of how the IP was accomplished 
by talking directly with the mechanics.  Although IPs specify steps that must be 
completed and bought-off, there can be some variance as to how the steps are 
completed subject to the specific mechanic doing the task, and how the 
environment and human factors can influence completion of the task. The 13 
production steps for IP XYZ were listed in the EPA FMEA. Then, with input from 
the mechanics that perform the IP, potential failure modes, causes and effects 
for each IP task prospective failure scenario were recorded in the matrix. To 
quantify the relevance of each IP task failure scenario, values were entered into 
the corresponding E and P columns. The ExP value was recorded as the FMEA 
engineering/production Risk Priority Number (RPN), which correlated to ICAO’s 
“L” value, and “L” was then reviewed relative to the Airline (A) value to quantify 
the systemic airline risk in the context of ICAO’s “S’ value [Figure 4-2]. 
 
Figure 4-2. Portion of EPA FMEA 
Instl Plan XYZ
IP
Step
Task POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE
POTENTIAL 
CAUSES
POTENTIAL 
EFFECTS
DETECTION 
METHOD
E P
RPN
(E*P)
A
1. Receive Inlet inlet not received unavailable no inlet installed Visual Inspection 1 1 1 4
2.
Remove Plastic 
Wrapping
plastic w rapping in tank
Left on as protection 
then forgot to remove
plugs the inlet screen - 
reduced/no fuel f low
Visual Inspection, 
Fuctional test
1 2 2 3
3.
Removal of end 
caps
end caps left in fuel tank (FOD)
Left on as protection 
then forgot to remove
plugs the inlet screen - 
reduced/no fuel f low
Visual Inspection, 
Fuctional test
1 2 2 3
4.
Clean mating 
surface
mating surfaces not cleaned/prep forgetting to prep
bad seal - fuel 
transfer
Visual Inspection 1 3 3 3
Field Test 1: EPA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
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Values for the Engineering “E” input were selected from a scale of 1 to 10 
based upon component/system reliability subject to engineering design 
statistics [Figure 4-3]. Values for the Production “P” input were selected from a 
scale of 1 to 10, based upon the probability of not detecting the production error 
subject to the existing QMS process attached to the IP task step [Figure 4-4]. 
And the Airline “A” input value was selected, also on a scale of 1 to 10, based 
upon the impact the IP error may have on the airline, if the error was not 
detected by the production enterprise [Figure 4-5]. 
 
Figure 4-3. E Input for EPA FMEA 
 
Figure 4-4. P Input for EPA FMEA 
E = Component / system reliability based 
on Engineering design statistics
Reliability 
Values
INPUT
Very High: Failure is almost inevitable > 1 in 2 10
1 in 3 9
High: Repeated failures 1 in 8 8
1 in 20 7
Moderate: Occasional failures 1 in 80 6
1 in 400 5
1 in 2,000 4
Low : Relatively few  failures 1 in 15,000 3
1 in 150,000 2
Remote: Failure is unlikely < 1 in 1,500,000 1
E Input for EPA FMEA
P = Probability of not detecting Production
error based on QMS process 
INPUT
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
P Input for EPA FMEA
Manufacturing Self Inspection
Quality Shakedow n type inspection
Installation verif ication performed at end of specif icied task
Installation verif ied via 100% concurrent inspection
Installation are verif ied via sampling surviellance and 
corrective action systems
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Figure 4-5. A Input for EPA FMEA 
 
4.3.2 Risk Assessment and Tolerability Matrices 
ICAO SMS uses a Risk Assessment Matrix to quantify risk probability (L) and 
risk severity (S) [Figure 4-6]. L correlates to the FMEA RPN, and S correlates to 
the FMEA A value. These translate to Risk Assessment values of 1A through 
5A on the ICAO scale. ICAO then uses a Risk Tolerability Matrix to quantify 
results [Figure 4-7]. The values were then entered into the EPA FMEA for 
assessment [Figure 4-8]. 
 
A =  Airplane risk based 
on operational statisitics
Risk definition INPUT
Very high severity ranking w hen a potential failure mode 
effects safe system operation
  and/or non-compliance w ith government regulation 
w ithout w arning.
Very high severity ranking w hen a potential failure mode 
affects safe system operation
  and/or non-compliance w ith government regulation w ith 
w arning.
Loss of primary function.
  - System inoperable w ith destructive failure w ithout 
compromising safety
Reduction of primary function.
  - System inoperable w ith equipment damage
Loss of comfort/convenience function.
  - System inoperable w ith minor damage
Reduction of comfort/convenience function.
  - System inoperable w ithout damage
Returnable appearance and/or noise issue noticed by 
most customers.
  - System operable w ith signif icant degradation of 
performance
Non-returnable appearance and/or noise issue noticed by 
customers.
  - System operable w ith some degradation of 
performance
Non-returnable appearance and/or noise issue rarely 
noticed by customers.
  - System operable w ith minimal interference
None No discernable effect. 1
Very Minor 2
High 7
Moderate 6
Low 5
A Input for EPA FMEA
Very Low 4
Minor 3
Hazardous
w ithout w arning
10
Hazardous
w ith w arning
9
Very High 8
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Figure 4-6. Field Test 1: Risk Assessment Matrix 
 
 
Figure 4-7. ICAO Risk Tolerability Matrix 
A = 9 to 10 A = 7 to 8 A = 3 to 6 A = 2 A = 1
Catastophic
A
Hazardous 
B
Major 
C
Minor 
D
Negligable 
E
91 to 100 5 Frequent 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E
51 to 90 4 Occasional 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E
21 to 50 3 Remote 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
11 to 20 2 Improbable 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E
1 to 10 1 Extremely Impossible 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
FMEA
RPN
(E*P)
Value
(L)
Meaning
Field Test 1: EPA Risk Assessment Matrix
(L) Engr & Prod'n Risk Probability
L = f (E, P)
(S) Risk severity
Risk to in-service aircraft if enginering and or production errors manifest
RPN conversion to ICAO scale "A" input conversion to ICAO scale
5A, 5B, 5C
4A, 4B, 3A
Unacceptable under the
existing circumstances
5D, 5E, 4C, 4D,
4E, 3B, 3C, 3D,
2A, 2B, 2C
Acceptable based on risk
mitigation. It may require
management decision
3E, 2D, 2E, 1A,
1B, 1C, 1D, 1E
Acceptable
ICAO Risk Tolerability Matrix
Intolerable Region
Tolerable Region
Acceptable
Region
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Figure 4-8. Field Test 1: EPA FMEA 
Instl Plan XYZ
IP
Step
Task POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE
POTENTIAL 
CAUSES
POTENTIAL 
EFFECTS
E P
RPN
(E*P)
A L S Tol
1. Receive Inlet inlet not received unavailable no inlet installed 1 1 1 4 1 1C A
2.
Remove Plastic 
Wrapping
plastic w rapping in tank
Left on as protection 
then forgot to remove
plugs the inlet screen - 
reduced/no fuel f low
1 2 2 3 1 1C A
3.
Removal of end 
caps
end caps left in fuel tank (FOD)
Left on as protection 
then forgot to remove
plugs the inlet screen - 
reduced/no fuel f low
1 2 2 3 1 1C A
4.
Clean mating 
surface
mating surfaces not cleaned/prep forgetting to prep
bad seal - fuel 
transfer
1 3 3 3 1 1C A
w rong solvent
bad seal - fuel 
transfer
2 3 6 3 1 1C A
5. Ok to seal missed inspection
mechanic doesn't 
stop for QA
bad seal - fuel 
transfer
1 1 1 3 1 1C A
interrupted w ork
bad seal - fuel 
transfer
5 1 5 3 1 1C A
contamination on mating surfaces 
after buyoff
job sequencing
bad seal - fuel 
transfer
4 3 12 3 2 2C T
6. apply sealant w rong type of seal w rong sealant used
bad seal - fuel 
transfer
4 5 20 3 2 2C T
imcomplete application of seal not enough sealant
bad seal - fuel 
transfer
1 1 1 3 1 1C A
7. install inlet installed clocked no mistake proofing fuel pickup 1 1 1 3 1 1C A
seal cured prior to install
job sequencing, 
interrupted w ork
rew ork or bad seal - 
fuel transfer
5 1 5 3 1 1C A
w rong torque sequence
didn't know  
requirement
bad seal - fuel 
transfer
1 1 1 3 1 1C A
8.
inspection - 
verify seal 
squeeze out
missed inspection interrupted w ork can't continue w ork 6 1 6 1 1 1E A
roller stamping schedule
bad seal - fuel 
transfer
6 10 60 3 4 4C T
9.
remove 
excessive seal
don't remove excess seal forgot no effect 1 10 10 1 1 1E A
10.
start tube 
installation with 
attached 
jumper bond missing
tube installed w ithout 
jumper bond.
High static discharge - 
Ignition sources
1 1 1 10 1 1A A
11.
clean mating 
surfaces 
(clamp, inlet, 
no cleaning w ork interruption
high resistance, 
compromised bond
2 2 4 5 1 1C A
12.
attach jumper 
to inlet clamp
loose fastening under torque
bond jumper detach - 
static discharge
6 2 12 10 2 2A T
clamp installed at an angle
torqued during 
installation
compromised bond 5 2 10 5 1 1C A
w rong hardw are used mixed parts
compromised bond, 
corrosion
1 10 10 5 1 1C A
13.
perform 
resistance 
check
missed operation w ork interruption
rew ork, improper 
ground may lead to 
ignition
1 1 1 10 1 1A A
meter out of calibration defective equipment compromised bond 4 7 28 5 3 3C T
accepted out of spec value w ork interruption compromised bond 1 1 1 5 1 1C A
incorrect testing Training/experience
failed resistence test, 
rew ork then retest
4 1 4 2 1 1D A
Field Test 1: EPA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
L =  Engr & Prod'n IP Risk: Values from "E-P-A Risk Assessment Matrix".
S = Engr & Prod'n to Airline Systemic Impact: Values from "E-P-A Risk Assessment Matrix".
E = Engineering component reliability statistics (Occurrence ). Values from "E Input for EPA FMEA".
P = IP Production Error Likelihood based on QMS (Detectability ). Values from "P Input for EPA FMEA".
A = Airplane in-service failure probability statisics (Severity  if IP error escapes). Values from "A Input for EPA FMEA".
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4.3.3 Field Test 1 Assessment  
Field Test 1 experimented with ICAO’s format for assessing risk severity. A 
single data point from each of the engineering, production and airline domains 
was connected in the context of the aircraft lifecycle, and correlated to an ICAO-
style SMS risk tolerability value. However, in practicality, a single data point is 
not inclusive of all aspects of the QMS in each domain system, and therefore a 
single data point does not indicate whether or not a risk can escape to the 
downstream domain. The EPA model documented the value of “A” in the 
context of the IP error escaping to the airline. But the single-point model does 
not take into account the many steps within the production system after 
accomplishment of the IP that could or would detect and correct the IP error 
before escaping. 
Furthermore, the type of risk that is under review needs to be better understood. 
Risk to the production domain means production risk. The primary business of 
manufacturing is to build aircraft, and to better understand risk for this domain in 
the context of an ICAO risk assessment, the model must better quantify the 
production system. And a risk to the production system does not necessarily 
correlate to an aircraft operational safety risk that is the focus of airline SMS. It 
is important to note that personnel safety risk, and culture, is a supporting (not 
primary) function of both the aircraft production and airline domains. The 
primary function of airlines is to fly airplanes safely for the public – and thus 
SafetyMS. SMS operational safety is not to be confused with the supporting 
function of airline mechanics, for example, whose personal safety is part of the 
culture, or painters on the aircraft production line who use safety tethers for 
protection them should they accidently fall from a gantry. 
Field Test 1 suggests that while data from the aircraft lifecycle can in theory be 
collected and collaborated into an ICAO risk assessment matrix, in practicality 
challenges are realized with aligning the primary domain-specific risk types, and 
with developing a comprehensive model that includes all the QMS functions that 
are already in place with each domain. 
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4.4 Field Test 2: OPA 
In light of observations from Field Test 1, Field Test 2 distinguished the need for 
greater focus on the production system – specifically to quantify the actual 
reported count of IP errors. IP errors are leading indicators of production system 
health. So the focus became to further consider the production-to-airline 
connection and mock-up this interface, and see if an IP error can directly 
correlate to an airline risk in the context of ICAO’s SMS Risk Assessment 
Matrix. For simulation the engineering domain was excluded, and the FMEA 
model was revised to receive two production domain inputs, and one airline 
domain input. 
4.4.1 Production and Airline Data 
The same IP was used as in Field Test 1, and the FMEA tasks, potential failure 
modes, potential causes and potential effects as identified with process walks 
with the mechanics remained unchanged. However, to provide better production 
focus, the FMEA was revised to OPA [Figure 4-9]. 
The “E” input from Field Test 1 was replaced with “O” to represent the 
Occurrence (or count) of production Non-Conformance Reports (NCR) – also 
referred to as “rejection tags” [Error! Reference source not found.]. The “P” 
input remained, however the input table was revised from a scale of 1 to 10, to 
a scale of 1 to 5 to better align with ICAO’s risk assessment matrix that is on a 1 
to 5 scale [Error! Reference source not found.]. Similarly, the “A” input 
remained but was revised to a 1 to 5 scale based on TC categories of in-service 
risk, thus improving the clarity of definitions [Figure 4-12]. 
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Figure 4-9. Portion of OPA FMEA 
 
 
Figure 4-10. O Input for OPA FMEA 
 
 
Figure 4-11. P Input for OPA FMEA 
Instl Plan XYZ
IP
Step
Task POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE
POTENTIAL 
CAUSES
POTENTIAL EFFECTS O P
RPN
(O*P)
A
1. Receive Inlet inlet not received unavailable no inlet installed 1 1 1 3
2.
Remove Plastic 
Wrapping
plastic w rapping in tank
Left on as protection 
then forgot to remove
plugs the inlet screen - 
reduced/no fuel f low
1 2 2 2
3.
Removal of end 
caps
end caps left in fuel tank (FOD)
Left on as protection 
then forgot to remove
plugs the inlet screen - 
reduced/no fuel f low
1 2 2 2
4.
Clean mating 
surface
mating surfaces not cleaned/prep forgetting to prep bad seal - fuel transfer 1 2 2 2
Field Test 2: OPA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
O = Occurrence
Occurrence (count) of production
Non-Conformance Reports (NCR)
INPUT
Very High
(Chronic)
37 - 60    (~5 per month) 5
High             
(Repeated)
13 - 36    (~3 per month) 4
Moderate     
(Occasional)
7 - 12    (~1 per month) 3
Low
(Relatively few)
2 - 6    (~1 per 2 months) 2
Remote
(Zero to rare)
0 - 1    (~ 0 per year) 1
O Input for OPA FMEA
P = Probability of not detecting 
Production error 
based verification method
Quality Verification methods
as applied to IP and task cards
INPUT
 Absolute Uncertainty Manufacturing Self Inspection 5
 Low Quality Shakedown type inspection 4
 Moderate
Installation verification performed at end of 
specified
3
 High
Installation is verified via 100% concurrent 
inspection
2
 Almost Certain
Installations are verified via sampling 
surveillance & corrective action systems
1
P Input for OPA FMEA
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Figure 4-12. A Input for OPA FMEA 
 
4.4.2 Risk Assessment and Tolerability Matrices 
FMEA results were translated to the OPA Risk Assessment Matrix to obtain “L” 
and “S” values [Figure 4-13], and the corresponding 1A through 5A values were 
input back to the OPA FMEA [Figure 4-14]. ICAO’s Risk Tolerability Matrix was 
again used (unaltered) to assign tolerability values [Figure 4-7]. 
 
 
Figure 4-13. Field Test 2: Risk Assessment Matrix 
A = Severity of 
operational 
Airplane risk
Risk definition INPUT
Catastrophe 
(Category 1)
  Failure conditions which would prevent continued safe flight and 
landing.
5
Hazard
(Category 2)
Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the airplane 
functions, safety margins, and operation efficiencies such as:   
1)  Physical distress or higher workload such that the flight crew 
cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or 
completely
2) Serious or fatal injury to a relatively small number of the 
occupants.
4
Major
(Category 3)
  Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the 
airplane functions, safety margins, and operation efficiencies.
    i.e.   Adverse operating conditions.
3
Minor
(Category 4)
  Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce airplane 
safety which involve crew actions that are well within their 
capabilities.
2
None
(Category 5)
  No discernable effect. 1
A Input for OPA FMEA
A = 5 A = 4 A = 3 A = 2 A = 1
Catastophic
A
Hazardous 
B
Major 
C
Minor 
D
Negligable 
E
21 to 25 5 Frequent 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E
16 to 20 4 Occasional 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E
11 to 15 3 Remote 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
6 to 10 2 Improbable 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E
1 to 5 1 Extremely Impossible 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
(L) Production Risk Probability
L = f (O, P)
(S) Risk severity
Risk to in-service aircraft if production errors manifest
Field Test 2: OPA Risk Assessment Matrix
Meaning
FMEA
RPN
(O*P)
Value
(L)
RPN conversion to ICAO scale "A" input conversion to ICAO scale
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Figure 4-14. Field Test 2: OPA FMEA 
Instl Plan XYZ
IP
Step
Task POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE
POTENTIAL 
CAUSES
POTENTIAL EFFECTS O P
RPN
(O*P)
A L S Tol
1. Receive Inlet inlet not received unavailable no inlet installed 1 1 1 3 1 1C A
2.
Remove Plastic 
Wrapping
plastic w rapping in tank
Left on as protection 
then forgot to remove
plugs the inlet screen - 
reduced/no fuel f low
1 2 2 2 1 1D A
3.
Removal of end 
caps
end caps left in fuel tank (FOD)
Left on as protection 
then forgot to remove
plugs the inlet screen - 
reduced/no fuel f low
1 2 2 2 1 1D A
4.
Clean mating 
surface
mating surfaces not cleaned/prep forgetting to prep bad seal - fuel transfer 1 2 2 2 1 1D A
w rong solvent bad seal - fuel transfer 2 2 4 2 1 1D A
5. Ok to seal missed inspection
mechanic doesn't 
stop for QA
bad seal - fuel transfer 1 1 1 2 1 1D A
interrupted w ork bad seal - fuel transfer 3 1 3 2 1 1D A
contamination on mating surfaces 
after buyoff
job sequencing bad seal - fuel transfer 3 2 6 2 2 2D A
6. apply sealant w rong type of seal w rong sealant used bad seal - fuel transfer 3 3 9 2 2 2D A
imcomplete application of seal not enough sealant bad seal - fuel transfer 1 1 1 2 1 1D A
7. install inlet installed clocked no mistake proofing fuel pickup 1 1 1 2 1 1D A
seal cured prior to install
job sequencing, 
interrupted w ork
rew ork or bad seal - fuel 
transfer
3 1 3 2 1 1D A
w rong torque sequence
didn't know  
requirement
bad seal - fuel transfer 1 1 1 2 1 1D A
8.
inspection - 
verify seal 
squeeze out
missed inspection interrupted w ork can't continue w ork 4 1 4 1 1 1E A
roller stamping schedule bad seal - fuel transfer 3 5 15 2 3 3D T
9.
remove 
excessive seal
don't remove excess seal forgot no effect 1 5 5 1 1 1E A
10.
start tube 
installation with 
attached 
jumper bond missing
tube installed w ithout 
jumper bond.
High static discharge - 
Ignition sources
1 1 1 5 1 1A A
11.
clean mating 
surfaces 
(clamp, inlet, 
no cleaning w ork interruption
high resistance, 
compromised bond
2 2 4 3 1 1C A
12.
attach jumper 
to inlet clamp
loose fastening under torque
bond jumper detach - 
static discharge
3 2 6 5 2 2A T
clamp installed at an angle
torqued during 
installation
compromised bond 3 2 6 3 2 2C T
w rong hardw are used mixed parts
compromised bond, 
corrosion
1 5 5 3 1 1C A
13.
perform 
resistance 
check
missed operation w ork interruption
rew ork, improper ground 
may lead to ignition
1 1 1 5 1 1A A
meter out of calibration defective equipment compromised bond 3 4 12 3 3 3C T
accepted out of spec value w ork interruption compromised bond 1 1 1 3 1 1C A
incorrect testing Training/experience
failed resistence test, 
rew ork then retest
3 1 3 2 1 1D A
Field Test 2: OPA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
L = Production-to-production IP Risk. Values from "O-P-A Risk Assessment Matrix".
S = Manufacturer-Airline Systemic Impact. Values from "O-P-A Risk Assessment Matrix".
O = Count of production NCRs (Occurrence ). Values from "O Input for OPA FMEA".
P = IP Production Error Likelihood based on QMS (Detectability ). Values from "P Input for OPA FMEA".
A = Airplane in-service failure probability statisics (Severity ). Values from "A Input for FMEA".
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4.4.3 Field Test 2 Assessment  
Field Test 2 experimented with the production-to-airline link using ICAO’s SMS 
Risk Assessment Matrix. The inclusion of NCRs provided improved production 
resolution (compared to Field Test 1), but the two production data points still did 
not comprehensively represent the production QMS filters that are in place to 
catch IP escapements within the production system. And the “A” value of the IP 
error escaping to the airline did not take into account the airline QMS filters that 
would or could catch the error and mitigate it at some point. 
Field test 2 defined a risk - but not the type of risk, i.e. production or safety. For 
example, an IP escapement can become an economic inconvenience and or 
schedule disruption to downstream production if rework is required, but this 
does not imply an airline safety risk. As with Field Test 1, Field Test 2 suggests 
that while data from aircraft lifecycle domains can in theory be collected and 
collaborated into an ICAO risk assessment matrix, in practicality challenges are 
realized with aligning the primary domain-specific risk types, and with 
developing a comprehensive model that includes all the QMS functions that are 
already in place with each domain. 
 
4.5 Field Test 3: OD 
Field Test 3 focussed on applying the SMS Risk Assessment Matrix exclusively 
to the production domain. Attention focussed on the same fuel systems IP as in 
the previous field tests. But the Airline (A) value was replaced with a Production 
Escapement (PE) value to measure of how far down the production system a 
prospective IP error may travel (or escape) before becoming known (or 
manifesting). 
4.5.1 Production Data 
FMEA tasks, potential failure modes, potential causes and potential effects as 
identified in the previous field tests were unchanged. However, to focus entirely 
on production, the FMEA was revised to OD [Figure 4-15]. 
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In Field Test 2 the “O” input recorded the NCR count associated with the IP 
task, or step. However, NCRs are key and very visible metrics that are already 
carefully watched within the production system as a function of the QMS. In 
SMS language NCRs can be classified as “leading indicators” that identify areas 
for proactive attention (Lofquist, 2010). Indeed, it was a higher than average 
fuel systems NCR count that pointed this research to IP XYZ. SMS philosophy 
requires awareness of human factors as part of the Assess-Disposition-Mitigate 
chain [Figure 4-1]. So “O” was revised to quantify the likelihood of an IP error 
based specifically on human factors information gathered from the shop floor. 
To generate the “O” FMEA input, 10 questions were established that focussed 
on the risk of IP accomplishment subject to human factors. The questions were 
answered by mechanics accomplishing the IP. Based upon their number of 
“yes” or “no” responses, the Occurrence value translated to a scale of 1 to 5 for 
input to the FMEA [Figure 4-16]. 
In Field Test 2 the “P” input was based upon the probability of not detecting the 
production error subject to the existing QMS process attached to the IP task 
step. For Field Test 3, “P” was replaced by “D”. This represented the 
Detectability of an IP issue, and included 10 questions that were answered by 
Quality and Manufacturing Engineers from the dedicated Fuel Systems IPT. As 
with the “O” input, based upon their number of “yes” or “no” responses, the “D” 
value was translated to a scale of 1 to 5 for input to the FMEA [Figure 4-17]. 
In the context of ICAO SMS definition these values aligned directly with L = 
OxD, or Likelihood of Risk = Occurrence x Detectability. 
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Figure 4-15. Portion of OD FMEA 
 
 
Figure 4-16. O Input for OD FMEA 
Instl Plan XYZ
IP
Step
Task
POTENTIAL 
FAILURE MODE
POTENTIAL CAUSES POTENTIAL EFFECTS O D
RPN
(O*D)
PE
1. Receive Inlet inlet not received unavailable no inlet installed 1 1 1 1
2.
Remove Plastic 
Wrapping
plastic w rapping in 
tank
Left on as protection 
then forgot to remove
plugs the inlet screen - 
reduced/no fuel f low
1 2 2 3
3.
Removal of end 
caps
end caps left in 
fuel tank (FOD)
Left on as protection 
then forgot to remove
plugs the inlet screen - 
reduced/no fuel f low
1 2 2 3
4.
Clean mating 
surface
mating surfaces 
not cleaned/prep
forgetting to prep bad seal - fuel transfer 1 2 2 3
Field Test 3: OD Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
1
Is this a blind Installation
Tip:  Mechanic is installing by feel only, no visual 
y/n
2
Are the drawing / PDD requirements unclear
Tip:  Include shop practices, tribal knowledge, drawing and IP 
conflicts, etc
y/n
3
Are there access issues
Tip:  Design complicates access 
y/n
4
Are there ergonomics / Human Factors / Industrial Safety or 
Accessibility issues?
Tip:  Examples include sizing range, position, weight and location of 
work, lighting, time before fatigue of position, etc.)
y/n
5
Are there tooling issues?
Tip: Inadequate space for tool application (tool sweep - greater than 
60 degrees desirable), tool certification, etc.
y/n
6
Is this a complex installation / design?
Tip: Is the installation not mistake-proof? 
y/n
7
Are there follow-on related process steps?
Tip: Safety device installation, sequencing of specific steps, etc.
y/n
8
Is there a possibility that the job is split between shifts/mechanics?
Tip:  Non-Conformance Report?
y/n
9 Is special training/certification required? y/n
10
Are there additional contributing factors to potential occurrence?
Tip:  Dust, temperature, drilling, congested work area, etc.
y/n
10% 81% 90% 96% 99%
>=5 4 3 2 1
5 4 3 2 1
O Input for OD FMEA
Occurrence (<=)
Number of "yeses" to IP step
O Input OD FMEA
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Figure 4-17. D Input for OD FMEA 
 
4.5.2 Risk Assessment and Tolerability Matrices 
FMEA results were translated to the OD Risk Assessment Matrix to obtain “L” 
and “S” values [Figure 4-18], and the corresponding 1A through 5A values were 
input back to the OD FMEA [Figure 4-19]. ICAO’s Risk Tolerability Matrix was 
again used (unaltered) to assign tolerability values [Figure 4-7]. 
 
1
Would a failure of this process step physically prevent a subsequent 
operation?
Tip:  Failure substantially changes standard work procedures 
y/n
2
Is the process step part of a surveillance plan? (random witness of a 
process)
Tip: Process Monitoring, Product and Process Surveillance (PPS
y/n
3
Is there a witness inspection that would detect this potential failure 
mode?  (Concurrent inspection, two sets of eyes)
Tip: Watching actual process (Torque, Functional Test, etc.)  
y/n
4
Is there an in-process test or measurement that would detect a failure 
of this process step?
Ex. Volt meter, go-no-go gages, functional test instrumentation
Tip:  Detection method can be in a follow-on Installation plan. 
y/n
5
Does this process step require post process inspection?
Tip: Application of Seal, grease y/n
6
Is the process step part of a sampling plan? (end-item inspection 
sampled)
Tip: Lot Sampling Plans   
y/n
7
Would the potential failure mode result in a visible difference to the 
hardware or documentation?
Tip: Can the process be visually inspected?
y/n
8
Would a failure of this process step be detected at end-item 
verification? Job
Tip: Job Sampling Surveillance System (JSSS)?
y/n
9 Is the process step only manufacturing self examined? y/n
10% 81% 90% 96% 99%
5y 4y 3y 2y 1y
5 4 3 2 1
D Input for OD FMEA
Detectability (<=)
D Input
Number of "yeses" to IP step
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Figure 4-18. Field Test 3: Risk Assessment Matrix 
 
 
 
PE = 5 PE = 4 PE = 3 PE = 2 PE = 1
Airline
In-Service
A
Testflight /
Pre-Delivery
B
Preflight
C
Downstream
Prod'n Line
D
Immediate
Prod'n Line
E
15 to 25 5 Frequent 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E
12 to 14 4 Occasional 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E
9 to 11 3 Remote 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
6 to 8 2 Improbable 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E
1 to 5 1 Extremely Impossible 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
FMEA
RPN
(O*D)
Value
(L)
Meaning
Field Test 3: OD Risk Assessment Matrix
(L) IP Risk Probability
L = f (O, D)
(S) Production Risk Severity
Risk to production system subject to where IP error manifests
RPN conversion to ICAO scale "PE" input conversion to ICAO scale
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Figure 4-19. Field Test 3: OD FMEA 
Instl Plan XYZ
IP
Step
Task
POTENTIAL 
FAILURE MODE
POTENTIAL CAUSES POTENTIAL EFFECTS O D
RPN
(O*D)
PE L S Tol
1. Receive Inlet inlet not received unavailable no inlet installed 1 1 1 1 1 1E A
2.
Remove Plastic 
Wrapping
plastic w rapping in 
tank
Left on as protection 
then forgot to remove
plugs the inlet screen - 
reduced/no fuel f low
1 2 2 3 1 1C A
3.
Removal of end 
caps
end caps left in 
fuel tank (FOD)
Left on as protection 
then forgot to remove
plugs the inlet screen - 
reduced/no fuel f low
1 2 2 3 1 1C A
4.
Clean mating 
surface
mating surfaces 
not cleaned/prep
forgetting to prep bad seal - fuel transfer 1 2 2 3 1 1C A
w rong solvent bad seal - fuel transfer 2 2 4 3 1 1C A
5. Ok to seal missed inspection
mechanic doesn't stop 
for QA
bad seal - fuel transfer 1 1 1 3 1 1C A
interrupted w ork bad seal - fuel transfer 3 1 3 3 1 1C A
contamination on 
mating surfaces 
after buyoff
job sequencing bad seal - fuel transfer 3 2 6 3 2 2C T
6. apply sealant w rong type of seal w rong sealant used bad seal - fuel transfer 3 3 9 3 3 3C T
imcomplete 
application of seal
not enough sealant bad seal - fuel transfer 1 1 1 3 1 1C A
7. install inlet installed clocked no mistake proofing fuel pickup 1 1 1 3 1 1C A
seal cured prior to 
install
job sequencing, 
interrupted w ork
rew ork or bad seal - fuel 
transfer
3 1 3 3 1 1C A
w rong torque 
sequence
didn't know  requirement bad seal - fuel transfer 1 1 1 3 1 1C A
8.
inspection - 
verify seal 
squeeze out
missed inspection interrupted w ork can't continue w ork 4 1 4 1 1 1E A
roller stamping schedule bad seal - fuel transfer 3 5 15 3 5 5C I
9.
remove 
excessive seal
don't remove 
excess seal
forgot no effect 1 5 5 3 1 1C A
10.
start tube 
installation 
with attached 
jumper bond
jumper bond 
missing
tube installed w ithout 
jumper bond.
High static discharge - 
Ignition sources
1 1 1 4 1 1B A
11.
clean mating 
surfaces 
(clamp, inlet, 
jumper, 
no cleaning w ork interruption
high resistance, 
compromised bond
2 2 4 2 1 1D A
12.
attach jumper 
to inlet clamp
loose fastening under torque
bond jumper detach - static 
discharge
3 2 6 3 2 2C T
clamp installed at 
an angle
torqued during 
installation
compromised bond 3 2 6 3 2 2C T
w rong hardw are 
used
mixed parts
compromised bond, 
corrosion
1 5 5 1 1 1E A
13.
perform 
resistance 
check
missed operation w ork interruption
rew ork, improper ground 
may lead to ignition
1 1 1 1 1 1E A
meter out of 
calibration
defective equipment compromised bond 3 4 12 1 4 4E T
accepted out of 
spec value
w ork interruption compromised bond 1 1 1 2 1 1D A
incorrect testing Training/experience
failed resistence test, 
rew ork then retest
3 1 3 2 1 1D A
PE = Production Escapement: Values from "Production Escapement (PE) Input for OD FMEA". 
Field Test 3: OD Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
O = Occurrence of possible  IP errors errors based on Human Factors. Values from "O Input for OD FMEA".
D = Detectability of possible IP errors based on QMS inspectio criteria. Values from "D Input for OD FMEA".
L = Production single-point failure IP Risk. Values from "OD Risk Assessment Matrix".
S = Production Risk systemic impact. Values from "OD Risk Assessment Matrix".
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4.5.3 Field Test 3 Assessment  
Field Test 3 experimented with production-to-production links using ICAO’s 
SMS Risk Assessment Matrix. The production-centric ATA-specific model 
included human factors inputs that influenced the evaluation of the IP risk 
assessment. It weighed the IP risk in terms of PE severity to the production 
system. Unlike attempting to connect more than one domain, the application of 
the risk matrix for a single domain proved to be viable, and furthermore it 
focused on the risk that is primary to the domain. In the case of the production 
domain, production risk is measured by the ICAO Risk Assessment Matrix, and 
the production risk allowance level is categorized by the ICAO Risk Tolerability 
Matrix. 
 
4.6 Evaluation of Field Tests 
The three field tests each targeted the application of ICAO’s risk assessment 
matrix. The first two tests applied the matrix to one or more domains, and it was 
observed that the matrix did not clearly identify a single point of failure as a 
function of multiple domains. The third test focussed on one domain – 
production – and was able to successfully apply the risk model to quantify a 
single point of production risk based upon IP input, and the systemic severity to 
the production system as a function of an IP error. 
In observing the three field tests the outcome is apparent by comparing 
tolerability results [Figure 4-20]. The EPA FMEA that included all three domains 
yielded 20 Acceptable, 5 Tolerable and 0 Intolerable results for IP XYZ tasks. 
The OPA FMEA that did not include the engineering domain, and had a 2/3 to 
1/3 focus on the production to airline domain yielded 4 Tolerable results and the 
remainder were Acceptable. The OD FMEA that was 100% production-centric 
yielded 19 Acceptable, 5 Tolerable, and 1 Intolerable result. This indicates that 
a multi-domain model is not data-concentrated to a degree that can focus on a 
single risk point. However, the model as applied to a single domain, ATA-
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specific commodity can focus on a single point, and assess its systemic impact 
within that domain. This research contends that SMS, as arguably proven with 
airlines, is viable based on this one-domain observation. 
Another key aspect of Field Test 3 was the inclusion of human factors for the 
“O” input. In response to a leading indicator, such as a high NCR count, 
production enterprises often carry out a process walk – or Gemba Walk - of the 
shop floor to observe related activities. In Quality Management, a Gemba walk 
is defined as “the idea is that if a problem occurs, the engineers must go there 
to understand the full impact of the problem, gathering data from all sources. 
Unlike focus groups and surveys, Gemba visits are not scripted or bound by 
what one wants to ask”. (Imai, 1997) 
Field tests did experiment with Gemba Walks but found the unscripted nature to 
be too undefined to provide a consistent and repeatable focus on IP human 
factors. Therefore the IPT generated the “O” questions, and walked the floor 
and asked the mechanics for “yes” or “no” responses that aligned with the 
context of human factors – a key constituent of SMS intent. 
The field tests constitute the Risk Management and Risk Assurance 
components of the ICAO SMS model. Observations substantiate that these two 
components, in an SMS-like architecture, can be applied to the production 
domain. However, the outcome is Production Risk Management – not Safety 
Risk Management. With this it is suggested that as applied to production the 
model should be referred to as a Production Risk Management System 
(PRMS). 
In the context of ICAO’s L and S: 
 Production Risk (PR) = L x S 
 L = IP Risk Probability 
  = Likelihood of IP error at production line 
  L = O x D 
     O =  Likelihood of Occurrence of IP error 
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     D = Likelihood of Detecting IP error at production line 
 S = IP Risk Severity 
  = Severity of IP escapement: How far along the production line, and
   into the airline, the IP error can travel (escape) before becoming
   known (manifesting). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that field tests were carried out using one 
ATA commodity – Fuel. There are 30 Airframe System chapters, and 7 
Structure chapters. Field tests developed a method for quantifying a risk 
Assessment and Risk Tolerability matrix in the Fuel system commodity. For the 
PRMS model to be successful across the entire aircraft manufacturing domain, 
the IPT assigned to each commodity must develop their ATA-specific “O” and 
“D” questions to support an ATA-specific Risk Assessment Matrix. To generate 
an overarching production domain risk management view, all the resulting risk 
assessment matrixes need to be correlated – possibly by simply multiplying 
them together. These would then feed an overarching manufacturer’s PR 
tolerability matrix.   
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Figure 4-20. Comparison of Field Test Results 
 
IP
Step
Task L S Tol L S Tol L S Tol
1. Receive Inlet 1 1C A 1 1C A 1 1E A
2.
Remove Plastic 
Wrapping
1 1C A 1 1D A 1 1C A
3. Removal of end caps 1 1C A 1 1D A 1 1C A
4. Clean mating surface 1 1C A 1 1D A 1 1C A
1 1C A 1 1D A 1 1C A
5. Ok to seal 1 1C A 1 1D A 1 1C A
1 1C A 1 1D A 1 1C A
2 2C T 2 2D A 2 2C T
6. apply sealant 2 2C T 2 2D A 3 3C T
1 1C A 1 1D A 1 1C A
7. install inlet 1 1C A 1 1D A 1 1C A
1 1C A 1 1D A 1 1C A
1 1C A 1 1D A 1 1C A
8.
inspection - verify 
seal squeeze out
1 1E A 1 1E A 1 1E A
4 4C T 3 3D T 5 5C I
9.
remove excessive 
seal
1 1E A 1 1E A 1 1C A
10.
start tube installation 
with attached jumper 
bond
1 1A A 1 1A A 1 1B A
11.
clean mating 
surfaces (clamp, 
inlet, jumper, 
washer)
1 1C A 1 1C A 1 1D A
12.
attach jumper to inlet 
clamp
2 2A T 2 2A T 2 2C T
1 1C A 2 2C T 2 2C T
1 1C A 1 1C A 1 1E A
13.
perform resistance 
check
1 1A A 1 1A A 1 1E A
3 3C T 3 3C T 4 4E T
1 1C A 1 1C A 1 1D A
1 1D A 1 1D A 1 1D A
EPA FMEA OPA FMEA OD FMEA
Field Test 1
Engr, production & 
airline data
Field Test 2
Production and 
airline data
Field Test 3
Production data 
only
Instl Plan: XYZ
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5.0 ICAO and Production Risk Management System 
(PRMS) Model 
With Field Tests substantiating PR as the key output of “SMS” architecture 
when applied to the production domain, ICAO’s model is revisited and 
recomposed in the context of a PRMS. ICAO identifies SMS via 4 components 
[Figure 2-2]. These support the implementation and functionality of SMS and 
have become the accepted standard with the aviation industry and regulatory 
bodies internationally. By adopting the same architecture, translating it into the 
production domain and integrating IP Risk Probability (L) as defined by Field 
Tests, PRMS emerges with the concept that PRMS can connect (via external 
escapements) to airline SMSs, but while the systems are similar they are not 
the same. SMS supports airlines’ safety risk. PRMS supports manufacturers’ 
production risk. 
The term “risk management” has been defined by ICAO as “the identification, 
analysis and elimination (and/or mitigation to an acceptable or tolerable level) of 
those hazards, as well as the subsequent risks, that threaten the viability of an 
organization” (ICAO, 2009). Another “risk management” definition is “the overall 
process of identifying, evaluating, controlling or reducing, and accepting risk. It 
is the general term given to the process of making management decisions 
about risks that have been identified and analyzed” (Wells & Rodrigues, 2003). 
It is important to note that these definitions define “risk” regardless of the 
domain. Field tests show that the type of risk is domain-centric – and therefore 
production risk and safety risk must be quantified and managed according to 
the applicable domain. 
This paper now refers to Bill Yantis’ “SMS Implementation” (Stolzer, et al., 
2011), and converts key aspects of his ICAO SMS implementation strategy into 
a PRMS implementation framework: PRMS parallels SMS by defining 
production as the state in which PR is reduced to, and maintained at or below, 
an acceptable level through a continual process of risk identification and risk 
management. This includes a closed loop system of measurement and 
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evaluation of production rate goals and operations, organizational performance, 
and human factors as set by the aircraft manufacturing enterprise. 
PRMS is holistic. No single action or person causes a PR. Risk is a result of an 
infinite number of related events that align to cause the perfect storm (Reason, 
1991). PRMS, as with SMS, is a system that seeks to proactively predict and 
mitigate – or head off - this perfect storm. But it is not absolute: 
 In the perfect world PR would be entirely eliminated, but absolute control 
is unachievable with human beings and dynamic production operations. 
 PR is an integral and unavoidable aspect of aircraft manufacturing. 
 PR is the outcome of the management of manufacturing processes. 
 PRMS should be considered as an optional business advantage 
strategy, even though some form of “SMS” for aircraft production and 
maintenance is likely to become a future regulatory requirement. 
PRMS defines the acceptable and measurable level of PR margin.  PRMS 
focuses on correlating IP risks with metrics from sources including non-
conformance reports, internal escapements, external escapements, supply 
issues, production rate goals, personnel training and qualifications, and human 
factors. PR is already central to production QMSs, and aligning them into the 
PRMS architecture would require investment for development and 
implementation – an investment similar to that of airlines aligning aircraft flight 
operations QMSs with SMS architecture. By the same argument this research 
suggests that by organizing around the components and elements as 
transcribed to PRMS, aircraft manufacturing companies would add to the 
integrity of already excellent QMSs. “very frankly, it’s matter of education. Once 
people see the advantages, they will be more likely to establish an “SMS” 
program in the absence of regulation (Overhaul & Maintenance (OVMT), 2009). 
As transcribed from ICAO’s SMS, PRMS includes 4 Components [Figure 5-1]. 
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PRM
Component 2
PRA
Component 3
PCM
Component 4
PRP
Component 1
Integration
Production Risk
Mgmt System (PRMS)
Enterprise Cultures and Values
 Monitor & Measure
 Production Ops data
 PR performanceCFR 21.165 Responsibility of 
holder
A) Maintain the quality control 
system in conformity with the 
data and procedures approved 
for the production certificate; 
and
B) Determine that each part 
and each completed product, 
including primary category 
aircraft assembled under the 
production certificate by 
another person from a kit 
provided by the holder of the 
production certificate, submitted 
for airworthiness certification of 
approval conforms to the 
approved design and is in a 
condition for safe operation.
POLICY: Production Risk Mgmt
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 Assess PR
 IP risk probability (L)
 IP risk severity (S)
 IP risk tolerability
 Identify
 Installation Plan (IP)
 Employee Reports
 Change Mgmt
 Regulatory
 Process / procedure
 Organization
 Outsourcing
 Suppliers Mitigate PR
 Accept / Avoid 
Mitigate / Transfer
 Continuous 
Improvement
 Plan-Do-Check-Act Document PR
 Organizational 
Culture
 Training & Education
- Production Risk
- Personal Safety Risk
 Communication
 
Figure 5-1. PRMS Architecture 
 
Of the four components, the risk management and risk assurance components 
require the most tailoring when transitioning from SMS to PRMS. Although both 
SMS and PRMS follow the Identify-Assess-Mitigate chain, the risk management 
and risk assurance components require significant alteration to encompass 
specific production nuances. The culture and policy components require less 
alteration since they are based on many industry studies and regarding 
organizational management, and therefore much of the language is transferable 
not only from SMS, but from other general sources. 
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5.1 Component 1: Production Risk Policy 
5.1.1 Element 1 – Management commitment and responsibility 
Management commitment and responsibility: Commitment of senior 
management to PR is reflected in a policy statement signed by the accountable 
executive. 
Accountable Executive 
Just as ICAO SMS requires commitment from executive management, and as 
with nuclear regulators’ observation of the need for executive accountability, 
PRMS needs support at the top enterprise level. Such commitment includes the 
identification of an Accountable Executive with overall responsibility for PR. This 
person would have authority for policy decisions, provision of resources, 
financial control, and PR reviews. The PRMS Accountable Executive would 
enforce essential tenets: 
 PRMS is the business approach to managing production risk. 
 PR indices (including ICAO’s risk assessment matrix and risk tolerability 
matrix) and mitigation as primary PRMS functions. 
 At time of implementation PRMS is a cultural change. 
 Production line supervisors and employees hold PR accountability, and 
senior management provides full support. 
 The enterprise ensures a healthy production culture with non-punitive 
action regarding human error management. 
PR Policy 
The enterprise PR policy must unequivocally show, via auditable 
documentation, senior management’s commitment to PR as central to the 
aircraft production enterprise. Management must create and maintain a healthy 
production culture whereby employees feel comfortable to do the right thing, 
and as appropriate report and query a standard production process that 
appears to be problematic. Through such reporting not only is the prospective 
risk averted, but the process is revised to mitigate risk out of the production line.  
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PR Reporting 
Similar to SMS safety policy, PR policy ensures a non-punitive PR reporting 
process. Traditionally, management reviewed confidential reports without the 
reportee identifying oneself. However, such confidentiality may not provide a 
feedback loop for management to gain additional information and make 
production line improvements. Organizations may prefer such reporting 
because it may shield adverse information from regulators during an 
investigation. In recognition of this issue the FAA implemented the optional non-
punitive Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) for airlines that incentivise 
employees who provide safety information. Similarly, PRMS can seek a 
regulated manufacturers’ PR reporting process to positively recognize 
employees who provide PR information. 
PR Review Board 
Similar to SMS’s accountable executive, the PRMS accountable executive 
should own and lead the PR review board – typically a weekly or monthly 
assessment meeting to review production performance metrics including: 
 results of PR assessments 
 results of production operations audits, inspections and investigations 
 human factors 
 operations feedback 
 regulatory violations, and proposed and upcoming regulatory changes 
 process initiatives and organizational conformity 
 status of PR items in mitigation 
5.1.2 Element 2 – Production accountabilities 
A statement of accountabilities clearly defines production responsibilities of 
managers and employees at different levels in the organization with effective 
delegation of responsibilities established for operationally critical areas when 
principal office holders are absent. 
As with all regulated industries, job roles and responsibilities are clearly spelled 
out in aircraft manufacturing enterprises. Definitions are defined with RAAs - 
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Responsibility, Accountability, and Authority (RAA). A minimal number of 
additional RAAs should be necessary for PRMS implementation, such as 
Accountable Executive and PRMS manager, but most positions within 
production RAAs already include, or can be adjusted to encompass. 
 Responsibility: The specific job function, duty or task assigned to each 
production employee along with necessary resources to perform the 
operational duties, as aligned with the work processes, procedures and 
activities. For example, the responsibility of IP XYZ installation is 
assigned to a fuel systems installation mechanic as defined by his RAA. 
 Accountability: Responsibility defines the physical activity of performing 
the job, and accountability is the obligation of the mechanic to meet the 
results of work activities. 
 Authority: The power or ability to command, grant permission and or 
approve is defined by individuals’ authorities.  Authority is delegated by 
management to enable an individual to complete an activity such as the 
IP. Or a mechanic may be delegated authority to sign off an IP on behalf 
of the QMS inspector. 
5.1.3 Element 3 – Appointment of key production personnel 
The production manager is tasked by the accountable executive with the daily 
oversight functions of PRMS. Depending on the PRMS-QMS implementation 
strategy, the PRMS accountable executive may assign daily responsibility to the 
PRMS or QMS manager. Since aircraft manufacturing companies are typically 
large well-organized enterprises, this paper suggests that existing production 
and QMS personnel, i.e. those who formed the IPT for the Field Tests, are 
suited to manage and perform the functionalities to support PRA and PRM. 
Selection Process and Criteria 
Selection and implementation of PRMS staff parallels dialogue that, since the 
inception of SMS, has been pivotal. As with successful businesses, margins are 
monitored closely, and additional expenditures must be carefully scrutinized. 
PRMS is a production versus protection discussion that is about risk 
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management in the universal sense. When so many layers of protection applied 
such that at the cost of protection exceeds the value of the product? Or such 
that the cost crosses the threshold of diminishing returns? To paraphrase 
James Reason: “production risk is defined more by its absence than its 
presence” (Reason, 1991). To put a value on measuring “absence” may seem 
intangible so the PRMS manager must be versed with all aspects of PRMS 
including the investment discussion. He must command strong managerial skills 
to effectively communicate with top leadership, as well as manage technical 
issues to ensure PRMS functionality. 
Professional Training 
For PRMS consistency, specific training should be established. Many technical 
managers have limited formal training in areas such as systems management, 
organizational behaviour, production risk, QMS and human factors (Stolzer, et 
al., 2011). As with many training requirements under a Part 25 certificate, 
PRMS training should be established and recurrent. 
5.1.4 Element 4 – Coordination of emergency PR response planning 
An Emergency Response Plan (ERP) includes contingency plans to ensure 
proper response to executive management decision-makers when a critical 
production risk situation arises. For example, if an installation continues to be 
problematic to the point where an imminent production stoppage may, or has 
occurred, key decision-makers must have 24/7 visibility of such an event in 
order to deploy emergency resources, or take appropriate action, to avert the 
production line stoppage. 
5.1.5 Element 5 - PRMS documentation 
PRMS documentation: All production management activities must be 
documented and be available to all employees. 
Regulated enterprises require a documentation system that defines company 
operating policies and procedures. PRMS must align with the existing with 
organizational structures that are typically in place with large enterprises, that is 
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a convention of four tiers: Organizational, divisional, departmental, and the task 
level. This ensures that all management and staff have defined and auditable 
definitions of their respective areas. 
 
5.2 Component 2: Production Risk Management 
PRMS requires that the organization has a formal means to collect, analyze and 
apply results from three different types of data (Johnson, 2012): 
 Reactive: The event has already occurred. Depending on the severity of 
the event it will become known through the “grapevine” or if highly critical 
it may make the morning news. Companies usually already have 
accident/event procedures in place and have investigative processes to 
establish fact-finding contributing factors. The event investigation 
process is a reaction to the event – and thus the term “reactive” 
 Proactive: Collecting, analyzing and assessing data is not new. But he 
emphasis on the term “proactive” is new. Production organizations have 
auditing, quality and safety departments that assess production 
performance and risk. The company is responsible for collecting and 
assessing opportunities for improvement with the data – and in PRMS 
(as with SMS) such audits are referred to as “proactive”. 
 Predictive: Predictive data systems are a means to use daily/normal 
operations to help identify production strengths and weaknesses. This 
data helps identify the hazards and threats so they can be managed 
before they become errors, or before an IP error escapes into the 
production stream. It is a matter of identifying and addressing challenges 
as early as possible. In advance of assigning a risk level. Frontline 
employees often see hazards and threats before management therefore 
predictive data should be worker-cantered. Voluntary reporting systems 
are effective and are addressed in the Production Culture Management 
component.  
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PRM houses the Identify-Assess-Mitigate-Document chain. It is about using 
leading indicators such as NCR counts to identify an IP for proactive 
assessment. But PR does not exclusively deal with sub-optimal IPs. It is also 
about identifying areas of personal safety risks and hazards that can undermine 
the efficiency (or risk) of a production system. 
5.2.1 Element 6 – Aircraft Production hazard identification 
The manufacturer must maintain processes that insure that hazards are 
identified for all operational activities. Hazard identification is based on a 
combination of reactive, proactive and predictive production management 
methods. 
Production Hazard Definition 
ICAO identifies hazards in the context of an object with the potential to cause 
injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or 
reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function (ICAO, 2009). 
With PRMS a production hazard is considered as a situation with the potential 
to cause injuries to production personnel, damage to production facilities, 
equipment or structures, loss of material, damage to the aircraft, or any damage 
that would negatively affect production rates and or generate production 
escapements. By paralleling ICAO’s context into production, PRMS adopts 
three categories of hazard – natural, technical and economic: 
Natural Hazards are consequence of the environment within which production 
operations take place such as movement of the aircraft as it moves from the 
assembly line to field test, flight test, and equipment exposed to the weather 
outside production facilities: 
- Severe weather (i.e. thunderstorms, floods, lightening, and hurricanes) 
- Adverse weather (i.e. icing, heavy rain and snow) 
- Geophysical events (i.e. earthquakes and floods) 
- Environmental (i.e. wildlife and wildfires) 
- Public health (i.e. sickness and epidemics) 
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Technical Hazards are the result of malfunctions in equipment, software or 
sources of energy: 
- Production systems (i.e. tooling, machinery, computing and data 
infrastructure) 
- Organization’s facilities (i.e. offices, production hangars, flight line) 
- Systems and equipment external to the organization (i.e. partners and, 
suppliers) 
Economic hazards are the consequence of the global socio-political economic 
environment in which the manufacturing company operates in: 
- Global GDP (i.e. multiple enterprise suppliers and partners in multiple 
global locations, operating in an integrated global economy) 
- Recession (i.e. 2008 financial crisis) 
- Production costs (material, equipment, people) 
 
Production Hazard Sources 
Manufacturing organizations are continuously exposed to production hazards. 
PRM begins with the identification of these hazards through the formal process 
of collecting, recording, analyzing and providing feedback to assigned 
production managers. Four types are data are available to the manufacturer – 
external, corporate, functional and individual. Data from these sources supports 
the IPT (as defined in field tests) before beginning an IP process walk.  
 External sources: The oversight of Production Certificates by regulators 
such as the FAA in the United States, CAA in the United Kingdom, CASA 
in Australia, and JCAB in Japan. Regulators maintain compliance-based 
surveillance by deploying onsite inspectors at the manufacturing 
facilities. This traditional approach works in conjunction with production 
QMSs data collection, and supports proactive hazard identification. 
 Corporate or organizational source: As the safety services department 
for SMS provides independent analysis of risk data, the production QMS 
department collects production data on behalf of the PRMS accountable 
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executive. Production hazards or threats are identified during the review 
of employee reports and annual or bi-annual audit data.  
 Functional source: PRMS audits take place intermittently during the 
calendar year. But on a daily basis process owners are responsible to 
ensure that departmental activities and production procedures are 
planned and trained for, and executed in line with operational goals. New 
hazards can occur at any moment, and line supervisors must positively 
support employees who identify and report production hazards in the 
PRMS model. 
 Individual sources: Hazards include individualized actions that production 
mechanics may take to complete inadequately defined IPs. Such action 
is referred to as a non-standardized workstream. IPs describe steps that 
are at a level suited for the mechanic to interpret. However, there may be 
an inadvertent lack of IP clarity that causes a margin of human error. In 
such cases the mechanic may, with best intentions, craft installation 
steps that are not consistent with another mechanic performing the same 
task. “O” questions are designed to bring such issues forward. However, 
should hazards be recognized with IPs that are not yet selected for a 
process walk, the mechanic should report the issue without fear of 
reprisal. Such an IP risk is an example of a threat to the production 
system. Examples include personal error, slippery conditions on the shop 
floor, tools that are out of calibration, inadequate protective clothing, and 
production rate pressures, etc. Stolzer suggests that employees think in 
terms of Threat and Error Management (TEM) with SMS, and PRMS 
adapts the same TEM philosophy. TEM requires that threats and 
personal errors are recognized by each employee as they occur, and that 
each employee manage the threat as a threat manager. While it is the 
employee’s responsibility to report these threats for resolution, it is 
management’s responsibility to remove these threats, as appropriate, 
from the production system. It is important to reiterate that PRMS is 
about mitigating risk as appropriate and within reason. Some level of risk 
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is inherent with every complex enterprise. No production system can be 
one-hundred percent risk-free as is recognized by TEM. 
Healthy PR Reporting 
For PR reporting to be successful, the enterprise must ensure the continuance 
of a healthy production culture as defined by PCM. This promotes and 
encourages employees to provide valuable PR information, which could be 
compromised or lost if management takes punitive action, no action and or no 
feedback. PR reporting is central to the proactive identification of hazards in 
terms of risk, and the prioritization of resources for implementation and 
mitigation is essential. 
 Non-punitive: PRMS management must review PR reports in a positive 
manner, and without the employee feeling threatened or in fear of 
punitive action. Just as all people inadvertently err, mechanics can make 
mistakes that result in operational errors. Reports must be reviewed in 
the context of an opportunity to make adjustments to the production 
environment and procedures. A positive approach and meaningful 
solution, rather than punitive action, shows that a healthy production 
culture is in place. 
 Action: If management is not responsive to actual or perceived PR 
issues, production personnel will not feel encouraged to report PRs. After 
submitting a report employees should receive timely feedback and see 
an actionable remedy, and or be informed that the PR report is taken 
seriously and under consideration. 
 Acknowledgement: If management does not acknowledge the report, the 
employee will feel ignored. Employees who report PRs must be 
recognized in order to maintain trust in the management, which in turn 
strengthens PCM. 
Reactive PRM 
Investigations take place subsequent to discovery of some level of failure or PR. 
In the airline environment this is after an accident or incident, and conversely in 
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the production domain it is after a production NCR, PR escapement, or flight 
test issue, for example. A production investigation is a symptom of aircraft 
production. The purpose of the investigation is to determine what happened, 
how, and to prevent a recurrence. Investigations are recognized as most 
effective when all parties work in concert with all levels of management and 
employees. Reactive data should be collected for the PRMS IPT ahead of the 
process walk to focus on the IP that may link to the issue. As transcribed to 
PRMS the following is compiled as guidance for a PRMS investigation: 
 Fact finding and data collection 
- IP review 
- Employee interviews 
- Production data analysis 
- Quarantine and analyze damaged, failed or miss-installed hardware 
- SME interviews 
- Production line video 
- Airline participation (in case of external escapement) 
 Data analysis 
- Assemble IPT to evaluate facts 
- Attain consensus on the facts, sequence of events and production 
system deficiencies 
- Ensure data ambiguities are resolved and understood 
 Written summary 
- Summarize factual information and analytical methods/results 
- Explain gaps in data to enhance credibility of reports 
 Findings, conclusions and recommendations 
- Summarize sequence of events and results of root cause analysis 
- Identify and assign specific corrective actions within production 
operations to prevent reoccurrence 
- Coordinate with airline in case of external escapement 
 Senior management review 
- Provide senior management with review of facts and corrective action 
plan 
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- Assign and track implementation of corrective actions 
- Conduct periodic follow-up assessments to ensure the effectiveness 
and sustainability of the corrective actions 
A reactive investigation in an environment of open communication can provide 
information on topics that include procedural and training deficiencies. By 
reacting to the PR, the investigation can also correlate areas previously not 
identified and initiate proactive actions. 
 
Production Operations Data Analysis 
Production data analysis is one of the most powerful tools to monitor the health 
of daily manufacturing operations. Production data is both reactive and 
proactive. It is reactive in the sense that it captures historic deviations from 
standard production operating procedures. And it is proactive in that trend 
information may show a shift in production parameters such as increased 
hazards in the assembly line wing-to-body join, for example, leading to 
increased production time-flow. Manufacturing data that is available includes: 
 Notification of (internal and or external) Escapement (NOE) 
 Quality Assurance Reports (QAR) 
 Production Non-Conformance Reports (NCR) 
 Manufacturing Parts Requests (MPR) 
 Production shipside data 
 Flight test delivery reports 
 Manufacturer/airline conferences 
 Service Bulletins 
 Design requirements 
 
Existing versus Predicted Hazards 
Existing hazards are those that currently exist in an organization, whereas 
predicted hazards are those that may manifest as a result of a change such as 
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with an IP revision, operational change, and new supplier or partner, or changes 
that partners and suppliers make within their organizations. Existing hazards 
that have been identified should be mitigated by starting with an IP process 
walk. Supporting data should come from areas such as voluntary employee 
reporting, audits, and production data from NCRs and investigations. 
Predicted hazards are a result of deliberate process or procedural change. 
Examples include new production tooling, production rate increases, production 
of a new aircraft model, a new computing system, and a change of, or new, 
suppliers. The IPT should identify PR issues that may surface from such 
changes, and then proactively treat them as predicted PR risk hazards and 
consider a process walk for potentially impacted IPs. 
 
5.2.2 Element 7 – Production Risk assessment and mitigation 
Individual production hazards are analyzed, and their consequences are 
assessed and communicated throughout the organization. Mitigation actions 
must be developed for those hazards presenting unacceptable operational risk. 
Likelihood, Severity and Assessment 
PR assessment is the analysis of the consequences of the hazards that could 
threaten the production organization. Field Tests adapted ICAO’s “SR = L X S” 
formula as applied to airlines, and translated it to develop a process to identify 
the probability of a single point of production failure, i.e. IP risk (L). 
To assess “L” in context of the enterprise production system: 
1. PRMS translates ICAO’s SMS Risk Assessment Matrix [Figure 5-2] into 
the PRMS Risk Assessment matrix [Figure 5-3]. 
2. PRMS refers to probability values 1 through 5 [Figure 5-4]. 
3. PRMS refers to severity values A through E [Figure 5-5].  
4. Alpha-numeric values A through 5 are aligned with the ICAO Risk 
Tolerability Matrix to determine production risk tolerability levels [Figure 
5-6]. 
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5. Tolerability values are entered into the corresponding FMEA IP tasks as 
exercised in Field test 3 [Figure 4-19]. 
SMS uses the Risk Assessment matrix to quantify in-service airline risk severity 
(S) that can manifest from “L”. The example used in this paper’s 
Method/Overview was low hydraulic fluid pressure due to an airlines’ A&P error 
(single point of failure, L) causing a airline risk in terms of the landing gear not 
retracting after takeoff, an air turnback and passenger travel delays (systemic 
risks, S). 
Conversely, the PRMS Risk Assessment Matrix quantifies “S” as to how far the 
IP error severity may escape (or travel) before manifesting. PR increases as the 
escapement moves further downstream within the production system. Although 
PRMS is about production system exposure to PR, the PRMS Risk Assessment 
Matrix as a secondary function can connect to an airline SMS and correlate the 
possibility of an external escapement. 
PR is an integral and unavoidable aspect of aircraft manufacturing. PRMS 
defines the acceptable and measurable level of PR margin, but does not 
eliminate PR. The IP Risk Assessment Matrix provides a measure of where the 
IP Risk can or does manifest in the production system. 
PR is managed by determining if the risk is tolerable or intolerable. SMS uses 
ICAO’s tolerability matrix, and PRMS is also able to use the matrix “as is” to 
quantify the tolerability level in the context of PR. The appropriate tolerability 
values are entered into the OD FMEA. Within the intent of SMS architecture, but 
as applied to the production world, this provides each IP step with a 
classification of Acceptable (A), Tolerable (T) or Intolerable (I) production risk. 
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Figure 5-2. ICAO Risk Assessment Matrix 
 
 
Figure 5-3. PRMS Risk Assessment Matrix 
 
 
Figure 5-4. ICAO Definitions of Probability (applied unaltered to PRMS) 
 
Catastophic
A
Hazardous
B
Major
C
Minor
D
Negligable
E
Frequent 5 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E
Occasional 4 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E
Remote 3 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
Improbable 2 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E
Extremely Impossible 1 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
Risk Severity
Risk
Probability
External 
Escapement
No 
Escapement
Airline /
In-Service
Testflight /
Delivery
Preflight
Downstream
Production
Line
Immediate
Production
Line
A B C D E
Frequent 5 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E
Occasional 4 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E
Remote 3 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
Improbable 2 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E
Extremely Impossible 1 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
IP Risk Severity (S)
(Place of IP error discovery / manifestation)
Internal EscapamentIP
Risk Probability
(L)
Probability (L) Meaning Value
Frequent Likely to occur many times (has occurred frequently) 5
Occasional Likely to occur sometimes (has occurred infrequently) 4
Remote Unlikely to occur (has occurred rarely) 3
Improbable Very unlikely to occur (not known to have occurred) 2
Extremely Improbable Almost inconceivable that the event will occur 1
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Figure 5-5. PRMS Definitions of Severity 
 
 
 
Severity (S) Meaning Value
Customer (airline) operational and or economic impact
External production escapement: Post delivery in-service problems 
requiring mitigation of escaped production issues
IP error manifests after C of A and delivery of aircraft to airline. In-
service discovery of production error
Issuance of regulatory Airworthiness Directives
A large reduction in flight-test / delivery capability, physical distress or a 
workload such that employees cannot be relied upon to perform their 
tasks accurately or completely
Production system escapements requiring large amounts of rework and 
schedule impact and or late delivery of airplane to customer
Production system scheduling issues requiring large amounts of 
"travelled" or out-of-sequence work and or late delivery of airplane to 
customer
Serious incident causing negative impact to flight-test / delivery 
operations
Personnel injuries causing negative impact to flight-test / delivery 
operations
Internal escapement. IP error manifests during pre-customer testflight 
causing airplane delivery delay. Customer economic impact.
A significant reduction in preflight operations capability, a reduction in 
the ability of employees to cope with adverse operational conditions as a 
result of increased workload, or as a result of conditions imparing their 
efficeincy
Production-line escapements requiring significant rework
Production scheduling issues requiring significant "travelled" or out-of-
sequence work
Serious incident causing negative impact to preflight operations
Personnel injuries causing negative impact to preflight operations
Internal escapement. IP error manifests during pre-flight preparation. 
Production rework required and possible delivery delay.
Nuisance requiring minor rework
Production operating limitations
Use of emergengy procedures
Minor incident
Internal escapement. IP error manifests downstream in production line 
causing re-work and or travelled work, but production delay not incurred.
Almost inconceivable that the event will occur
No escapement. IP error is realized immediately and resolved.
Negligable:
Immediate Production Line
A
B
C
D
E
Critical:
Airline / In-Service
Hazardous:
Flight-test / Delivery
Major:
Preflight
Minor:
Downstream Production Line
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Figure 5-6. ICAO Risk Tolerability Matrix (applied unaltered to PRMS) 
 
It is important to observe the differences between the PRMS and ICAO 
definitions of severity [Figure 5-7]. ICAO/SMS definitions are entirely geared 
towards airline operational safety. Trying to embed these into the production 
operations is a misfit, so for PRMS the definitions were revised to align with the 
production domain while the scale remained constant. By comparing SMS 
versus PRMS severity definitions, this research argues that applying SMS as-is 
into the production domain is not viable. 
 
5A, 5B, 5C
4A, 4B, 3A
Unacceptable under the
existing circumstances
5D, 5E, 4C, 4D,
4E, 3B, 3C, 3D,
2A, 2B, 2C
Acceptable based on risk
mitigation. It may require
management decision
3E, 2D, 2E, 1A,
1B, 1C, 1D, 1E
Acceptable
ICAO Risk Tolerability Matrix
Intolerable Region
Tolerable Region
Acceptable
Region
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Figure 5-7. ICAO SMS Definitions of Severity 
 
PR Mitigation 
PR mitigation is the management of potential effects of production operational 
hazards and resulting economic impacts. Risk management decision-making 
can affect multiple departments, therefore PRMS must ensure the IPT involved 
and familiar with the IP process walk remains active with PR mitigation. 
Risk tolerability margins are defined by acceptable, tolerable and intolerable. 
The IPT reviews intolerable steps to understand the nature of the issues. IP 
XYZ Step 8 received an Intolerable rating (5C) because it could potentially (or 
has) cause interrupted work and disruptions with preflight operations. With a 
potential schedule and economic impact to the manufacturer this indicates a 
case for mitigative action to be taken.  
Tolerable margins range from 2C to 5D. “Tolerable” is not necessarily 
interpreted as “OK”. For example, step 6 received a rating of 3C implying the 
occasional manifestation of escapement at preflight. This should also be 
Severity (S) Meaning Value
Equipment destroyed
Multiple deaths
A large reduction in safety margins, physical distress or a workload 
such that employees cannot be relied upon to perform their production 
tasks accurately or completely
Serious injury
Major equipment damage
A significant reduction in safety margins, a reduction in the ability of  
employees to cope with adverse production operational conditions as a 
result of increased workload, or as a result of conditions imparing their 
efficeincy
Serious incident
Injury to persons
Nuisance
Operating limitations
Use of emergengy procedures
Minor incident
Negligable Almost inconceivable that the event will occur E
A
B
C
D
Catastrophic
Hazardous
Major
Minor
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reviewed from the perspective of schedule and economic impact perspective – 
it may be occasional, but how much does the escapement cost and exactly how 
often could it, of has it, happened? Is it really tolerable, or can a process be 
altered upstream to mitigate this potential or actual 3C event?  
 
PR Categories 
PRMS adapts the four risk mitigation categories as used by ICAO and SMS. 
These are used alone or in combination. 
 Accept or assume risk: The PRMS manager or executive team accepts 
the PR with or without mitigation. By accepting the risk it is determined 
that that the possible negative impact, and the probability of it occurring 
as documented by the tolerability matrix, does not require mitigation. 
 Avoid risk: The PRMS manager or executive team eliminates, revises, or 
re-sequences IPs to avert the PR. 
 Mitigate risk: The PRMS manager or executive team approves, funds, 
schedules and implements one or more IP risk mitigation strategies. 
 Transfer risk: The PRMS manager or executive team transfers ownership 
of the IP, or IP step, to a better suited production position. 
 
PRM Documentation 
Just as SMS requires documentation of risk assessment and mitigation 
activities, so does PRMS. Aircraft manufacturing is a large enterprise and 
already administrates multiple online computing systems. Adding PRMS to the 
production documentation and records system incurs costs to be evaluated and 
presented by the accountable executive. As with PRMS in general, the debate 
of implementation and maintenance costs versus value, is invoked when 
considering IT infrastructure requirements. Notwithstanding the cost discussion, 
PRMS documentation: 
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 Establishes managerial accountability and supports informed decision-
making. 
 Provides records of risk assessment and mitigation decisions. 
 Gains signatory buy-in from process stakeholders who have authority to 
commit budget to mitigation strategies. 
 Provides accountability of accepted predicted residual risks, and 
agreement with processes and risk determinations/decisions. 
 Provides accountability to regulators who oversee the production 
certificate. 
 Provides closed-loop data. 
 
5.3 Component 3: Production Risk Assurance 
 
Introduction 
PRA assures there is an acceptable and managed level of production risk 
through the use of PRA tools and methods. It is the monitoring and feedback 
system to provide confidence in the entire production management team to 
afford assurance as to the performance of production operational systems and 
processes using prescribed assessment tools. PRA works in conjunction with 
the existing QMS, and adapts the ICAO “SMS” framework to focus on 
production hazard identification, risk assessment and mitigation. Production risk 
assurance requires an input of production performance to complete the 
production management cycle and make necessary changes to the affected 
system. 
Concepts and Definitions 
Safety assurance as described in ICAO’s Safety Management Manual was 
derived from ISO 9001:2000. A number of states define safety assurance in the 
framework of quality assurance (Stolzer, et al., 2011). Similarly, this paper 
defines production assurance in the same context: PRA ensures procedures 
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are carried out consistently, functional departments are in compliance with State 
regulations, operational problems (production hazards) are identified and 
resolved, continual improvement of processes and procedures and the 
verification that corrective actions to recognized production hazards are proven 
to be effective and sustainable. 
As with SMS safety assurance, PRA can be carried out within the existing QMS. 
The PRM and PRA components require frequent interface to ensure production 
hazards are collaboratively managed and monitored [Figure 5-8]. It is in the 
areas of PRM and PRA that the enterprise requires the most attention to align 
with PRMS, whereas the policy and culture components require less 
rearrangement since they are more domain-generic in their makeup. 
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and Production Risk Assurance (PRA)
 
Figure 5-8. PRM-PRA Functional Relationship 
 
Parallel and Sequential PA 
PRA works sequentially when new production processes are implemented, and 
after existing processes are revised. In conjunction with PRA’s sequential 
activities, PRM proactively identifies potential hazards associated with the 
change, documents the mitigation strategy and controls to manage the 
associated risk, and gains management approval for the associated risk. Then 
PRA ensures that the PR controls achieve intended objectives, and PRA 
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provides feedback to line managers regarding the effectiveness of controls and 
overall health of the production system. PRA works in parallel with PRM for 
audits to ensure production functions are current, and to ensure the overall 
health of production processes and procedures. 
 
5.3.1 Element 8 – Production performance monitoring and 
measurement 
Production assurance activities focus on assessing the health of the production 
organization. Specific goals for improvements in all areas should be set for all 
senior operational managers. Production assurance should include monitoring 
of external sources of production information and include participation in 
production groups or production data sharing organizations. 
Production assurance is conducted by measuring the outcomes of operational 
activities that result in the production of aircraft by the organization. In SMS, and 
conversely with PRMS, production assurance elements are applied to gain an 
understanding of the human and organizational issues that can impact 
production risk. As transcribed to PRMS, performance monitoring and 
measurement may be accomplished by assessing organizational processes 
through the lens of the following perspectives (ICAO, 2009): 
 Responsibility: The manager who is accountable for PRMS operations. 
 Authority: Who can direct, control, or change PRMS procedures, and 
make key decisions on PR acceptance issues. 
 Procedures: Specified ways to carry out PRMS operations that correlate 
the “what” objectives into “how” activities. 
 Controls: Facets of the system such as hardware, software, and 
procedures that support PRMS. 
 Interfaces: Lines of authority between departments, communication 
throughout PRMS, and consistency of PRMS between work and 
employee groups. 
 92 
 Process measures: Means of providing feedback to responsible 
managers to ensure that PRMS outputs are as planned. 
 
Production Data Sources 
Aircraft systems, structures and power plants are organized by ATAs 
(APPENDIX A). ATAs are common standards, or “chapters” for all commercial 
aircraft documentation. This unique aspect of chapter numbers is used for 
airplane models regardless of the manufacturer. Thus an ATA chapter 
reference number for a Boeing 747 is the same as for an Airbus A380, Embraer 
ERJ 145, Gulfstream V, and BAe 125. For example, Fuels is ATA (Chapter 28), 
Oxygen (Chapter 35), Electrical Power (Chapter 24), Doors (Chapter 52), and 
so forth. 
This research used the count of NCRs from ATA 28 as the leading indicator to 
focus on IP XYZ. Aircraft manufacturers and their IPTs typically organize 
around ATAs, so these teams are already in place and can readily be aligned to 
support a PRMS model. Production data is ATA-specific and includes: 
 Notification of (internal and or external) Escapement (NOE) 
 Quality Assurance Reports (QAR) 
 Production Non-Conformance Reports (NCR) 
 Manufacturing Parts Requests (MPR) 
 Production shipside data 
 Flight test delivery reports 
 Airline performance quality reports 
 Airline equipment quality reports 
 Continuous Operations Safety Program (COSP) 
 Maintenance communications from airlines to manufacturer 
 In-service airline reliability and maintenance data (i.e. MTBF) 
 Manufacturer/airline conferences 
 Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) 
 Regulatory Safety Bulletins 
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 Service Bulletins 
 Design requirements 
Such data is used by aircraft production enterprises for metrics. Depending on 
the level of PRMS investment, the data may be assimilated into one PRMS 
database and with the use of an algorithm, prospective problem IPs may be 
proactively identified. Such leading indicator data is provided ahead of process 
walks, and supports traditional reactive PRM activities. 
Measuring PR Performance 
PRMS uses PR indicators to measure the pulse of the production system, and 
establishes PR targets. Indicators align with production data sources, as 
defined by the manufacturer based upon specific enterprise expectations. PR 
targets connect to PR values to maintain economic margins. Examples that the 
manufacturer may select include: 
PR Indicator 
- NCRs 
- Not meeting production rate 
- Internal production escapement 
- External production escapements 
- Economic / over budget 
- Workforce disruption such as labour strike 
- Supplier disruption 
- Regulatory violations 
- Workforce accidents or incidents 
- Missed employee training and certification 
PR Target 
- Optimize/tighten threshold values in IP Tolerability Matrix 
- Clarify IPs 
- Reduce number of production NCRs to a maximum acceptable 
threshold 
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- Reduce number of escapements to a lower acceptable threshold 
- Reduce rework on production line, and rework that occurs 
downstream (travelled work) as a result of line production errors 
- Reduce out-of-sequence work 
- Increase production rate 
- No missed workforce recertification 
- Zero workforce accidents or incidents 
- Improve management response time to employee reports 
- Reduce supplier flow time 
PR Value 
- Clarify IPs: Lost time due to interpreting unclear IP steps 
- Reduce rework: Lost time on unaccepted work, and on time taken to 
make corrections and or rework the installation 
- Increase production rate: Deliver more aircraft per year and increase 
revenue 
5.3.2 Element 9 – Management of change 
External or internal changes may introduce new hazards to production 
operations activities. Processes must exist to manage organizational responses 
to regulatory changes, major changes in operational procedures or new 
activities. Production reporting systems should have processes established to 
identify new risks and actively monitor performance in new areas of the 
operation. 
ICAO states … a formal management of change process should identify 
changes within the organization which may affect established processes, 
procedures, products, and services. Prior to implementing changes a formal 
management of change process should describe the arrangements to ensure 
safety performance (ICAO, 2009, 9.8.4). 
As applied to PRMS, “safety performance” becomes “PR performance”. PRMS 
transcribes change management as the documented strategy to proactively 
identify and manage PR that can accompany a significant change with the 
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aircraft manufacturer, whether operational, technical, or organizational. 
Examples for the PR change management process include: 
 production operations expansion or contraction 
 changes to existing production systems, equipment or programs 
 new aircraft models and procedures 
 outsourcing of production operations 
 changing suppliers and partners 
 organizational changes to include a merger of reorganization 
Changes take place in manufacturing enterprises in order to generate new 
aircraft models, create derivatives of existing models, deploy up to date 
manufacturing technology, avert escapements, and so forth. Changes keep the 
enterprise competitive in the short and long terms. While the outcomes of 
changes are included with the manufacturers’ regulatory oversight, the actual 
process of change is less established (Quinn, 1996). PRMS, as with SMS, 
suggests the need to better formalize and document the change process and 
better substantiate change decisions. This also provides a permanent record of 
why decisions were made that can be accessed and understood by employees 
who were not at the enterprise when changes were made. 
Two forms of change are identified – incremental change and deep change. 
Change management has been greatly studied with quality and human factors 
researchers for decades. As applied to PRMS, incremental change 
management is applicable to areas such as employee reports, audit reports, 
NCRs, performance metrics, etc. Deep change represents a commitment by the 
organization to escape a slow death to extinction or insignificance (Quinn, 
1996). An example would be an aircraft manufacturer’s recognition that its 
existing airplane model is becoming outdated. In response, significant 
investment is made to design and manufacture a new model in order for the 
company to remain competitive. Change management is a component of 
PRMS, and PRMS adopts industry standards and conventions for this activity. 
Change Management 
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The FAA ATO developed a change management approach to ensure hazards 
are identified and unacceptable risk is mitigated prior to making procedural, 
process, or system change. As applied to PRMS it is initiated by a change 
proponent or sponsor who performs PR analysis. Terms are transcribed to 
PRMS as follows: 
 PR Management Panel: A PRMP is a group of carefully selected 
stakeholders from various organizations affected by the change. The 
PRMP identifies potential production hazards, conducts PR assessment, 
develops suggested mitigation strategies and completes PRMD. 
 PR Management Document: The PRMD is an effective tool to summarize 
(record) the PR analysis, capture the prioritized hazards and associated 
PR mitigations and serves to enable the management team to 
understand the change, associated PRs, mitigation strategies and 
commitment to fund and implement the mitigation strategies. 
 PR Management Decision Memo (PRMDM): Should the change 
proponent conclude that no PR will be introduced into the system by the 
change, a PRMDM is prepared to document the justification and 
rationale. 
The PRMP assembles the ATA IPT to provide senior management with a 
technical assessment of the proposed changes to existing systems or 
processes. The PRMP is scalable to the size of the aircraft manufacturing 
enterprise. The completed PRMP completes the PRMD and is reviewed and 
signed by leadership. Signatures represent the acceptance of the PR analysis 
process, the acceptance of predicted residual PR after implementation of 
mitigation strategies and the commitment of resources to implement the PR 
mitigation strategy. Further discussion of this process is described in the ICAO 
SMS Implementation Guide – IATA, April 2010a, 6.2 (Stolzer, et al., 2011). 
Eric Lofquist argues that traditional metrics in the civil aviation industry of 
reporting incidents and accidents do not fully capture the true state of an 
evolving organization and are, at best lagging indicators (Lofquist, 2010). As 
transcribed to PRMS, he proposes a balanced approach to managing risk as a 
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system that monitors risk in three temporal phases embedded in the 
organizational culture. These phases - proactive, interactive and reactive - are 
mechanisms and measures that are both separated in time, and include both 
leading and lagging indicators that are both qualitative and quantitative, and 
include production personnel’s perceptions of evolving production systems 
during change. He argues that this will provide a balanced approach to the 
production system’s risk at any given point in time and give organizational 
leaders leading indicators from which to make proactive measurements. This 
approach is compatible with SMSs already place with most civil aviation-related 
organizations, and supports an integrated system such as a manufacturing 
enterprise with multiple overlapping certificates. 
5.3.3 Element 10 – Continuous Improvement of the PRMS 
Production assurance utilizes quality tools such as internal evaluations or 
independent audits to assess organizational health from a safety perspective. 
Onsite assessments of operational management systems on a recurring basis 
provide opportunities for Continuous Improvement (CI) of processes and 
procedures for each functional area of the organization. PRMS audits are 
aligned with ISO 9000. ISO 9000 is a series of standards that are already part 
of aviation industry certification processes (Hale, et al., 1997). 
Plan-Do-Check-Act 
Aircraft production companies continuously go through organizational changes 
to remain viable in the market. Management systems evolve based upon 
lessons learned, remediation of flaws in production operations, and 
identification of improvement opportunities. Continuous improvement and 
learning is inherent to a healthy production culture that enables proactive PR 
management through process assessment and improvement. 
At its functional working level, PRM identifies and mitigates aircraft PRs, and 
PRA assures effectiveness of PRM [Error! Reference source not found.]. 
However, the relationship between PRM and PRA is different at the 
organizational level. Here, PRA supports enterprise management of production, 
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and delivery of aircraft and services to the customer. PRA is part of the 
overarching business primary and operates unlike its working level RAA. 
Transport Canada, EASA, the FAA, and other regulatory bodies employ the 
PDCA tool to manage organizational change. PDCA (plan–do–check–act or 
plan–do–check–adjust) is an iterative four-step management method used in 
business for the control and CI of processes and products. It is also known as 
the Deming circle/cycle/wheel, and Shewart cycle - control circle/cycle, or plan–
do–study–act (Deming, n.d.). As adapted to PRMS, PDCA encompasses the 
working levels of PRM and PRA and includes the production enterprise at large 
for continuous improvement [Figure 5-9]. PRMS uses this tool to ensure 
compatibility with Transport Canada, EASA and the FAA who utilize a version of 
the PDCA cycle with SMS.  
 
Figure 5-9. PRMS Plan-Do-Check-Act 
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PRA and CI 
PRMS relies on existing company QMS infrastructure and personnel. Similar to 
conventional QA, PRA includes the independent activity of providing evidence 
needed to establish confidence, among all concerned, that PRMS is being 
performed effectively. At the enterprise level, PRA supports CI by assuring 
production quality through independent audits and evaluation of established 
processes, procedures and documentation. In contrast, at the functional level, 
PRA QC is the responsibility of the line manager to oversee the day-to-day 
activities of inspectors who ensure compliance of production activities such as 
IP accomplishment. PRA operates with generalists in the enterprise context. 
And with QC personnel, PRA provides technical experts who identify procedural 
deviations and errors on the production line.  
Management Review 
An essential ingredient of SMS is management review that requires a periodic 
formal meeting of senior leadership to review the health of the production 
enterprise. The output of PRM and PRA activities are primary metrics that 
indicate opportunities for improvement. The management review process can 
include a number of agenda items to assess the health of the organization in 
terms of regulatory compliance, PR, efficiency, productivity, incident and 
accident reports, status of corrective and preventative actions, audit results, and 
so forth. 
 production and quality performance audits 
 operational results that reflect production process or production system 
deficiencies 
  audit results, to include internal evaluation, internal audits and regulatory 
feedback 
 Regulatory violations 
 Incident and accident investigation results 
 Status of corrective and preventative actions 
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 Review of prioritized list of production operational risks: 
- production 
- quality 
- security 
- environmental 
 organizational effectiveness to include division of work streams 
 changes in regulatory policy or legislation 
To paraphrase Stolzer: Production Risk Assurance is nothing more than 
assuring production risk through the use of quality assurance tools and 
methods, all with a focus on production. The central message to all of us is to 
create a simple alignment of the work streams in production, quality, security 
and environmental disciplines so that the manufacturer can understand and 
embrace the processes and tools. Otherwise the leadership will continue to deal 
with inefficiency, confusion and redundancy (Stolzer, et al., 2011). 
5.4 Component 4: Production Culture Management 
The trend around safety culture originated after the Chernobyl disaster brought 
attention to the importance of safety culture and the impact of managerial and 
human factors on the outcome of safety performance (O'Conner, et al., 2008), 
and although the term of “organizational culture” became known in businesses 
in the late 80s and early 90s (Kinicki, 2011), corporate culture was already used 
by managers and addressed in sociology, cultural studies and organizational 
theory in the beginning of the 80s (Smircich, 1983). 
Introduction 
PCM requires the accountable executive to advocate PR practices that will 
improve the organizational production culture, provide effective production 
training for all employees, and communicate production information that 
promotes adherence to standard production operating procedures and 
consistent behaviours. Similar to ICAO’s description of safety promotion, PRMS 
defines PCM in the context of Training and Education, and Production Risk 
Communication. 
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Concepts and Definitions 
PCM requires the PRMS accountable executive to demonstrate the mindset 
that is expected of employees. The entire management team must “walk the 
talk” to underscore the importance and value of a healthy production culture. 
The UK CAA categorized training into four levels relative to SMS, that also 
apply to PRMS: 
 operational staff 
 managers and supervisors 
 senior leadership 
 accountable manager 
In order to provide more awareness of the relationship between culture and 
organizational identity, a conceptual path model was created (Lin, 2012). The 
findings showed that, in the airline model, safety culture has been strengthened 
as a result of the implementation of the SMS. Furthermore, the loyalty factor of 
the organizational identity is found to positively and significantly predict the 
performance of SMS through the safety culture. The same benefits should also 
apply to PRMS since humanistic characteristics and psychology (or soft 
attributes) of people between aviation domains is similar. 
Organizational culture is a set of shared mental assumptions that guide 
interpretation and action in organizations by defining appropriate behaviour for 
various situations. At the same time although a company may have its "own 
unique culture", in larger organizations, there are diverse and sometimes 
conflicting cultures that co-exist due to different characteristics of the 
management team. The organizational culture may also have negative and 
positive aspects (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). 
Yi Hsin Lin researched the relationship between safety culture and the 
organizational identity of a safety management system, in order to provide more 
awareness of how airline employees perceive organizational identity and safety 
culture as they successfully implement SMS (Lin, 2012). By transposing the 
findings to PRMS, it can be argued that production culture – a subset of 
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organizational culture - can be strengthened as the result of implementation of a 
PRMS. Furthermore, the loyalty factor of organizational identity should be found 
to positively and significantly predict the performance of PRMS through 
production culture management. 
 
5.4.1 Element 11 – Training and education 
The organization must identify personal safety training requirements for each 
level of management and for each employee group. Production training for 
operational personnel should address production responsibilities, including 
complying with all operating and production procedures, recognizing and 
reporting hazards and ultimately ensuring that employees have the knowledge 
and skills to safely complete production activities. 
PCM requires different types of training for different enterprise levels. 
Production personnel must know how and when to submit hazard reports, how 
the reports are processed, and the results of the reports. Managers and 
supervisors require training for PR identification, assessment and mitigation, 
and the accountable executive focuses on PR leadership strategy. 
While PRMS leadership must be knowledgeable of all PR aspects, production 
line employees (although familiar with PRMS at large) focus on detailed 
processes that are part of their day-to-day functions. ICAO, 2009, 9.11 provides 
guidance for training and education that translate to PRMS: 
 documented process to identify training requirements 
 validation process that measures the effectiveness of training 
 indoctrination training incorporating PRMS, to include human factors 
 initial (general PR) job-specific training 
 recurrent PR training 
PRMS staff involved in leadership, change management, continuous 
improvement, or investigations require training for: 
 roles and responsibilities pertaining to PRMS and QMS 
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 event investigation and analysis techniques 
 audit principles and techniques 
 management system design, analysis and implementation 
 root cause analysis 
 human and organizational factors 
 communication and training techniques 
 
5.4.2 Element 12 – Production communication 
Production communication includes information on production culture, reporting 
systems, investigation results, production risk lessons-learned and 
management actions taken as a result of employee PR reporting. 
Production Culture 
As with SMS, PRMS uses Dr. James Reason’s definition of safety culture and 
applies it to production culture [Figure 5-10]. This consists of five elements: 
 Informed Culture: people are knowledgeable about the human, technical, 
organizational and environmental factors that determine the production 
risk of the enterprise as a whole. 
 Flexible Culture: people can adapt enterprise processes when facing 
stressful and temporary production operations. 
 Reporting Culture: people have enough trust and confidence in PRMS to 
respond to PR reports in a way that justifies the time and effort to submit 
the report. 
 Learning culture: people at all levels of the enterprise continue to identify 
opportunities for improvement and implement reforms to production 
operations procedures and processes. 
 Just culture: a just culture, for the most part, refers to the attitude of the 
management team to deal rationally, fairly and justly with employees who 
make unintentional mistakes. 
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Figure 5-10. Organizational Culture 
 
Communication of production information is a key responsibility for the 
production manager and for the organization as a whole. Continuous 
improvement and learning is accomplished through the sharing of lessons 
learned from investigations, hazard report analysis and operational safety 
assessments. Feedback to operational personnel such as examples of 
procedural improvements as a result of production reports is an essential 
feature of production communications. Communication includes PR culture 
information, reporting systems, investigation results, PR lessons learned and 
management responses to employee PR reporting.  
Communications to specific employee groups ensure engagement is specific to 
job types such as to production line supervisors, technicians, QA line 
inspectors, installation mechanics, production planners, production controllers, 
crane operators, machine operators, painters, tool crib personnel, and so forth. 
Organizational culture studies require cultural assessments to be measurable, 
and this data is provided to PRM via the PR Culture Assessment tool as 
customized for this study (Appendix C).  
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PR Summit 
Similar to SMS safety summits, PRMS schedules an annual stand-down or PR 
summit where senior leaders and production operations executive management 
meet to align PRMS across the enterprise. The agenda may include: 
 review of RAAs 
 review of enterprise culture and strategies to improve culture 
 review of enterprise and regulatory relationship 
 assessment of PRMS processes 
 PR hazard tracking system and effectiveness 
 PR data analysis metrics 
 
5.5 Summary of PRMS Model 
PRM and PRA are the most salient differences between safety risk 
management and production risk management. Put simply, SMS is in-service 
(airline) risk management while PRMS is about aircraft production risk. This 
research recognized that there is not a direct correlation from a shop floor IP 
event to an airline risk. But there are a string of events (or non-events), that can 
take place during production that can lead to an external escapement that can 
subsequently be identified within airlines’ SMSs. PRMS uses risk philosophy to 
proactively identify and mitigate production risk. It identifies IP risk probabilities 
(L), uses a risk assessment matrix to quantify the severity of how far 
downstream the resulting IP error may travel (S), and uses a risk tolerability 
matrix to determine if mitigative action is or is not required. A PR that manifests 
during production is an internal escapement. An external escapement is a PR 
that manifests after the airplane receives the C of A and is delivered to the 
airline at which point the airline SMS reviews the risk impact in terms of 
reliability, safety, inconvenience, economic, etc. Airline and manufacturers do, 
or course, collaborate for resolution at times of external escapement. 
PRMS uses data collection methods to identify risk within the production 
system. Field test 3 included human factors. It gathered data such as how an 
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aircraft mechanic may use poorly defined IPs, use tools that may not be most 
suitable for the job at hand, use insufficient lighting in a confined space with 
limited access, or work in cold weather. It targets operational risk facing the 
manufacturing organization, whereas SMS focuses on risks associated with 
airline operational safety. For PRMS to align with SMS philosophy the elements 
of PR identification, and PR assessment and mitigation were established. Using 
the context of the Australian Civil Aviation Authority (CASA) for risk, risk is be 
termed as “low enough that attempting to make it lower, or the cost of assessing 
the improvement gained in an attempted risk reduction, would actually be more 
costly than any cost likely to come from production risk itself”. As with SMS, 
PRMS identifies risks through a concert of reactive and proactive means.  
Reactive data is historical and in the form of “incoming data and trends” 
Proactive data is gathered from the process walk and assesses prospective or 
future events that may manifest if mitigation does not happen. 
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6.0 Discussion and Evaluation of PRMS 
6.1 Risk Management in High-Risk Domains 
6.1.1 Aircraft Production Risk Mgmt is not Airline Safety Risk Mgmt 
The aviation industry includes the domains of the aircraft lifecycle as identified 
in this paper. Regulators attempt to apply SMS across all three domains. When 
investigating the nature, or primary function of each domain, it evident that the 
primary type of risk for each domain is different. For this reason this research 
proposes that the concept of applying one generalized SMS across the aviation 
industry at large is not feasible. 
As industries became more complex over the last century the necessity to 
manage risk – or manage safety - became increasingly essential to conduct 
business enterprises. Depending on the industrial sector, or professional field, 
one term is preferred over the other but both are generalized as the same even 
though used for different domain-centric implications (Harms-Ringdahl, 2004) . 
Little systemic research has been completed on the applicability of different 
safety (or risk) management methods, or the limitations of generalizing 
safety/risk management across and within industries and domains. While the 
practices of human factors training and incident reporting promote risk 
management, successful design and implementation varies substantially due to 
differences across working domains. The one-size-fits-all SMS gold standard 
approach to designing and running one SMS across all industrial domains is 
considered to be difficult or possibly even dangerous to follow (Grote, 2012). 
By using three attributes to benchmark and design an SMS program, a clearer 
understanding emerges of why one SMS does not work for both the airline and 
production operations domains. These attributes are (1) the kinds of safety (or 
risk) to be managed, (2) the general approach to managing uncertainty as a 
hallmark of organizations that manage safety or risk, and (3) the regulatory 
regime within which safety or risk is managed (Grote, 2012). The attributes align 
with industry-accepted SMS definitions and standards as discussed in this 
paper and with the recognized SMS features to include: 
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 Safety (risk) policy 
 Safety (risk) resources and responsibilities 
 Risk identification and mitigation 
 Standards and procedures 
 Human factors based systems design 
 Safety (risk) training 
 Safety (risk) performance and monitoring 
 Incident reporting and investigation 
 Auditing 
 Continuous improvement 
 Management of change 
The approach to designing SMS architecture framed with these three attributes 
and with the above features is subject to the enterprise domain, and not 
necessarily to the industry in general, i.e. aviation. 
6.1.2 Type of Risk - Process versus Safety 
It is essential to differentiate between process risk and personal safety risk 
(Hopkins, 2009). The salient distinction between airplane production and airline 
operations is that production is primarily about building airplanes at a 
predetermined rate, with minimal production risk, to meet enterprise goals. 
Production is concerned with process-driven work tasks that if not executed on 
schedule, can jeopardize production rate. Or if not performed properly and the 
IP error left undetected, the airplane may be subject to delivery with defects in 
the context of production escapements. As described in this paper, production 
escapements in turn invoke varying types of downstream risk – albeit internal or 
external. Production personnel safety is a secondary function to production risk, 
such as a mechanic sustaining a shop-floor injury that may impact the 
scheduled completion of an IP, or the engineering department not providing 
support to clarify design issues to avert production confusion and negative rate 
impact. 
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Conversely, the primary function of a commercial airline operation is to transport 
people safely. Any airplane operational safety risk is directly connected to the 
personal safety risk of the customer, or the flying public, which can jeopardize 
the airline enterprise. However, to support airline operations, the aircraft 
maintenance process that sustains safe flight operations requires the secondary 
function of process-driven work tasks that align more closely with production 
risk architecture.  
The distinction between process risk and safety risk was evidenced during the 
field tests of this research. Field test 1 attempted to apply airline SMS 
architecture to the production environment. An effort was made to include 
unadjusted safety risk management to a domain that is primarily concerned with 
production risk. Field test 3 showed that with production risk management as 
the primary focus of the resulting PRMS architecture, PR can be managed with 
similarities to SMS. But it is not the same – SMS could not just be transferred to 
production operations. To achieve PRMS, the Safety Risk Management 
component was adjusted to Production Risk Management, and the Safety 
Assurance component to Production Risk Assurance. 
This paper recognizes the different primary risk management focuses of airlines 
and aircraft manufacturers. Depending on the aviation industry domain, process 
risks and safety risks must be identified and assessed as primary or secondary 
functions. There is little conceptual and empirical knowledge on how measures 
aimed at process safety or personal safety yield their affects and how they 
interact, which constitutes and very significant need for future research (Grote, 
2012). This paper demonstrates that is it important to understand what the 
primary risk focus is, whether safety or process, before designing an SMS, or 
SMS-like architecture.  
6.1.3 Approach to Managing Type of Risk 
Along with recognizing the type of primary risk to be managed, the approach to 
managing the risk must be defined. The traditional premise is to manage and 
minimize risk through regulatory oversight, bureaucratic organization, rigid 
standards, and automation of work processes with limited degrees of freedom 
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for employees (Taylor, 1967, c1947). More conventional theory espouses 
flexibility to empower organizations and employees with a degree of freedom. 
This provides for some actions to be self-directed rather than rigidly following 
fixed plans. Typically, high risk domains such as airline operations and aircraft 
production manage safety and process risk with the traditional methodology due 
to the consequences of uncontrolled uncertainties (Grote, 2012). SMS 
recognizes the value of approaching risk management with a balance of 
traditional standardization and a limited degree of self-empowerment – or a 
balance between stability and flexibility. 
The type of primary risks for airlines and manufacturers are different, but given 
that both are in high-risk domains, the philosophy of managing risk is 
transferable, but not the exact architecture as tested by the adaptation of SMS 
to PRMS architecture. 
6.1.4 Regulatory Considerations 
Although some degree of self-regulation is provided for, aviation regulatory 
bodies are mostly traditional due to the high-risk nature of the aviation industry 
(Business & Commercial Aviation, 2006). This is consistent as evidenced by 
domestic and international aviation regulatory bodies that are in various stages 
of requiring SMS for aviation domains. This research considers all aviation 
regulatory bodies and makes the case that SMS is applicable exclusively to 
airlines, whereas a similar but different architecture that is specifically 
production-risk centric should be recognized as applicable to the aircraft 
manufacturing environment. 
6.1.5 Risk Management Design 
To provide some guidance on how risk management should be designed, three 
components of safety/risk management are considered – standards and 
procedures, safety training, and incident reporting and investigation. These are 
among components most commonly introduced in high-risk industries while also 
being in need of adaptation to particular circumstances and domains (Grote, 
2012).  
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6.1.6 Standards and Procedures 
Standards and procedures are relevant to high-risk domains. Rules and 
behaviour identify how actions, such as Installation Plans on the production line 
or Task Cards during aircraft maintenance, relate. Rules are the written for 
instructions, such as the IP, that when mature are repeated with a high degree 
of regularity. Behaviour describes the qualitative, or subjective, way in which the 
person routinely carries out the rules. While it is important to have stability in 
order to provide a consistent and repeatable process, PRMS requires some 
flexibility for frontline workers to raise the need for process changes in cases 
where the rules and behaviour – resulting in actions – may have become 
misaligned over time. (Becker & Zirpoli, 2008). This balance between stability 
and flexibility is part of the production culture component.  
6.1.7 Safety and Process Training 
Personal safety training is typically associated with individual and team safety. It 
is common in high-risk domains (Burke, et al., 2006). In recent years many 
high-risk domains have invested in personal training since accident analyses 
show malfunctioning coordination as precursors to accidents (Salas, et al., 
2007). In the airline business a personal safety risk may transfer to a flight 
operations (primary) risk, whereas in the aircraft manufacturing business a 
personal safety risk may translate to a (primary) production risk, such as a 
mechanic falling from a platform and causing a production stoppage. For both 
the airline and manufacturing aviation domains personal safety training is a 
transferable piece of SMS to PRMS architecture. 
PR training for PRMS is about informing personnel of how their process actions 
can affect the production system in the context of situational awareness or 
errors and immediate or downstream consequences. While PR training focuses 
on the production system risk, safety training focuses on personal safety which 
may as a secondary function impact production. 
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6.1.8 Incident Reporting and Investigation 
Incident and accident reporting aligns with the Production Culture Management 
component of PRMS. Such reporting can only work when blame and punitive 
action is avoided (Dekker, 2008). An example would be a mechanic who notes 
that another worker routinely completes IPs in order to meet the time allocated 
for task completion, which keeps the production supervisor satisfied that 
production rate is staying on schedule. However, for the task to be completed 
on-time, the mechanic moves to a subsequent IP step without providing process 
time for the first step to complete which requires curing of a sealant. The 
mechanic is not concerned with this, as he notes, he considers the sealant to be 
cured before he moves to the next step, and it is the IP step/time allocation that 
is incorrect. The second mechanic, in the spirit of a blameless culture, should 
feel comfortable to advise the supervisor of the issue so the IP can be revised, 
or the mechanic who considers the sealant to be cured – to be better trained to 
understand the necessity of a full cure time. 
  
6.2 PRMS and the Manufacturing Domain 
ICAO annexes mandate the provision of an SMS framework to govern aviation 
worldwide. It is applicable to service providers such as maintenance 
organizations, as well as enterprises responsible for type design and/or 
production of aircraft, i.e. aircraft manufacturers. Simultaneously, the FAA is 
working on how to apply SMS, and AC120-92A provides guiding principles for 
the entire aviation/aerospace industry. During November 2010, the FAA issued 
a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). Although the proposal only covered 
Part 121, the agency stated that the NPRM would provide the groundwork for 
other facets of the industry. “The FAA developed these general requirements 
with the intent that in the future they could be applied to other FAA-regulated 
entities, such as Part 135 operators, Part 145 repair stations and Part 21 aircraft 
design and manufacturing organizations and approval holders …… the agency 
also says it does not intend for the NPRM to cover contractors, subcontractors 
or organizations not directly regulated by FAA” (Lynch, 2011). 
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In other words, the goal is to mandate SMS for all domains of the airplane 
lifecycle. This includes the Identification of safety hazards; Remedial action to 
maintain safety performance; Continuous monitoring; Improvement of SMS 
performance; and interfaces between departments within an organization as 
well as between organizations and external contractors 
Aviation organizations around the world are aware of the importance of 
implementing SMS – but regulatory direction and mandates have been years in 
the making. “There is already a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) from 
the FAA for the implementation of SMS for air carriers and airports, and this 
same methodology and requirements will apply to the rest of the aerospace 
industry, so there needs to be a concerted effort from industry to start 
understanding and implementing this new way of managing safety more 
effectively, otherwise industry will meet a brick wall when trying to submit a 
proposal or meet project requirements at least initially for civilian projects” 
(Fuentes, 2011).  
Field tests during this research indicate that taking a stock SMS and applying it 
to the manufacturing domain is misguided. The goal of SMS is to address the 
organizational factors that have an impact on the safety of the vehicle, system 
or final product. It is about a culture of product reliability so that the overarching 
airplane lifecycle system and aircraft are safe. SMS addresses air operational 
safety as the primary function, but the manufacturer’s primary function is to 
produce aircraft with minimal production risk. Further upstream in the lifecycle, 
airplane design engineers use extensive calculations to substantiate the safety 
and reliability of the airplane system and airplane subsystems. Designing a safe 
airplane is a primary function of aircraft engineering, flight operational safety is a 
primary function of airlines, and the primary function of production is to build the 
airplane as certified by the Type Certificate. Production achieves this by building 
aircraft via production risk management – not safety risk management. 
Personnel safety is a supporting (not primary) component of production, thus a 
PRMS should be architected accordingly. Manufacturers operating under the 
FAR Part 21 certificate incorporate Quality Management Systems that 
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encompass IS9000 and AS9100 standards. These align directly with PRMS 
architecture components to allow the manufacturing organization to constantly 
increase the level of production performance. 
A further challenge is in implementing the interfaces between departments 
within an organization, as well as between organizations and external 
contractors. Boeing’s organization is a national and multinational effort. The 
production supply chain has many primary suppliers, and sub-suppliers. Global 
partners design and build large sections of the airplanes that are shipped to 
locations in the USA for final aircraft assembly. The FAA is challenged with the 
concept of putting an overarching manufacturer “SMS”, and manufacturer to 
airline SMS interface, in place for USA based enterprises. The FAA’s NPRM 
“does not intend to cover contractors, subcontractors or organizations not 
directly regulated by FAA”. This further complicates implementation for the 
globally connected manufacturing enterprise. The administrative and practical 
implication of being “SMS” compliant only within the FAAs jurisdiction while 
overseas suppliers and contactors do not have to meet FAA oversight, further 
compounds the practicality of implementation – even if “SMS” did fit in the 
manufacturing domain.   
But, if at some point the FAA includes manufacturers’ overseas contractors and 
suppliers, given the complexity of Boeing’s 787 supply chain and production 
system for example, to meet FAA SMS objectives the FAA would have to certify 
an immense global infrastructure for the 787 production program alone, and 
link/flow the data into international SMS-compliant airlines that fly 787s. Again, 
applying one gold standard SMS across all industry domains even in a less 
convoluted business model is misguided. However, applying a domain specific 
SMS, i.e. a PRMS model for the production domain, should be feasible for the 
manufacturing domain of the airplane lifecycle. 
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6.3 PRMS and the Maintenance Domain 
6.3.1 Reducing Risk in MROs 
SMS is taking foot with airlines. It is now moving into MRO’s shop floors. To be 
successful in this domain a thorough understanding of its application to aircraft 
maintenance must be understood. In Aviation MRO, Komarniski (President, 
Grey Owl Aviation Consultants; Manitoba) states that SMS focuses on the 
safety of the aircraft itself. Yet, management often is quick to view it as an 
employee occupational health and safety measure. “Their reaction to SMS is, 
‘we’ve had an employee safety program in place for years,’” he said during a 
recent SMS workshop. “But if a maintenance procedure is not done right, it 
could injure the person doing it, as well as damage the airplane.” Komarniski’s 
comments align with the importance of differentiating between process and 
personal safety risk that was addressed in section 5.1.2 of this paper. 
Komarniski comments on MRO maintenance procedures as process-driven 
tasks.  By using the same argument for not using SMS for manufacturers, this 
paper argues that applying a stock SMS into MROs is misguided, but a PRMS 
approach does align with the MRO domain. The primary function of an MRO is 
to maintain aircraft per task cards and deliver aircraft back to revenue service, 
just as manufacturers build airplanes per task cards (or IPs) and deliver the 
aircraft to revenue service. The manufacturers’ and MROs’ primary function is 
to mitigate production risk (not safety risk). Airlines’ primary function is flight 
safety. Employee occupational health and safety is a supporting function 
common to airlines’ safety risk, manufacturers’ production risk, and MROs’ 
production risk. As Komarniski notes, employee safety is often confused with 
airline operations flight safety risk. Conversely, employee occupational health 
and safety should not be confused with MROs’ and manufacturers’ production 
operations risk (Overhaul & Maintenance (OVMT), 2009). 
SMS and PRMS architectures each require tailoring of the four components, but 
there are also commonalities. For both architectures, personnel safety and 
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training (as supporting functions) are included with organizational culture, but 
the type of safety and training is specific to the domain. “PRMS” shop level 
employees must fully support the process. Without their backing, technicians 
may perceive “PRMS” as just another flavour of the month that will be pursued 
for awhile and then discarded”. “Employee training must be established so they 
will understand what “PRMS” will do for them”. Komarniski also emphasizes the 
importance of a friendly” reporting system, so that once a report is submitted, 
top management can respond quickly with the corrective action to be taken. For 
MROs and manufacturers the response may be the need for training, the use of 
proper tooling, a new or revised repair or manufacturing process, or changes to 
the way work cards and installation plans are written. Situational Awareness for 
MROs and manufacturers is a concept that should be considered for training. 
To mitigate production risk, mechanics should be aware of how their tasks 
impact downstream production or repair events. If they miss-perform a task they 
should be aware of the impact on production rate, in that it may generate 
downstream rework for example, and how it may delay the return of an airplane 
from MRO to revenue service. Aspects of training and a non-threatening 
reporting system are included in the production culture management component 
of PRMS. As with PRMS in the manufacturing domain, the culture and climate 
must be clearly documented and understood in the MRO domain (McDonald, et 
al., 2000). 
As of 2009 SMS was moving to regulatory implementation with MROs. ICAO 
Annex Six, mandated that its 190 member states establish SMS requirements 
for their MRO shops by Nov. 19, 2009. Transport Canada has required repair 
stations working on commercial airliners to file an SMS plan with the agency 
since 2005. But as with SMS implementation at Part 121 airlines there is 
confusion to exactly what it is, how to implement, and how long the 
“requirements” will look more like industry standards or recommendations rather 
that fully implemented and audited requirements (Goglia, 2010). “Don’t make 
this too complicated” said Bob Huberston of the MITRE Corporation. 
Complications stem from various sets of rules that must be followed. At present, 
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ICAO SMS guidance is available, and a final FAA rule is the works. But 
focussing on compliance with a blind eye to other hazards may not help 
organizations achieve their safety goals (Moody, 2008). 
SMS struggles with airline implementation, not because the safety management 
concept is seen as out of place with airlines, but because in part, of legalistic 
and administrative issues such as reporting requirements, and oversight 
capacity of regulators. Implementation of “SMS” with manufacturers and MROs 
will be even more convoluted. Findings from this research indicate that stock 
SMS architecture does not fit in a process-driven MRO domain whose primary 
function is mitigated through production risk – not safety risk – management. 
6.3.2 Integration of the MRO Domain 
Air carriers’ are responsible for the work carried out by maintenance providers 
who they contract with. The operator’s quality organization is focused on 
assuring the MRO is in compliance with Part 145 requirements.  However, the 
air carrier does not need to understand the detailed nuances of running an 
MRO such as the extensive qualifications and certifications used for state-of-
the-art management and maintenance processes.  
“The airlines’ primary function is to fly airplanes and provide the safest travel 
experience possible for the customer. It is not in aircraft maintenance. Air 
carriers are really good at being air carriers …. An MRO, on the other hand, is 
really good at being an MRO. So the business domain needs are different and 
have to be harmonized in some way so that results from projects are of mutual 
benefit” (Berry, 2013). The primary focus is different between an MRO and 
airline. Repair stations make money by delivering aircraft per schedule back to 
the airlines. Airlines earn revenue by flying airplanes with passengers, and or 
cargo, with quality aircraft.  
Discussions are in place as to how an airline’s SMS can effectively interface 
and oversee all its operations including outsourced MROs and or in-house 
maintenance. And an MRO business typically has several airlines customers, 
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so the discussion becomes further convoluted when addressing how an MRO 
can meet multiple airlines’ SMS requirements that may have been implemented 
and interpreted subject to various airlines’ enterprise models.  
The question of how an airliner’s SMS can interface with, and impact an MRO 
requires significant understanding. “If an MRO has invested heavily in lean 
processes to produce internal efficiencies, the operator's quality organization 
can impose un-optimized processes undermining the MRO's lean 
implementation. This can affect both parties' quality and production 
expectations” (Berry, 2013). By the same token, airlines that perform their own 
maintenance and repair under their own Part 145 certificate must develop an 
interface from the Part 121 side of their house to the Part 145 side. 
The aircraft maintenance system is described as a complex socio-technical 
system. The four key aspects of aircraft maintenance that play a key role in are 
(Ward, et al., 2010): 
1) Regulations 
2) Other external bodies such as the manufacturer, customers, vendors 
and the airline. 
3) Internal functions such as contract negotiation, personnel selection, 
personnel training 
4) The production system that can include base, heavy, line, or light 
maintenance – all of which are supported by engineering, planning and 
commercial and quality departments 
The interface and complexity discussion further supports the case that 
application of SMS into the MRO domain is misguided. Beyond the argument 
that a PRMS model fits MROs, and SMS does not, it can be argued that even if 
airlines’ SMSs do fit and are applied to MROs, there can be an adverse impact 
on MRO lean processes that were set up to benefit the MRO, and the airline 
customer. In other words, SMS if pushed into the MRO domain, if not judiciously 
implemented, can negatively affect both domains' quality and production 
expectations. This calls for careful consideration when considering the interface 
between airlines and their MROs: “In moving to the SMS environment carriers 
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now need to assess their own processes effects on vendors when engaged in 
outsourcing. By defining the interface between themselves and the MRO they 
will be able to address and standardize processes and controls” (Berry, 2013). 
This research supports the position that SMS interface with an MRO can be 
adverse to both domains. It is argued that an airline/SMS interfacing with an 
MRO/SMS interface can be counter-productive to all parties, because SMS in 
the MRO domain in itself is a misguided concept. However, a PRMS model in 
the MRO domain will work, so it is the airline/SMS to MRO/PRMS interface that 
must be developed. 
6.3.3 PRMS and MRO Regulations 
In 2007 the FAA’s Flight Standards service was drafting its planned 
implementation of SMS for repair stations. The Part 145 AC was entitled 
“Introduction to Safety Management Systems for Maintenance Organizations”.  
The document is very similar to AC 120-92, “Introduction to Safety Management 
Systems for Air Operators” and in alignment with the FAA’s move to comply 
with ICAO’s SMS standards (Broderic & Pierobon, 2012). 
Part 145 guidance was mostly identical to the air operator AC, other than the 
term "maintenance organization" in place of "air operator," where applicable. 
The close resemblance between the two documents was "by design," Don 
Arendt (FAA Manager of Flight Operations Safety Analysis Information Centre) 
told O&M, to ensure that FAA's multiple SMS efforts remain "aligned" as much 
as possible” (Broderick, 2007). 
Based on their size, air operators are regulated under three rules - Part 91, 121 
and 135. Part 121 applies to “majors” such as American Airlines, Part 135 
applies to small regional carriers, and Part 91 is applicable to private individual 
operators. To accommodate these “Part” variances, SMS architecture is 
organized into subsets that divides the larger (and often more complicated) 
carriers from smaller ones. In 2010 there were 62 different major airlines in the 
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United States, including passenger carrying and cargo service providers 
(Swartz, 2014). 
Unlike FAA rules for operators, U.S. regulations for MROs are not organized 
into such subsets, and as SMS is attached to the one Part 145 for MROs, by 
default, there is just one standard for all. This in itself is a significant issue for 
SMS/MRO discussion given that as of 2007 there were about 5,000 Part 145 
certificate holders in the USA. About 28 percent employ fewer than five people, 
and 63 percent had fewer than 20 on the payroll. At the other end of the 
spectrum, about five percent had more than 250 employees. From a 
complexity-of-operations standpoint, nearly half the Part 145s had two or fewer 
ratings on their certificates, and 10 percent were working directly for Part 121 
operators (Broderick, 2007). 
With such numbers and diversity in the Part 145 domain, the concept in itself of 
applying a safety-centric architecture to a process-centric production risk 
environment seems unfeasible, and the argument that PRMS type architecture 
becomes more validated since it is domain-centric. A PRMS architecture is 
applicable to aircraft manufacturing and maintenance production risk, and is 
scalable to the many variances within those domains. 
As of 2007 the agency planned to have SMS regulations for maintenance 
organizations in place by Jan. 1, 2009, which would align the agency's deadline 
with that of ICAO. Don Arendt acknowledged that while the air operators will 
"most likely get three years from the final rule's effective date to phase in SMS, 
maintenance organizations could get more time … The repair station world is 
behind the air operator world on this … There's not a lot published on repair 
station SMS”. 
An argument is that there are already more than enough data-gathering 
oversight programs, and thereby SMS – just another one – is redundant.  To 
name a few these are the Continuous Analysis and Surveillance (CAS) program 
under FAR 121.373, Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), Flight 
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Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA), and Aviation Safety Action Partnership 
(ASAP). “FAA already has numerous safety management programs in effect 
that it cannot effectively manage now. How can it add another system and 
expect to manage it? Will it turn out to be another pile of data collected simply to 
collect with the rest? …. Some in the industry might suggest that all the safety 
management systems in the industry be scrapped at once and integrated into 
one huge safety management system.  …. I don’t believe the mandate of the 
ICAO should extend to and include OEM product manufacturers, applicants and 
employers, and product or service providers in our industry” (Prentice, 2009). 
As of 2014 there is not an FAA-mandated SMS for maintainers. Efforts continue 
and some MROs are using their interpretation of SMS as industry good 
practice. But their claim to SMS is often confused with personnel safety, not 
airplane safety – and is not primarily defined to address the primary function of 
the domain, that is, production risk. 
 
6.4 PRMS Implementation, Assessment and Value 
6.4.1 Introduction 
Similar to SMS, PRMS can be approached by breaking it into bite-size pieces. 
As an MRO or manufacturer implements a PRMS they will find that many 
elements already exist within the organization. However, these elements may 
not be clearly documented, and a direct correlation between QMS and PRMS 
policies, programs, systems and procedures should be established. A 
methodology modelled after ICAO SMS gap analysis tools, can be developed to 
help design the PRMS and ensure thorough implementation. “A golden rule that 
becomes the foundation for success, just as it is for any other initiative within an 
organization, is that an organization’s executives must totally "buy in" and 
remain engaged throughout the process from development to implementation, 
by committing the time, resources, and effort it requires. Think about it. If the 
executives of an organization do not take “PRMS” seriously, how can they 
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expect employees to embrace the behavioural changes that will be necessary 
for compliance? Executives can show their support by regularly scheduled 
briefings that communicate progress and maintain forward movement. For 
changes to be successful, it will be critical that senior executives motivate 
middle management, as this is where the accountability for change most likely 
falls. Lack of motivation coupled with a lack of accountability for forward 
progress at the middle management level will surely doom the project” 
(Cavalcante, 2012). 
As with SMS, PRMS would most likely require organizational changes. 
Organizational culture develops over time, is dependent on the seniority of 
employees, rate of turnover, experience level of employees, training, 
administrative policies and consequences of production risk noncompliance, or 
lack of consequences for production performance noncompliance, as well as 
many other factors. Changing the corporate culture involves new habits that are 
repeated. Everyone must believe and take part in the process …... Changing 
the corporate culture involves new habits that are repeated until they become 
the new normal (Cavalcante, 2013). 
For a PRMS to be successful it cannot simply be a copy of someone else’s, or a 
manual that is put to one side and ignored. PRMS aims to proactively reduce 
the cost of the manufacturer’s primary function (production) by mitigating 
production risks, and of supporting functions such as personnel incidents and 
injuries. PRMS must be created with inclusion of all organizational departments 
in order for it to pay for itself by minimizing production risks, escapements, and 
correlating events. In the SMS airline world it is argued that it is difficult to put a 
price on accidents that did not happen – so what should the SMS budget be? 
The monetary value of PRMS may be easier to quantify. A production risk can 
be extrapolated into a prospective internal production escapement that may be 
discovered immediately before the airline takes delivery of the airplane, in which 
case the manufacturer delays delivery to the airline while retrofit takes place. 
The airline may bill the manufacturer for lost revenue since the aircraft does not 
become operational, revenue-generating equipment per the airline’s schedule. 
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Or, the production escapement may be external where several in-service 
aircraft are impacted and the manufacturer is liable for repairs under warranty at 
significant and very quantifiable costs. Aircraft manufacturers pay close 
attention to such actual and perceived events, and can use the data to establish 
the cost benefits of PRMS. Manufacturers have extensive records of the cost 
impact of production escapements, whereas airline in-flight accidents are rare – 
so airlines have a more challenging time to substantiate the monetary value of 
SMS. Safety risk costs are arguably qualitative, whereas production risk costs 
are quantitative. This emphasizes the difference between safety versus 
process-centric risk domains, and the misguided philosophy of applying SMS, 
rather than a PRMS, directly into the production environment. 
6.4.2 Implementation 
Majella McDonald comments that implementing an SMS, and conversely a 
PRMS takes time, effort and money. There is no “one-size-fits-all”, and each 
organization has its own vision, culture, customers, financial constraints, etc. 
She states that the most effective way to implement is through a phased 
process which provides for the enterprise to plan, develop, prepare their 
employees, implement, and conduct appropriate evaluation in practical 
consecutive steps. PRMS adapts to her four-phase implementation framework 
(McDonald, 2011): 
Phase 1 
1. Identification of the following: 
a. The accountable executive 
b. The person (or possibly group) responsible for implementing the PRMS 
c. Manager’s PR accountabilities; what managers are responsible for 
2. Describe and document the system. 
a. PRMS components — general and/or specific to divisions 
b. Ensure employees are aware of these descriptions 
3. Conduct a gap analysis 
a. Obtain an organizational baseline. Include a production culture assessment 
b. Determine how the organization will measure the success of the PRMS 
4. Develop a PRMS implementation plan. 
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a. Document how is it to be rolled out and the accountable person(s) 
b. Develop a realistic timeframe for the overall rollout plan 
c. Consider the human resource needs and financial implications of each phase 
5. Develop documentation relevant to the enterprise’s production policies and objectives. 
a. What currently exists and what is still needed (e.g., discipline policy, definition of 
terms, investigation policy, etc.)? 
6. Develop and establish ongoing means for production communication. 
 NOTE: This step may be inadvertently overlooked or underestimated and the 
complete PRMS can suffer due to poorly developed — or nonexistent — 
communication channels. 
7. Determine and formalize divisional interfaces to share production information and learn 
from experiences. 
8. Determine how all the PRMS data is to be collected and dealt with. 
9. Commence development of production performance indicators and performance 
targets. Determine how the PRMS will be evaluated, both in terms of process evaluation 
as well as outcome evaluation. 
a. The process of implementation should be continuously evaluated to ensure it is 
being implemented as planned 
b. Outcome evaluation is the customary evaluation of a program — is it reaching the 
targets or goals we wanted it to? 
Phase 2 
1. Implementation of reactive risk management processes. 
a. Document (and follow) event investigation processes conducted by formally trained 
personnel 
2. Deliver training relevant to reactive risk management processes. 
a. Make all personnel aware of the processes, their own responsibilities, and how 
these reactive processes work together 
3. Document all aspects relevant to reactive risk management tools for trend analysis 
4. Develop formal communication to personnel of findings from reactive production events. 
5. Determine PRMS software needs/packages available as well as current and future 
company needs. 
Phase 3 
Implementation of risk management processes such as a confidential production reporting 
system, hazard identification and tracking system with feedback mechanism, regularly 
scheduled systemic production risk audits, and task analyses for all production-related activities. 
1. Set up a risk-management working group to assess acceptable levels of risk. 
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2. Define the risk assessment tools and risk control mechanisms when an unacceptable 
level of risk has been identified. 
3. Deliver training on these proactive and predictive production management processes. 
4. Provide formal communication to personnel concerning these proactive and predictive 
tools including why they are beneficial. 
5. Coordinate and maintain reactive production data synthesized with proactive and 
predictive production data (when this becomes available) from combined analyses 
tools. 
Phase 4 
1. Refine the production performance indicators and performance targets commenced in 
Phase 1 (Part 9). 
2. Develop PRMS continuous improvement initiatives 
3. Develop training and documentation relevant to operational production assurance. 
4. Maintain and upgrade as needed the processes for production communication. 
6.4.3 Assessment 
When promoting SMS in the airline domain, the critical issues are how airline 
policy makers identify the key components of the system, how managers weigh 
the importance of its various dimensions and steps, and how employees are 
taught to evaluate the effects of these safety practices (Chen & Chen, 2012). 
Chen and Chen used scale development theory with Eigen values to assess 
SMS effectiveness, and a similar concept can be developed for PRMS 
assessment [Figure 6-1]. By identifying and mathematically weighting key 
factors, a quantified assessment can be established for PRMS effectiveness. 
Another study to develop quantifiable structuring of critical success factors of 
airline SMS was completed by Yeuh-Ling Hsu, Wen-Chin Li and Kuang-Wei 
Chen (Hsu, et al., 2010). Here regulatory SMS components were listed from 
ICAO - Doc9858 SMM (2006); UK CAA – UK CAP712 (2002); Transport 
Canada – TP 1388IE (2002); FAA – OEP Vertsion 1.0 (2007); and Australia 
CASA – AC 172-01(0) (2005). These were aligned in the context of: 
Organization; Documentation; Risk Management; Quality Assurance; Safety 
Promotion; and Emergency Response. From here “components” such as 
organizational structure, management commitment, risk management 
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capability, performance monitoring, and so forth, were arranged with 
“dimensions” and ranked in order of significance. By reviewing this model, a 
similar approach can be adopted as another consideration for PRMS 
assessment. 
 
Figure 6-1. Scale Development of PRMS Evaluation 
Factor 1: Documentation and commands (DC)
DC1 Managers order clear commands for PRMS operation.
DC2 The contents of PRMS manual are readily understood.
DC3 System can precisely save, secure and trace the information.
DC4 Establish an incentive system to reward the good PRMS perfomance.
DC5 There is an intranet system to share the PRMS related information.
DC6 Simple and unified standard for production behavior.
DC7 Documents are reserved and updated in a standardized format.
Factor 2: Production promotion and training (PT)
PT1 Employees learn the concepts through training.
PT2 Employees know how to execute PRMS through training.
PT3 Employees upgrade the self-managed ability through training.
PT4 Company provides training continuously.
PT5 Employees construct the correct production attitude through training.
PT6 Company holds PRMS promotion activities regularly.
PT7 Company provides diverse training programs.
Factor 3: Executive management commitment (EMC)
EMC1 Top management participates in the PRMS related activities.
EMC2 Management handles production risk issues following just culture.
EMC3
Top management declares the determination to execute PRMS, even when the 
company finance is in the down cycle.
EMC4 Top management declares commitment in formal documents.
Factor 4: Emergency preparedness and response plan (EP)
EP1 Employees acquainted with the plan. 
EP2 Employees are trained to execute the plan periodically.
EP3 Company simulates the plan periodically.
EP4
Company establishes the plan with clear procedures and individual 
responsibility.
Factor 5: Production  management policy (MP)
MP1
Company develops the precise standard to monitor and evaluate the PRMS 
performance.
MP2 Company continuously improves the PRMS performance.
MP3 Company’s internal reporting channel is highly accessible.
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6.4.4 Value 
In 2011 the FAA estimated that the cost of SMS implementation to Part 121 air 
carriers would cost $721 million over 20 years for the initial SMS development, 
documentation and ongoing operations. The FAA also submitted that the 
resulting benefits in terms of avoided casualties, aircraft damage and accident 
investigation could exceed $1.14 billion (Lynch, 2011). This implies that SMS is 
cost effective, at least in theory. 
In evaluating the prospective cost benefit of a PRMS implementation at a single 
manufacturing enterprise, the case study on Costs of Unsafety In Aviation 
provide some guidance (Cokorilo, et al., 2010). Authors of the research 
comment that their results are a qualitative tool that can be utilized for 
implementing a safety management system which has to be based on cost 
benefit analysis which balances accident probability and related costs against 
the costs of safety improvement measures. The research is based on a cost 
benefit analysis due to safety related benefits connected to aircraft accidents. 
By using a similar concept for PRMS, the benefit analysis can centre on PR 
related events connected to internal and external IP production escapements. 
This may be accomplished by providing costs to the PRMS Risk Assessment 
matrix to quantify the monetary impact associated with internal and external 
escapement events. By using historical data, a manufacturer can assign real 
values to estimate actual escapement cost impacts over time, and thereby 
establish the value of PRMS and the ROI projection. As an example, 
hypothetical $$ values are placed into the PRMS Cost Risk Assessment Matrix 
[Figure 6-2]. 
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Figure 6-2. PRMS Cost Risk Assessment Matrix 
6.5 PRMS Maturity 
As with SMS, just implementing a PRMS is not enough unless the PRMS 
achieves maturity in each organization to which it is applied (Fuentes, 2012). 
Factors are outlined to achieve risk management on a continuous basis that 
apply to a “PRMS” model. The ICAO/FAA SMS approach includes 
organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures that 
transcribe to PRMS’ 4 components and 12 elements. These follow the 
philosophy of Dr. James Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” model (Reason, 1991), 
[Figure 6-3]. 
 
Figure 6-3. Production Risk using James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model 
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The manufacturing organization must integrate all components of PRMS 
architecture – but implementation is just the first step. It must run long enough 
for enough data to be gathered about production escapements, rate increases, 
organizational changes, personnel safety incidents, and any other conditions 
that increase production risk. The analysis, or measurement of “PRMS” 
effectiveness, can be achieved through two different types of data indicators: 
leading and lagging (Fuentes, 2012). 
Leading indicators are the amount of events that must increase such as IP 
reports, and internal audits that need to be evaluated and closed. Lagging 
indicators are the number of events that need to decrease such as production 
discrepancy reports, airplane late deliveries, internal escapements, external 
escapements, and so forth. By measuring and monitoring these organizational 
processes, improving workplace conditions, containing unplanned events, 
identifying latent conditions and reinforcing defences, in conjunction with 
continuous feedback, the initial level of PRMS maturity should be recognized. 
Top management support is essential for all aspects of a PRMS, including is a 
yearly assessment of how the PRMS is working compared to how it is designed 
on paper. “If the organization just approves their “PRMS”, but does not truly 
translate it into real life, the “PRMS” not only does not exist, but also becomes a 
false sense of security for the organization, creating expectations of 
improvement in “production” performance that are unrealistic. This type of 
organization is the typical company that creates what has been called the 
organizational accident, a tragedy that is directly the result of the actions and 
decisions of the organization and its management at all levels.” A change 
management practice is contained in ISO9001. It defines the quick response of 
an organization if it becomes aware of changes that can create new hazards, 
and it is already incorporated is manufacturers’ QMSs, Therefore, this area is 
already aligned for a PRMS-manufacturer arrangement. 
To achieve PRMS maturity, all Components and Elements must be integrated in 
daily operations. “It takes time to work and show results but methodical 
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implementation of “PRMS” concept will work to constantly improve “production 
operational risk” (Fuentes, 2012). 
 
6.6 Further Considerations 
6.6.1 Systemic SMS 
 
As efforts around the world continue to implement or recommend SMS, 
discussion moves towards a holistic approach to decrease systemic 
breakdowns. The issue was addressed in 2012 by the International Federation 
of Airworthiness (IFA) at City University London. The dialogue was specific to 
the maintenance-flight operations interface, and how to better integrate the 
system. Discussion centred around fatigue of maintenance engineers, how 
effectively line maintenance communicates with the flight deck after the 
engineers work long hours, and the possibility of implementing a fatigue risk 
management system with AMO personnel (Pierbon, 2012). 
 
This presents a challenge in the context of connecting two high-risk domains 
with one system. Flight operations deal with safety risk as the primary function, 
an AMO’s primary function is the work-task process/production function. This 
research paper shows the distinction between system-centric and production-
centric primary functions and suggests the two systems are connectable but 
they are not the same, and an integrated one-system approach to be 
misguided. 
 
If the fully integrated discussion was taken to an aircraft manufacturing 
enterprise, it may be argued that the airlines’ flight deck must have interface 
with the manufacturer’s AMO maintenance engineers who must also be subject 
to minimum rest periods, and then in turn the one-standard integrated system 
would require minimum rest periods for production line personnel and 
production-support engineers. The question becomes “how deeply into each 
others’ business domains should everyone be connected?” How integrated can 
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a system be before it becomes impractical, burdensome and even dangerous? 
Results of this research differentiate between safety management and 
production risk management, and the limitations of overlapping these primary 
functions. 
 
6.6.2 SMS Standstill 
The affects of SMS on commercial operations is not well understood. Some 
argue that SMS is seen as another cost for safety problems that are low-risk, 
within the existing cost of doing business, and spending to save is a challenge 
to justify. Furthermore, the vehicles of regulatory implementation are under 
debate. In recent years regulators have been shifting from human factors 
management to SMS with focus not just on airlines, but with the aviation 
industry at large. EASA’s umbrella Organizational Requirements (OR) and 
Authority Requirements (AR) operations rules allow for separate approvals for 
maintenance certification, production, design and flight operations. This 
provides for an organization to certify its operational functions along these 
segmented lines, rather than following ICAO’s SMS organizationally-wide 
unified SMS certification. Given the concerns of having a fragmented SMS 
within an enterprise, the European Council (EC) in 2011 requested EASA to 
rewrite its rules without the umbrella provision (Burchell, 1 May 2011). Baines-
Simmons also recommends against the fragmented umbrella approach. He 
argues that for SMS to be effective it should be embedded in organization – not 
bolted on. As of 2012 the EC was still in debate and falling further behind 
ICAO’s intended implementation date of 2010. 
The debate of how an SMS enterprise is aligned, and how it should be certified, 
is relevant to a PRMS. A large aircraft manufacturing company includes design, 
manufacturing and test flight operations. Many also provide MR&O services 
[Figure 2-1]. MR&O and manufacturing are task-driven functions that align with 
a PRMS. Flight test operations are safety-centric and therefore align with an 
SMS. Should SMS and PRMS functions be certified separately within the 
manufacturing enterprise given their differences? What would the overhead cost 
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burden be to a separate SMS and PRMS implementation? Or – would the cost 
of a combined SMS/PRMS be less than or greater than separate 
implementations? Is it feasible for a manufacturer to expend resources to 
simultaneously implement an SMS and PRMS into the enterprise, or for 
effective implementation should they be implemented on different time 
schedules? If separated then the effect is “bolted on” which is contrary to some 
industry expert recommendations. This research does not seek to answer these 
cost questions – but raises them for further studies to address. Given the 
debates within regulatory bodies for implementing SMS with airlines, one can 
anticipate similar debates for the equally at best, if not more complex, aircraft 
production enterprises. And from a production perspective, one may argue that 
a PRMS is another cost burden to manage production risks that are already 
within the existing cost of doing business, and a PRMS ROI would not be 
substantiated. 
6.6.3 SMS... Boom or Bust? 
As of August 2013, ICAO and the Aviation section of the FAA continue with the 
intent to mandate SMS with Part 121 service providers, and EASA recently 
published its proposed SMS rules for repair stations. Conversation now 
addresses how U.S. domestic repair stations will cope with both EASA and FAA 
SMS rules, and if and when ICAO and the FAA will fully align with the EASA 
mandate. SMS is still a voluntary program for airlines and repair stations. It is 
essentially a sophisticated data gathering activity in the general area of flight 
operations, maintenance, human factors, and communications. Data is 
collected and analyzed so that problem areas can be defined and corrected 
before safety is compromised. Furthermore, SMS data is designed to be shared 
with other operators in the domain, and not protected with the voluntary and 
anonymous element of SMS. This is a point of resistance for operators opposed 
to SMS implementation. 
As part of regulatory oversight, data gathering programs have been in place for 
many years such as FAR 121.373 CAS or CASP, the Continuous Analysis and 
Surveillance Program that was imposed for all Part 121 and some 135 air 
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carrier operations. All major airlines must follow this for internal analysis of 
repeat discrepancy write-ups so that they can be analyzed, fixed, and not 
repeated, therefore enhancing safety. The data is also mandatorily provided to 
the FAA who use it as possible indicators of violations. But external to the airline 
organization, it is exclusive and proprietary to FAA. 
A fully implemented FAA SMS is designed to mesh with the ICAO and EASA 
standards. The philosophy is to create a uniform system with which to compare 
safety standards and share statistics with each of the affected airline operators 
around the world. This is a noble concept but many feel it just won't work insofar 
as the sharing concept is concerned. The FAA also intends to provide data on 
accidents it has collected to the NTSB. This will probably include SMS data. 
The NTSB can contribute its expertise by looking closer at FAA collected data 
and examine accidents with more precision (Prentice, 2013). 
The problem is that the SMS proposal so far does not include an employee 
confidential statement nor does it provide for the protection of proprietary carrier 
data. The fear in the industry is that critical proprietary operator safety 
information would be disclosed and would act as a deterrent to employee 
disclosure. 
This discussion relates directly to a PRMS. First, even though primary airline 
operations pertain to public safety, imposition of data sharing across the 
operators is argued against due to prospective loss of confidentiality and 
possible use for litigation. And secondly it may be used for litigative purposes 
against the very airline providing the data. The primary function of MROs and 
manufacturing companies is production and therefore the “safety” argument to 
support implementation with these domains is not applicable. Furthermore, 
other than some data required for Part 25 regulatory oversight, much production 
data is closely held by the businesses in these domains and is used to optimize 
production rates that directly correlate to enterprise cost margins. The PRMS 
model aligns with a voluntary and anonymous production risk reporting system 
for internal organizational, but manufacturers would resist sharing it across 
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national and international aircraft manufacturing companies and MROs who 
compete intensely with one another. 
 
6.7 PRMS Liability 
The FAA uses SMS as a methodology for controlling risk in airlines which 
leaves the attorneys concerned with prospective liabilities that an airline may 
encounter with an SMS program if an accident takes place. Questions are 
concerned with how evidence from SMS records of a reported violation or risk 
may correlate with the accident. However, Kent Jackson argues that SMS’s 
voluntary disclosure programs avoid or minimize enforcement actions following 
self-discovered mistakes. Therefore SMS is not a liability (Jackson, 2008). 
Conversely, this paper proposes the same argument for a PRMS with 
manufacturers and aircraft maintainers. 
 
A PRMS benefits the industry domain by having a strong data reporting and 
analysis capability that is used to reduce risk. For example, when a repetitive 
production non-conformance tag may, or does, correlate with production 
escapements, PRMS identifies margins to document the PR, and averts similar 
production errors in the future. PR is mitigated rather than accepted, and liability 
is avoided. This general risk control approach is already implemented in various 
ways, and documented and used as a function of aircraft QMS production 
operations. It is thus transferrable into PRMS architecture. Mechanics may see 
PRMS as leverage by upper management to document poor performance, but 
front line participants have to trust the system. The whole enterprise must not 
see it as a tool for management versus labour issues. Workers should 
participate with anonymity and without retribution, and the production culture 
must promote confidence that no one will connect the reports to personnel files. 
Reporting in small organizations cannot work since everyone knows each other 
and it is difficult to create anonymity. This is not an issue for aircraft 
manufacturers that are large enterprises. If front-line production workers grade 
themselves and each other in an honest and open fashion, then PRMS can 
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provide production risk management benefits, similar to pilots self-reporting 
programs where the airlines benefit from SMS. 
Jackson researched case law regarding SMS records. He did not find reported 
aviation-related cases, or any disputes that were over SMS record keeping. The 
SMS cases he did find were in the maritime industry, and whether or not it is 
negligent not to have an SMS program: “The most interesting of these cases 
stemmed from the Oct. 15, 2003, crash of the Staten Island Ferry vs Andrew J. 
Barberi into a pier, which killed 11 passengers and injured many more. In a 
February 2007 ruling on liability, the federal judge specifically noted the lack of 
SMS: It is not surprising that the Staten Island Ferry's rules were not followed 
given the haphazard way in which they were disseminated. At the time the 
accident occurred, the internal rules were neither well understood nor effectively 
enforced. The Staten Island Ferry had no formal SMS. There was no single 
manual that was readily accessible to crewmembers. There was no mechanism 
to monitor who had received the procedures and at what time. And there was 
no system for ensuring that the rules were actually obeyed. … Instead, 
according to Capt. Gansas, "there was 'on the job' training and the policies and 
procedures were passed down from the senior captains and assistant captains" 
by word of mouth.” 
Another argument in favour is: “…Effective management systems will, therefore, 
contribute to a decrease in insurance costs, improved reputation, and 
commercial success …” page 24 of Part A, EASANPA 2013-1 (Johnson, 2013). 
Aimee Turner takes the opposite position regarding open data and information 
sharing: “...where even the smallest threat of prosecution exists, could a well-
meaning attempt at boardroom level to encourage openness and information-
sharing lead to a paper trail of ignominious discovery? Could the diligent 
documenting of a myriad of minor mistakes turn up as a prime exhibit in a 
criminal case? Is SMS simply masquerading as procedural jailbait?” (Turner, 
2008). 
 136 
Nick Sergi comments that “If you have an implemented SMS policy and have an 
occurrence you are more likely to violate a provision of insurance coverage, 
thus more liability. This does not seem right, but when you think about it and 
how insurance works, I think you will agree” (Sergi, 2010). The same 
conversation is applicable to PRMS. 
SMS has become an industry standard for the aviation industry, and is in 
various stages of implementation with airlines around the world. As some form 
of it becomes regulated in the manufacturing and MRO domains, legalities of 
whether or not it is negligent for the domains not to have a version of an SMS, 
or PRMS must be addressed. In the future if a case is shown where a PR led to 
an external production escapement that in turn connected to an airline safety 
risk, and the manufacturer did not have a PRMS in place, it may be argued that 
the manufacturer is liable for not having a PRMS. Or, as Turner may say, a 
PRMS may become jailbait. 
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7.0 Current Status of FAA SMS Regulations 
7.1 SMS Voluntary Pilot Project 
In 2010 the FAA issued an extensive guide for SMS voluntary implementation 
activities: “Safety Management System (SMS) Pilot Project Participants and 
Voluntary Implementation of Service provider SMS Programs” (FAA, 2010). The 
guide contains expectations and procedures necessary to implement SMS by 
service providers. The document defines service providers … “as any 
organization providing aviation services ….  including certificated and non-
certificated aviation organizations, air carriers, airlines, maintenance repair 
organizations, air taxi operators,  single pilot operators, corporate flight 
departments, repair stations, pilot schools, approved training organizations, and 
organizations responsible for type design and/or manufacture of aircraft.” 
The implementation guide “is not mandatory and does not constitute a 
regulation. Development and implementation of an SMS is, therefore, voluntary. 
While the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) encourages each service 
provider to develop and implement an SMS, these systems in no way substitute 
for regulatory compliance or with other certificate requirements”. It is similar in 
scope and format to the international ISO standards and is modelled after the 
safety, quality, and environmental management standards developed by 
organizations such as ISO, the British Standards Institute, Transport Canada, 
Standards Australia, and the International Air Transportation Association 
(IATA). It incorporates requirements of Annex 6, of the conventions of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), requirements of FAA Order VS 
8000.367, Appendix B, and is aligned with ICAO’s SMS definitions. 
The purpose of the guide is to assist service providers in developing and 
implementing an integrated, comprehensive SMS for their entire organization. 
The guide details a four phased process similar to that outlined in the ICAO 
Safety Management Manual (SMM) as outlined in ICAO Document 9859. This 
phased approach is employed by the U.K. Health and Safety Executive (HSE – 
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equivalent to U.S. OSHA) as a safety culture maturity model [Figure 7-1].  
Furthermore, the guide provides a chart of how the implementation levels 
correlate to SMS components and elements [Figure 7-2]. The chart can be 
modified for PRMS implementation simply by replacing the SMS components 
and elements with PRMS components and elements. 
The implementation guide recognizes that complete implementation of SMS at 
a large complex organization may take as long as three years. As the service 
provider completes each implementation level, that level is validated by the 
FAA. And upon successful completion of all levels the service provider receives 
a “Letter of Acknowledgement” verifying their participation in the SMS Pilot 
Project (SMS PP) and their associated accomplishments in the development of 
their SMS. The Letter of Acknowledgement is signed by the FAA, Director of 
Flight Standards Service. 
 
 
Figure 7-1. SMS Implementation Levels 
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SMS Development Chart
Components, Elements and Processes should be completed 
by the indicated Level of Implementation
Implementation 
Level
SMS Framework Expectation 1 2 3
Component 1.0 Safety Policy and Objectives X
Element 1.1 Safety Policy X
Element 1.2 Mgmnt Commitment and Safety Accountabilities (*1) X
Element 1.3 Key Safety Personnel X
Element 1.4 Emergency Preparedness and Response X
Element 1.5 SMS Documentation and Records X
Component 2.0 Safety Risk Management (SRM) (*3) X
Element 2.1 Hazard Identification and Analysis X
Process 2.1.1 System and Task Analysis X
Process 2.1.2 Identify Hazards X
Element 2.2 Risk Assessment and Control X
Process 2.2.1 Analyze Safety Risk X
Process 2.2.2 Assess Safety Risk X
Process 2.2.3 Control/Mitigate Safety Risk X
Component 3.0 Safety Assurance X
Element 3.1 Safety Performance Monitoring and Measurement X
Process 3.1.1 Continuous Monitoring X
Process 3.1.2 Internal Audits by Operational Departments X
Process 3.1.3 Internal Evaluation X
Process 3.1.4 External Auditing of the SMS X
Process 3.1.5 Investigation X
Process 3.1.6 Employee Reporting and Feedback System X
Process 3.1.7 Analysis of Data X
Process 3.1.8 System Assessment X
Process 3.1.9 Preventive/Corrective Action X
Process 3.1.10 Management Review X
Element 3.2 Management of Change (*3) X
Element 3.3 Continual Improvement X
Component 4.0 Safety Promotion X
Element 4.1 Competencies and Training X
Process 4.1.1 Personnel Expectations (Competence) (*2) X
Process 4.1.2 Training X
Element 4.2 Communication and Awareness X
(*1) Level 1 - only comply with expectations 1.2 B) 2) & 3)
(*2) Level 1 - only comply with expectation 4.1.1 B) 1)
(*3) Level 2 - Implementation of 2.0 B) 2) a), b) & d) and 3.2, will be limited in level 2 
by the lack of the system/task analysis process (process 2.1.1)
 
Figure 7-2. SMS Development Chart 
As of December 2013, 94% of major part 121 U.S. airlines have been or are 
participating in the voluntary program [Figure 7-3]. This is as a result of a now 
decade-old regulatory movement to implement SMS with airlines (FAA, 2013). 
With the knowledge that SMS would most likely be regulated at some point, 
airlines generally took the voluntary path so as not to be caught flat-footed when 
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SMS is mandated. On the other hand, repair and overhaul facilities are 
participating at a rate of 0.30%. 
 
Figure 7-3. U.S. Participation of Voluntary SMS Pilot 
AAL – Alaska Region: Appendix D 
ACE – Central Region: Appendix E 
AEA – Eastern Region: Appendix F 
AGL – Great Lakes Region: Appendix G 
ANM – Northwest Mountain Region: Appendix H 
ASO – Southern Region: Appendix I 
ASW – Southwest Region: Appendix J 
AWP – Western Pacific Region: Appendix K 
 
7.2 Final FAA Rule 
The FAA published an SMS NPRM for Part 121 service providers in 2010. 
Since then, the industry returned comments, and after years of iterations and 
revised projected dates for the regulatory mandate, the FAA has set 05/12/2014 
as the new projected date to register its final rule under the Federal Register: 
FAA Safety Management Systems for Part 121 Certificate Holders 
Popular Title: SMS for Part 121 
#
Providers
# 
Participants
#
Providers
# 
Participants
#
Providers
# 
Participants
#
Providers
# 
Participants
#
Providers
# 
Participants
AAL 5 5 4 284 0 48 0 6 0 0
ACE 6 6 4 146 0 322 0 30 1 28
AEA 14 16 17 338 4 1106 0 104 0 8
AGL 15 17 12 252 2 325 2 266 0 8
ANM 7 8 7 252 0 325 0 84 0 38
ASO 18 18 11 304 4 795 1 98 0 19
ASW 6 6 14 217 3 677 0 86 0 36
AWP 12 12 17 333 1 994 1 119 0 13
Total 83 88 86 2126 14 4592 4 793 1 150
Participation
14 CFR Part 142
94.32% 4.05% 0.30% 0.50% 0.67%
U.S.
Region
14 CFR Part 121 14 CFR Part 135 14 CFR Part 145 14 CFR Part 141
Major Airline Carrier
General/Regional/
Charter Carrier
Repair Station
(MR&O)
Flight School Training Center
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RIN 2120-AJ86 
Stage: Final Rule 
Previous Stage: NPRM: Publication Date 11/05/2010; End of Comment Period 
02/03/2011; Extended Comment Period 01/31/2011; End of Extended Comment Period 
03/07/2011. 
Abstract: This rulemaking would require each certificate holder operating under 14 
CFR part 121 to develop and implement a safety management system (SMS) to 
improve the safety of its aviation related activities. A safety management system is a 
comprehensive, process-oriented approach to managing safety throughout an 
organization. An SMS includes an organization-wide safety policy; formal methods for 
identifying hazards, controlling, and continually assessing risk and safety performance; 
and promotion of a safety culture. SMS stresses not only compliance with technical 
standards but increased emphasis on the overall safety performance of the 
organization. This rulemaking is required under P.L. 111-216, sec. 215. 
Effects: 
 Regulatory Flexibility Act 
 Information Collection 
Prompting action: Statute 
Legal Deadline: 
 Final Rule: 07/30/2012 
 NPRM: 10/29/2010 
Rulemaking Project Initiated: 08/01/2010  
Docket Number: FAA-2009-0671 
Dates for Final Rule: 
Milestone Originally  
Scheduled 
Date 
New  
Projected 
Date 
Actual 
Date 
To OST  03/16/2012  03/21/2012  04/12/2012  
Returned to Mode      03/05/2013  
Resubmitted to OST/2   07/12/2013  06/27/2013  
To OMB  04/16/2012  02/05/2014    
OMB Clearance  07/16/2012  05/05/2014    
Publication Date  07/27/2012  05/12/2014    
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Explanation for any delay: Unanticipated issues requiring further analysis 
Federal Register Citation for Final Rule: None 
 
7.3 SMS Manufacturing and MRO Pilot Project 
In 2011 the FAA started an SMS Manufacturing Pilot Project intended to run for 
up to 24 months. It was designed to support the FAA’s ability to respond to the 
ICAO 2013 deadline for implementing SMS rules for manufacturers. The pilot 
project involves production approval holders (including at least two PMA 
holders) working with the FAA on developing SMS programs according to the 
rough guidelines developed by the FAA for purposes of the pilot project. Pratt & 
Whitney supported the pilot project that was the first Part 21 manufacturing pilot 
project in the world (Dickstein, 2011). 
SMS with airlines took years of regulatory NPRMs and industry comments to 
reach its current state. Now the march is towards the other domains of the 
industry, with MROs and maintenance providers close in line.  There are 88 
Part 121 airlines in FAA jurisdiction, and even with a management system that 
is architected for safety – the primary function of airlines – it has taken the 
Federal Government and the FAA a decade to reach the 05/12/2014 final rule. 
There are 4,592 Part 145 service providers under FAA jurisdiction. Given past 
history, it can be anticipated that the FAA will continue to encourage these 
MR&Os, along with manufacturers, suppliers, and so forth to participate in SMS 
on a voluntary basis. Maybe it will take the next ten years for MR&Os to move 
from a participation level of 0.3% to closer to 94.32% - and this would be the 
indicator that this domain has reached the threshold of a mandated “SMS” 
regulation. My research contends, however, that for such levels to be reached, 
the architecture must be domain-specific, it must be production process risk 
driven – not safety risk driven. To be effective it must fit the domain. 
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8.0 Conclusions 
This research concludes that the overarching architectural philosophy, but not 
the specific lower-level details, of SMS can be applied to aircraft production and 
maintenance, as it has been applied to other industries including nuclear, rail 
and chemical. Just as SMS was tailored to these industries, it is has been 
tailored to the airline domain of the aviation industry. Field tests in this research 
attempted to take the airline SMS “as is” and apply it to the aircraft lifecycle at 
large, then to a restricted scope of the lifecycle, and then exclusively to aircraft 
production. It was determined that an unaltered “airline SMS” does not support 
an “aircraft lifecycle SMS”, neither does it support an “aircraft production SMS”. 
However, by modifying the detail level of airline SMS, the architecture is 
adaptable to aircraft production and maintenance operations. The modified 
model that emerges is “PRMS”. 
Aircraft manufacturing and maintenance PRMS may be seen as a “cousin” to 
airline SMS. PRMS predictively and proactively identifies and prioritizes PR 
values for manufacturers and maintainers to mitigate risk within their domains. 
However, external PRMS escapements manifest in the airline environment. In 
such cases PRMS can interface with airline SMS data, even though PRMS and 
airline SMSs are independent systems with different primary focuses. Airline 
SMS is about airline operational safety risks – PRMS is about aircraft 
production and maintenance process risks. 
SMS incorporates many existing airline QMS and ISO 9000/9001 facets, and 
similarly PRMS can be an extension of (or part of depending on implementation 
strategy) aircraft production and maintenance QMSs. PRMS differentiates from 
QMS in that it develops ATA-specific questions that focus on human factors at 
the production or maintenance lines, and applies the results to an ICAO-like 
Risk Assessment Matrix. Given that a manufacturer’s QMS is compatible to 
PRMS, as are airline QMSs and SMSs, the question arises about whether or 
not the investment of transitioning to PRMS architecture is cost effective. Mike 
Gamauf says “a good implementation should provide a systemic way to identify 
risks, and then manage them so as to not reduce the productivity of the 
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organization (Gamauf, 2007). This research suggests a methodology to 
establish the PRMS ROI for manufacturers and maintainers. 
The overarching reason that SMS is not applicable to the manufacturing or 
maintenance domains is that airline SMS is about safety risk, whereas PRMS is 
about process-driven risk. The primary domain functions, and thereby risk types 
are different. As evidenced in field tests the risk management system must be 
appropriately architected. Field tests show that by trying to identify a single-
point-of-risk across all domains, the risk model does not provide adequate risk-
type fidelity to focus on a specific domain. It is too general. However, Field Test 
3 shows that when the risk model is tailored to one domain, risk in that domain 
can be assessed within the context of the ICAO risk management model. 
This research concludes that an “umbrella organization” that meets ICAO’s 
organizationally-wide unified SMS certification proposal is not viable. The term 
“SMS” should be dropped from all domains other than airline operations. 
However the term “risk management” is applicable to all domains - SMS and 
PRMS are subsets of RM. An airplane lifecycle RM model is viable, and the 
manufacturing, airline and maintenance domains of the airplane lifecycle can be 
architected with the four components that SMS uses. Furthermore, each RM 
domain can be tailored to support an ICAO risk tolerability matrix. By taking this 
approach the domains are appropriately adapted to quantify their specific risk 
types, and by using a common tolerability matrix output, interfaces can be 
connected between the domain matrixes. This approach ensures an 
overarching risk management system supports domain-specific enterprises 
[Figure 8-1]. Findings from this research indicate that industry and regulators 
should modify their discussion to address how to connect an aircraft lifecycle 
risk management system via risk ICAO tolerability matrixes, rather than how to 
integrate a lifecycle Safety Management System. 
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Figure 8-1. Airplane Lifecycle Risk Management 
 
Results indicate that the research methodology is effective. By starting with the 
overall aircraft lifecycle, and using iterative field tests to bring the scope into a 
specific domain, the boundary around production (Field Test 3) is established. 
And with SMS arguably proven and  accepted for Part 121 airlines, Field Test 3 
aligns closely with the most current industry and regulatory dialogue that 
increasingly focus on the viability (or non-viability) of SMS in the production and 
maintenance domains. It is recommended that further research address 
development of the four components for an Engineering Risk Management 
System (ERMS), along with its associated Risk Tolerability Matrix. This would 
complete quantification of the airplane lifecycle risk management model using 
SMS-like architecture. 
The most challenging aspect of this research is the dynamic nature of SMS. 
Since this research began, regulators wrote and rewrote the rules as to when 
SMS would be implemented, what SMS entails, and when it should and would 
be mandated as opposed to just recommended as industry practice. The global 
aviation industry is and has responded with various opinions that cover a wide 
spectrum of issues including the technical makeup of SMS, risk management 
 146 
theory, organizational theory, legality of regulatory mandates, liability of an 
implemented SMS, costs burdens and or benefits, data management and 
sharing, implementation, and the redundancy of SMS given the effectiveness of 
existing QMSs within domain infrastructures. All of these areas and more are 
research topics. Staying on track, exclusively to research the viability of SMS 
architecture in aircraft production, became a challenge given the amount of 
tangential subject matters under debate that connect to this study. 
Secondly, introducing Safety Risk Management to a production IPT proved to 
be challenging. With production, safety is typically associated with personnel 
safety such as personal injury that can occur on the shop floor. During Field 
Tests 1 and 2, there was ambiguity when the focus shifted from airplane 
operational safety to the personal safety risk of workers. It was necessary use 
the terms very concisely: Safety in the context of SMS relates to aircraft 
operational safety, safety in the production system relates to personnel safety, 
and PRMS relates to production risk with personnel risk as a supporting PRMS 
function. Until these terms were clearly delineated, there was confusion at all 
levels of staff involvement as to exactly what or how to quantify safety when 
attempting to apply “SMS” to production. Research shows that this confusion of 
what “safety” means, when applying SMS to non-airline domains, is also playing 
out in the aviation industry at large. 
When research began I considered SMS as applicable to all domains of the 
aircraft lifecycle. My thought was that each domain could have an SMS to 
support an integrated airplane lifecycle SMS, and thereby have a one-stop-shop 
to identify aircraft operational safety risk. I anticipated some minor data-type 
modifications to the four SMS components when applied to production – but not 
enough alteration to warrant a paradigm shift in my philosophy. As research 
unfolded it became increasingly clear that to support the various domains the 
primary risk intent has to be revised to be domain specific – to the point where 
the very term “SMS” became a misnomer for aircraft production and 
maintenance. Results indicate that an airplane lifecycle risk management 
system may be connectable through the use of domain-specific ICAO Risk 
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Tolerability matrices – but not via an overarching SMS. In 2008 the FAA 
inspector asked if SMS could be applied to manufacturing operations. This 
research concludes that it cannot be. However, an ICAO-style risk tolerability 
matrix can be developed that is domain-risk specific. The tolerability matrixes, 
not SMS, can be the common denominator across the aircraft lifecycle domains. 
The researcher proposes that further investigation of tolerability matrix 
interfaces take place. 
In 2012 a small pharmaceutical research and development company began to 
develop Process Safety Management (PSM). It is observed that the company 
did not move towards fitting SMS “as-is” into their company, but took elements 
of SMS and tailored it to their business, and in doing so they focussed without 
confusion, on their primary risk factor, i.e. “process” (Goddard, 2012). In the 
same context it is argued by this paper that the application of airline SMS to 
production and maintenance domains is misleading, and management of 
production risk in the “spirit” of SMS should be named and architected for what 
it is, that is Production Risk Management System (PRMS). 
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Appendix A - Joint Planning Development Office 
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Appendix B – Air Transport Association Chapters 
(ATA) 
 
AIRFRAME SYSTEMS 
ATA Number ATA Chapter name 
ATA 20 STANDARD PRACTICES – AIRFRAME 
ATA 21 AIR CONDITIONING AND PRESSURIZATION 
ATA 22 AUTOFLIGHT 
ATA 23 COMMUNICATIONS 
ATA 24 ELECTRICAL POWER 
ATA 25 EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS 
ATA 26 FIRE PROTECTION 
ATA 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS 
ATA 28 FUEL 
ATA 29 HYDRAULIC POWER 
ATA 30 ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION 
ATA 31 INDICATING / RECORDING SYSTEM 
ATA 32 LANDING GEAR 
ATA 33 LIGHTS 
ATA 34 NAVIGATION 
ATA 35 OXYGEN 
ATA 36 PNEUMATIC 
ATA 37 VACUUM 
ATA 38 WATER/WASTE 
ATA 39 ELECTRICAL - ELECTRONIC PANELS AND MULTIPURPOSE COMPONENTS 
ATA 40 MULTISYSTEM 
ATA 41 WATER BALLAST 
ATA 42 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS 
ATA 44 CABIN SYSTEMS 
ATA 45 DIAGNOSTIC AND MAINTENANCE SYSTEM 
ATA 46 INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
ATA 47 NITROGEN GENERATION SYSTEM 
ATA 48 IN FLIGHT FUEL DISPENSING 
ATA 49 AIRBORNE AUXILIARY POWER 
ATA 50 CARGO AND ACCESSORY COMPARTMENTS 
 
STRUCTURE 
ATA Number ATA Chapter name 
ATA 51 STANDARD PRACTICES AND STRUCTURES - GENERAL 
ATA 52 DOORS 
ATA 53 FUSELAGE 
ATA 54 NACELLES/PYLONS 
ATA 55 STABILIZERS 
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ATA 56 WINDOWS 
ATA 57 WINGS 
POWER PLANT 
ATA Number ATA Chapter name 
ATA 61 PROPELLERS 
ATA 71 POWER PLANT 
ATA 72 ENGINE - RECIPROCATING 
ATA 73 ENGINE - FUEL AND CONTROL 
ATA 74 IGNITION 
ATA 75 BLEED AIR 
ATA 76 ENGINE CONTROLS 
ATA 77 ENGINE INDICATING 
ATA 78 EXHAUST 
ATA 79 OIL 
ATA 80 STARTING 
ATA 81 TURBINES (RECIPROCATING ENGINES) 
ATA 82 ENGINE WATER INJECTION 
ATA 83 ACCESSORY GEARBOXES 
ATA 84 PROPULSION AUGMENTATION 
ATA 91 CHARTS 
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Appendix C – Production Culture Assessment 
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1 Production Risk Reporting         
1.1 Existence of a PRMS reporting system x 
  
  
1.2 Confidentiality x x 
 
  
1.3 Existence of a program to inform employees and encourage them to use it x 
  
x 
1.4 Percentage of employees who know about the Production Risk reporting system x 
  
  
1.5 Existence of a process to use results to improve  production risk x 
 
x x 
1.6 Administration separated from the enforcement organization x x 
 
  
1.7 De-identification of reports before dissemination within the organization x x 
 
  
1.8 Use of metrics on organizational response to reports x 
 
x x 
1.9 Frequency of analysis and reporting x 
 
x x 
1.10 Percentage of reports that are responded to within nominal response time x 
  
  
  
    
  
2 Production Risk Organization         
2.1 Existence of a separate organization for  production risk 
 
x x x 
2.2 Published roles and responsibilities 
 
x x x 
2.3 Published  production risk policy 
 
x x x 
2.4 Existence of  production risk plan 
  
x x 
2.5 Regular  production risk updates, and update frequency 
  
x x 
2.6 Performance metrics in safety plan 
  
x x 
2.7 Percentage of employees who know about the PRMS organization 
   
x 
2.8 Assignment of safety staff from within or outside the organization x 
 
x x 
2.9 Percentage of employees who can correctly name their safety point of contact  
   
x 
2.10 
Assignment of production risk aversion  points of contact throughout the organization 
down to the line worker level 
x 
 
x   
  
    
  
3 Training         
3.1 Existence of an ongoing Production Risk training program 
   
x 
3.2 Types of Production Risk training 
  
x x 
3.3 
Percentage of employees  who are up to date on recurring safety / production risk 
training    
x 
3.4 Systemic tracking of safety / production risk within the organization x 
 
x x 
  
    
  
4 Senior Management Involvement         
4.1 
Frequency of senior management presentation in  production risk issues to the 
organization   
x x 
4.2 
Organizational levels of having  personal contact with Senior Management regarding 
safety /    production risk issues    
  
4.3 Inclusion of the Production Risk Manager in the senior management structure 
  
x x 
4.4 Production Risk manager responsibility for or involvement in financial decisions 
  
x x 
4.5 Production risk criteria used for manager selection and evaluation 
  
x   
4.6 Inclusion of a Production Risk manager's responsibilities in job performance reviews 
  
x   
4.7 Staff with degrees or certification in Production risk 
  
x x 
4.8 Staff assessed for role in achieving production risk goals.     x x 
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Appendix D - Alaskan Region (AAL) 
 
 
  
Voluntary SMS Pilot Project Participation
Service Provider
Certificate 
Type 
SMS 
Level
Tatonduk Outfitters LTD 121 2
Peninsula Airways, Inc. 121 3
Northern Air Cargo, Inc. 121 3
Era Aviation, Inc. 121 2
Lynden Air Cargo, LLC 121 3
Coastal Helicopters, Inc. 135 *
Taquan Air 135 1
Temsco Helicopters 135 1
Ryan Air (Arctic Transport Servies, inc 135 *
Northern Air Services 145 *
* Waiting for Level 1 Orientation Meeting
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Appendix E - Central Region (ACE) 
 
 
  
Voluntary SMS Pilot Project Participation
Service Provider
Certificate 
Type 
SMS 
Level
Federal Express Corp. 121 2
GoJet Airlines, LLC 121 2
Endeavor Air 121 2
Trans States Airlines, LLC 121 2
United Parcel Service Co. 121 2
Air Evac EMS, Inc. 135 3
SpiritJets, LLC 135 1
Corporate Flight Management, Inc.
(121 certification in progress)
121 / 135 1
Aviation System Standards FAA 135 *
EagleMed, LLC 135 2
Flight Safety International 142 2
* Waiting for Level 1 Orientation Meeting
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Appendix F - Eastern Region (AEA) 
 
 
Voluntary SMS Pilot Project Participation
Service Provider
Certificate 
Type 
SMS 
Level
CHAMPLAIN ENTERPRISES INC dba CommutAir 121 3
PIEDMONT AIRLINES INC 121 2
ATLAS AIR INC 121 *
BALTIA AIRLINES INC. 121 1
POLAR AIR CARGO WORLDWIDE INC 121 *
US AIRWAYS INC 121 4
COMPASS AIRLINES LLC 121 1
DYNAMIC AIRWAYS LLC 121 1
JETBLUE AIRWAYS, CORP. 121 1
ATLANTIC COAST AIRCRAFT SERVICES 121 1
SOUTHERN AIR INC 121 1
HYANNIS AIR SERVICE 121 1
MOUNTAIN AIR CARGO INC 121 1
SKYLEASE 1, INC. 121 2
Arcadia Aviation 135 1
Alpha flying/ Cobalt Air LLC 135 1
Aviation Services Unlimited 135 *
Charter Flight Inc. 135 2
Corporate Air, LLC 135 *
Hanger 6 FAA Flight Program 135 1
Flight Options 135 2
GAMA Charters Inc. 135 2
KEY AIR LLC 135 1
Keystone Med-Flight 135 1
Metropolitan Aviation LLC 135 1
North American Air Charter 135 1
Projet 135 1
Renaissance Jet, Inc. 135 1
STAT MedEvac 135 1
USAC Airways 135 1
TISMA 135 1
BombardierWest Virginia Air Center 145 1
KCI Aviation 145 1
Pratt & Whitney 145 1
Uniflight, LLC 145 1
* Waiting for Level 1 Orientation Meeting
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Appendix G - Great Lakes Region (AGL) 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary SMS Pilot Project Participation
Service Provider
Certificate 
Type 
SMS 
Level
PSA AIRLINES INC 121 4
CHAUTAUQUA AIRLINES INC 121 2
FRONTIER AIRLINES INC 121 2
REPUBLIC AIRLINES INC 121 2
SHUTTLE AMERICA CORP 121 2
MN AIRLINES LLC (Sun Country) 121 2
GULF AND CARIBBEAN CARGO INC 121 2
KALITTA AIR LLC 121 2
ABX AIR, INC 121 2
USA JET AIRLINES, INC 121 1
AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION 121 2
UNITED AIRLINES, INC 121 121 4
RYAN INTL. AIRLINES, INC. 121 1
RHOADES AVIATION, INC 121 1
BALTIA AIRLINES, INC (new certification) 121 1
Airnet System Inc. 135 *
Aitheras Aviation LLC 135 *
Executive Air Taxi 135 1
Executive Jet Management, Inc. 135 3
First Wing Aircraft Charter & Mgmt 135 *
Mercy St. Vincent 135 1
Midwest Aero Club, LLC
dba Best Jets International, Inc.
135 2
NetJets Aviation, Inc 135 4
Oak Air, LTD. 135 *
Priester Aviation 135 1
Travel Management Co LTD. 135 1
Ultimate Jet Charters Inc. 135 1
Bowling Green State University 141 1
University of North Dakota JDO School of Aviation 141 2
Executive Jet Management, Inc. 145 145 2
University of North Dakota JDO School of Aviation 145 1
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Appendix H - Northwest Mountain Region (ANM) 
 
 
  
Voluntary SMS Pilot Project Participation
Service Provider
Certificate 
Type 
SMS 
Level
Alaska Airlines, Inc. 121 3
Horizon Air Industries, Inc. 121 3
Skywest Airlines, Inc. 121 2
Evergreen Intl. Airlines, Inc. 121 2
Great Lakes Aviation LTD 121 2
Empire Airlines, Inc. 121 1
Key Lime Air (121 certification in progress) 135/121 1
Air Methods HEMS 135 4
Alpine Air Cargo 135 1
Executive Flight 135 1
Global Aviation Inc. 135 1
Kenmore Air Harbor, Inc. 135 1
Premier Jets Inc. 135 2
Wings of Alaska 135 1
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Appendix I - Southern Region (ASO) 
 
 
Voluntary SMS Pilot Project Participation
Service Provider
Certificate 
Type 
SMS 
Level
Delta Air Lines, Inc. 121 4
Miami Air International, Inc. 121 4
Falcon Air Express, Inc. 121 1
World Airways, Inc. 121 1
Seaborne Virgin Island, Inc. 121 1
Express Jet Airlines, Inc. 121 3
AmeriJet International, Inc. 121 1
North American Airlines 121 2
Sky King, Inc. 121 1
Florida West International Airways, Inc. 121 1
Centurion Air Cargo, Incl 121 2
Carribbean Sun Airlines, Inc. 121 1
Aerodynamics, Inc. 121 1
Spirit Airlines, Inc. 121 2
Western Global Airlines 121 2
Orange Air, LLC (new certification) 121 1
National Air Cargo Group, Inc. 121 2
Silver Airways Corporation 121 1
Aviator Services 135 *
Avantair, Inc. 135 *
Presidential Aviation 135 1
Professional Flight Transportation, Inc.
(Windsor Jet Management)
135 1
Executive Air Services, Inc. 135 1
Florida Jet Service, Inc. 135 *
Airgate Aviation, Inc. 135 *
Sky Limo Corporation 135 *
Skylink Jets, Inc. 135 *
Execuflight, Inc. 135 *
AAR Airlift Group, Inc. 135 *
Aviator College 141 *
F & E Aircraft Maintenance 145 2
AAR Aircraft Services, Inc. 145 1
Propulsion Tech 145 1
Precision Turbines, Inc. 145 *
* Waiting for Level 1 Orientation Meeting
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Appendix J - Southwest Region (ASW) 
 
 
  
Voluntary SMS Pilot Project Participation
Service Provider
Certificate 
Type 
SMS 
Level
American Airlines 121 4
Southwest Airlines 121 *
American Eagle 121 3
Air Transport Inter. 121 1
Omni Inter. 121 1
Ameristar Air Cargo 121 1
Berry Aviation 135 2
Omniflight Hel. 135 2
Jet Solutions/Flexjet 135 2
PHI 135 3
7-Bar Flying Service 135 1
C and S Aviation Ltd. 135 In que
Flying A Service 135 1
Mountain Aviation Enterprises 135 1
ERA Helicopters 135 1
Metro Aviation, Inc 135 3
Flying A Flight Service 135 In que
Flight Concepts, Inc. 135 In que
Chevron USA Prod 135 1
Memorial Hermann Life Flight 135 1
A/C Ducting Repair 145 1
ST Aerospace 145 1
Metro Aviation, Inc. 145 1
* Waiting for Level 1 Orientation Meeting
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Appendix K - Western Pacific Region (AWP) 
 
 
 
Voluntary SMS Pilot Project Participation
Service Provider
Certificate 
Type 
SMS 
Level
Aeko Kula Inc. 121 2
Aero Micronesia Inc. 121 1
Allegiant Air LLC 121 1
Hawaii Island Air Inc. 121 1
Hawaiian Airlines Inc. 121 3
Kaiserair Inc. 121 1
Mesa Airlines Inc. 121 2
Sierra Pacific Airlines Inc. 121 1
Swift Air LLC 121 1
TEM Enterprises Inc. 121 1
Virgin America Inc. 121 2
Vision Airlines Inc. 121/135 1
Aero Jet Services LLC 135 1
Arctic Air Services, Inc. 135 *
Aviation Concepts, Inc. 135 *
Blue Hawaiian 135 2
Dreamline Aviation LLC 135 *
Jack Harper 135 1
K&S Helicopters 135 1
Makani Kai Helicopters 135 1
Med-Trans Corporation 135 1
Pinnacle Air Charter 135 1
Reach Air Medical Service 135 1
Rogers Helicopters 135 1
Schubach Aviation (Tango Air Inc.) 135 1
Solairus Aviation 135 *
Superior Air Charter (JetSuite) 135 *
West Air, Inc 135 1
XO Jet 135 1
Able Engineering 145 1
Bombardier Tucson Air Center 145 1
Transpac Aviation Academy 141 1
* Waiting for Level 1 Orientation Meeting
